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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters around two related questions: (1) what are the de-
terminants of the decision to work?, and (2) what are the (unintended) eﬀects of policies
stimulating labor market participation? The ﬁrst two chapters tackle the second question
in the empirical setting of the Mini-Job reform in Germany, which expanded substantially
the in-work beneﬁts, or tax advantages for low-earning workers. The third chapter, dealing
with the ﬁrst question, focuses on the transmission of employment behavior and preferences
for work across generations.
The ﬁrst chapter analyzes how ﬁrms respond to changes in tax beneﬁts for low-earning
workers and how, through equilibrium eﬀects, such policies also aﬀect non-targeted, high-
earning workers. Combining theoretical and empirical analysis, I document the presence
of both job creation and substitution underlying ﬁrm responses induced by the Mini-Job
Reform. In particular, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a high pre-reform use of low-earning workers
increase the demand for workers with better earnings, an important result.
The second essay provides an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of the same reform on earnings
and employment prospects of targeted workers. The ﬁndings question the role of in-work
beneﬁts as an antipoverty policy since they do not improve earnings of targeted workers.
However, they also show that these beneﬁts provide opportunities for jobless individuals to
smoothly transit to better paid employment.
Finally, in the third chapter, joint with Lukas Mayr and David Koll, we analyze how employ-
ment status and attitudes towards work are related across generations. Using data for the
US, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive correlation between the employment status of mothers and
children, after controlling for productivity and other observable factors. We interpret this
ﬁnding as evidence of transmission of preferences for work. We show that the correlation
i
is unlikely to be driven by networks, transmission of speciﬁc human capital or local labor
markets' conditions, and we provide suggestive evidence for a role model channel.
ii
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Chapter 1
Labor demand responses to labor supply
incentives: Evidence from the German
Mini-Job reform
1.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, tax beneﬁts for workers with low earnings have become a popular
policy in many developed countries. These in-work beneﬁts aim to provide incentives to work
for individuals with low earning capacity, and to promote their self-suﬃciency. There are
numerous studies showing the eﬀectiveness of these policies for expanding the labor supply
of targeted groups.1 This paper contributes to a much scarcer literature on demand-side and
equilibrium eﬀects of tax beneﬁts for low-earning workers.
A series of recent studies for the UK (Azmat, 2014), US (Leigh, 2010; Rothstein, 2010) and
Germany (Galassi, 2016) have documented that, when tax beneﬁts are expanded, ﬁrms share
the beneﬁt because the before-tax wages of these workers decline.2 My paper draws on this
insight and investigates the response of ﬁrms to in-work beneﬁts in terms of demand for
both low-earning and high-earning workers. I argue that changes in labor demand induce
spillovers from the labor of workers who are explicitly targeted by the policy, to the labor
1The eﬀectiveness of tax credit programs on labor supply is documented in Eissa and Liebman (1996),
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), Saez (2002), Eissa and Hoynes (2004), Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2013) for
the US, Blundell et al. (2016), Blundell and Shephard (2011), Blundell (2006), Blundell (2000) and Blundell
et al. (2000a) for UK, and Blundell and Hoynes (2004) for a comparison. The eﬀectiveness of tax credits as
redistributive policies is analyzed in Hoynes and Patel (2015).
2Tax shifting from the worker to the employer is a natural consequence of the expansion of the labor
supply of workers with low earning capacity, as intended by the policy, and it depends on the sensitivity of
labor demand for these workers (Eissa and Nichols, 2005).
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of workers not targeted by the policy. When low-earning and high-earning workers diﬀer in
characteristics relevant for the production of goods and services (such as hours worked or
skills), they are imperfect substitutes through the lenses of ﬁrms. Hence, a change in the
pre-tax wage of low-earning workers provides incentives for ﬁrms to react to both the lower
cost in this segment of the labor market, as well as the relative change in the cost of diﬀerent
types of labor.
Empirical evidence on ﬁrm responses to in-work beneﬁts is provided by exploiting the Mini-
Job reform in Germany in 2003, which led to a signiﬁcant expansion of tax beneﬁts for low-
earning workers. Since the reform, workers in the so-called mini-jobs, with gross monthly
earnings below e400, are exempt from Social Security Contributions (SSC) and income tax,
and workers in midi-jobs (between e400 and e800) have a subsidized SSC rate. Mini
and midi-jobbers are known in the literature and policy discourse as marginal workers.
Workers whose earnings are above this threshold are considered in regular employment and
are subject to full taxation. The Mini-Job reform led to a large increase in the number of
mini-jobs, from approximately 4 million in 2002 to 7 million in 2004. The Mini-Job program
in Germany is therefore comparable, in terms of coverage, to the well-known Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) in the US.
I use a simple theoretical framework of the ﬁrm's decision on the use of heterogeneous labor
to derive some testable implications. When low-earning (unskilled or part-time) and high-
earning (skilled or full-time) workers are imperfect substitutes, the upward shift in the labor
supply of low-earning workers after and expansion of in-work beneﬁts leads to a reduction in
the pre-tax wage of these workers relative to the wage of high-earning workers. The reaction
of the ﬁrm which combines both these types of workers can thus be decomposed in terms
of a scale eﬀect (resulting from lower labor costs) and a substitution eﬀect (resulting from
changes in the relative cost of diﬀerent types of jobs). While the scale eﬀect induces an
increase in the demand for both low-earning and high-earning labor, the substitution eﬀect
leads to a replacement of high-earning jobs with low-earning jobs. Furthermore, the scale
eﬀect is strong if a ﬁrm has a high ex-ante intensity (or cost-share) of low-earning workers,
and the substitution eﬀect dominates if the intensity is low.
I document the presence of both scale and substitution eﬀects using a panel of German
establishments between 2000 and 2007, matched to administrative data of workers. The
signiﬁcant expansion of tax beneﬁts with the introduction of the Mini-Job reform allows
to apply a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy, in which I exploit the variation in the pre-
reform intensity in low-earning workers across establishments. According to the model, this
variation determines the heterogeneity in the strength of the scale and substitution eﬀects
in response to changes in in-work beneﬁts. The main identifying assumption is that in the
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absence of the reform ﬁrm level outcomes, such as total employment or employment type,
would have grown at the same pace in both high-intensity and low-intensity establishments
(the so-called parallel trends assumption).3 I verify that this is indeed the case for the
years preceding the reform.
My estimates show that after the reform, (i) high-intensity establishments denote a larger
increase in the use of high-earning workers than low-intensity establishments, (ii) the increase
in employment of low-earning workers is smaller in high-intensity establishments than in low-
intensity establishments, and (iii) total employment, in terms of both workers and hours,
grows more in high-intensity establishments than in low-intensity establishments. One of
the key implications of my model is that this pattern can only emerge when both scale
and substitution eﬀects occur simultaneously. Intuitively, ﬁrms that exhibited a higher
intensity in low-earning workers ex-ante experience a stronger reduction in labor costs and
thus manifest a stronger scale eﬀect. On the other hand, low-intensity ﬁrms have a stronger
incentive to substitute towards low-earning jobs because a larger fraction of their workforce
is now relatively expensive.
Overall, the theoretical framework and the empirical results suggest that there is a slight
convergence between high-intensity establishments (which grow relatively more and demand
relatively more high-earning workers) and low-intensity establishments (which demand rela-
tively more low-earning workers). This convergence across establishments is observed in the
data.
To understand how ﬁrms change the demand for labor consistent with the previous observa-
tions, I analyze relative changes in the labor force composition within establishments. The
relative expansion in high-earning workers of high-intensity establishments is driven by an
increase in hours per worker (i.e., there are more full-time and less part-time workers), and
by a change in the education level of workers (i.e., there are less low educated and more
medium educated workers). The change in the educational composition of the workforce
takes place in parallel with a larger increase in investment in physical capital (which has
a higher complementarity with skilled labor) in high-intensity establishments than in low-
intensity establishments. I also provide evidence of a relative change in tasks within estab-
lishments: high-intensity establishments tend to shift towards more complex tasks, whereas
low-intensity establishments lean towards tasks with lower complexity. Finally, the results
also suggest that high-intensity establishments upgrade earnings of incumbent workers and
hire disproportionately more workers with high earnings. Multiple alternative speciﬁcations
3Throughout the remainder, I will use the expression high-intensity establishments for establishments
with a relatively high intensity of low-earning workers prior to the reform, and low-intensity establishments
for establishments with a relatively low intensity of low-earning workers prior to the reform.
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that include ﬁrm-speciﬁc trends, lagged dependent variables, and diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the
intensity in low-earning workers support the robustness of these results.
The mechanism explored in this paper relies on two key assumptions, namely the expansion of
the labor supply in the low-earning segment, and the imperfect substitutability between low-
earning and high-earning workers. The paper also provides additional evidence to support
these assumptions. First, I document that women and workers previously not participating
in the labor market represent a substantial part of mini-jobbers, indicating an important
role of the tax incentives in activating secondary workers. There is also an expansion of
the proportion of workers taking up secondary jobs, which is related to the legal change
brought by the reform regarding their tax exempt status if complying with the mini-job
earnings threshold. All of these facts support the idea that the Mini-Job reform lead to an
increase in the supply in the low-earning segment of the labor market. I also show that
marginal and regular workers indeed diﬀer along several dimensions that are crucial for the
substitutability between these workers. For some low complexity occupations, substitution
between high-earning and low-earning workers seems relatively easy to implement (e.g. by
splitting full-time into part-time jobs), whereas for other occupations, the high-earning and
low-earning workers appear to be closer to complements.
Finally, I use a parameterized version of the model that is consistent with my empirical
results to shed light on the potential eﬀects of the reform on overall employment and output.
The main insights from this exercise is that total employment might increase as the decline in
high-earning employment does not completely oﬀset the increase in low-earning employment,
and that, apart from the reallocation of high-earning employment from low-intensity to
high-intensity establishments, the reform also lead to a reallocation of production from low-
intensity to high-intensity establishments.
The ongoing political controversy over the Mini-Job reform, which has remained under
scrutiny within Germany and other countries considering similar reforms, illustrates the
policy relevance of my paper. Pundits and policy makers in Germany have attributed ob-
served increases in labor precariousness to the Mini-Job reform. It is argued that the program
mainly favoured ﬁrms who substituted high-earning occupations with low-cost workers, in-
creasing precariousness of employment. At the same time, the strength of the German labor
market over the last decade has led others to stress that the program may result in beneﬁcial
job creation.4 I provide evidence for both eﬀects, in particular for an unexpected eﬀect on
4As opposed to the consensus about the positive eﬀect on employment of the EITC (see e.g. the discussion
by Hilary Hoynes in 2014 in Building on the success of the Earned Income Tax Credit), there is no apparent
agreement about the employment eﬀect of the Mini-Job design. Examples of negative opinions include Fur
eine hand voll euro (Spiegel, 2004) or The dark side of Germany's job miracle (Reuters, 2012). Positive
views include for instance Putting Germany's mini-jobs in their context (El Pais, 2015), Our jobs market is
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the employment of high-earning workers that were not targeted by the policy. More gen-
erally, my results show that the design of policies focusing on low-earning workers should
take into account the labor demand response to such interventions, and the spillovers on the
high-earning segment of the labor market.
Related literature
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. A large body of research
documents the eﬀects of tax beneﬁts for low-earning workers on labor supply. In the case
of the German Mini-Job reform, several papers suggest that it induced an increase in labor
supply by encouraging secondary workers (e.g. married women) to participate in the labor
market, and regular workers to take up marginal employment as a second job (Carrillo-Tudela
et al., 2015; Caliendo and Wrohlich, 2010; Bargain et al., 2010; Fertig and Kluve, 2006; Freier
and Steiner, 2008; Steiner and Wrohlich, 2005). My paper builds on the documented shift
in labor supply to understand how ﬁrms respond to the consequent changes in wages of
diﬀerent types of workers.
In the spirit of some recent studies, my paper deals with labor demand responses to in-work
beneﬁts. The closest paper is Tazhitdinova (2018), which analyzes ﬁrms' role in magnifying
the labor supply responses to the Mini-Job design, as estimated using the bunching at the
tax kinks and notches. The mechanism is similar to Chetty et al. (2011) for Denmark.
Firms disproportionately create employment at workers' tax discontinuities because tax-
advantaged workers are more attractive for ﬁrms than workers slightly above the threshold
due to a defacto higher ﬂexibility.5 Gudgeon and Trenkle (2017) use bunching estimators to
analyze sluggish adjustment of workers from lower to higher earning thresholds in the context
of the German Mini-Job reform. They show that ﬁrms with higher employment dynamics
before the reform ﬁnd it easier to adjust workers' earnings. In a diﬀerent setting, Shephard
(2016) analyzes the introduction of the WFTC in the UK, documenting spillovers from the
demand for eligible workers to the demand for similar non-eligible workers which arise in the
presence of labor market frictions, following the introduction of the WFTC in UK.6 All of
broken - and Germany may have the answer (The Telegraph, 2012). Apart from concerns about employment
eﬀects, political economy arguments may be contributing to the diﬀerent opinion about the Mini-Job reform
with respect to other in-work beneﬁts, as reﬂected by the article by Krebs and Schaﬀer German labour
reforms: Unpopular success which puts on the table a political economy argument behind the unpopularity
of the Hartz reforms: the existence of a very concise group of losers, i.e. the long-term unemployed, more
aﬀected by the Hartz IV reform not analyzed in this paper.
5A similar result is documented by Haywood and Neumann (2017), and the mechanism is theoretically
explored in Kolm and Tonin (2011).
6In the case of the WFTC and the EITC, workers' entitlements vary according to household structure,
i.e. they are diﬀerent across workers who compete within a unique labor market. This is not the case in
the Mini-Job design, in which beneﬁts directly depend on earnings and not on other traits of workers. The
mechanism at work in the setting of the WFTC and the EITC is similar in spirit to Beaudry et al. (2014).
A wage shock for a particular group of workers aﬀects employment of other workers within the same labor
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these studies provide evidence that ﬁrms' incentives are aﬀected by tax beneﬁts awarded to
workers, which is crucial to the idea conveyed in my paper. However, the eﬀects considered by
these studies are conﬁned to workers who compete in the same labor market and are perfect
substitutes in the eyes of a ﬁrm. In contrast, I provide evidence for a diﬀerent type of response
by ﬁrms, which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been considered in the literature so
far. I investigate the eﬀects on the demand for both low-earning and high-earning workers,
although the latter are not directly targeted by the reform. I show that a labor supply shock
to low-earning workers induces a spillover to high-earning employment via ﬁrms' incentives to
respond to the changes in relative wages. This evidence complements the documented eﬀects
on labor demand within the low-earning segment. The mechanisms at play in this analysis
involve imperfect substitutability among production inputs, and imperfect elasticity of labor
demand. See e.g. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for an extensive review over the vast literature
on technological change which has dealt with input substitutability, and Hamermesh (1986)
for a discussion of the elasticity of labor demand.
Eﬀects of the Mini-Job reform connected to the labor demand have also been explored with
a more structural approach. Jacobi and Schaﬀner (2008) estimate the labor demand for
heterogeneous labor using a ﬂexible cost function framework in Germany, and documents no
changes in the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor after the Mini-
Job reform. Also relying on parameter instability, Bradley and Kuegler (2017) assess the
eﬀects of the Hartz reforms on employment and wage levels, by estimating a structural model
of the labor market featuring search frictions and heterogenous workers and ﬁrms. The main
diﬀerence of my paper is that I propose a mechanism of labor demand response which relies
on changes in relative wages and does not need time variation in structural parameters. This
mechanism is conﬁrmed by reduced form results using ﬁrm-level data.
My paper also contributes to the literature studying displacement eﬀects of labor market
policies, which has focused mainly on job seeker assistance. A paradigmatic example is
Crepon et al. (2013), which uses a two-step randomized program of job-seeker assistance in
France to compare the outcomes of untreated workers in treated and untreated areas.7 The
authors document that the positive impact on the job ﬁnding probability of a treated worker
is partially outweighed by a negative impact for untreated job seekers in treated areas. More
generally, the literature on displacement eﬀects of labor market programs focuses on treated
and untreated workers who compete for the same jobs, similar in nature to the studies on
labor demand and in-work beneﬁts. Instead, the mechanism that I investigate in this paper
relies on substitution between low-earning and high-earning workers who operate in diﬀerent
market due to the presence of frictions.
7The double randomized design of Crepon et al. (2013) is superior to the non-experimental designs in
previous papers (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2004; Ferracci et al., 2010; Pallais, 2014; Gautier et al., 2015).
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labor markets.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the growing literature on responses of labor demand
to labor market policies (Harasztosi and Lindner, 2017; Cahuc et al., 2018; Garcia Perez and
Rebollo Sanz, 2009). This strand of the literature examines labor demand policies (such as
minimum wage, wage subsidies or hiring credits), as opposed to the policy examined here,
where the beneﬁt is provided to workers. The empirical strategy based on ﬁrm-level data
in this paper relies partially on the approach used by Harasztosi and Lindner (2017) and
Cahuc et al. (2018).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides details on the institutional
context of the Mini-Job reform and describes the data sources used in the analysis. Section
3 presents descriptive evidence, and section 4 introduces the theoretical framework. Section
5 discusses the empirical strategy, and section 6 provides the results. Section 7 uses a
parameterized version of the theoretical model to argue about the potential implications for
overall employment and output, and section 8 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Context of the Mini-Job Reform and
Data
This section discusses the institutional background of the Mini-Job reform. Next, it presents
details about the data used in this paper.
1.2.1 Institutional context
The Mini-Job reform was part of a wider set of policies, the so-called Hartz reforms, which
were gradually implemented between 2003 and 2005. The explicitly stated objective was to
simultaneously reduce unemployment and increase competitiveness.
In this paper I focus on Hartz II or Mini-Job reform, one of the most controversial components
of the Hartz reforms. Introduced in April 2003, it expanded the exemptions in social security
contributions (SSC) and income tax for workers with low earnings.8 Mini-jobs did already
exist in Germany before the reform, but they were restricted to employment with a maximum
of 15 hours a week and gross monthly earnings of e325, provided it was the only source of
income for the worker.9 Mini-jobbers were exempted from income tax and from the SSC,
8It is common to refer to the employment with tax advantages as marginal, as opposed to regular
employment, which is subject to full taxation.
9Mini-jobs as low-paid employment without SSC for employees existed in Germany with diﬀerent labels
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which amounted to 21% of gross earnings for regular employment, while employers paid 22%
tax on gross wages, slightly above the 21% employer rate on regular jobs. If gross monthly
earnings surpassed the e325 limit, the entire amount of earnings was subject to the 21%
rate of SSC for each the employer and the employee, and to the income tax.
After the reform, the earnings limit was extended to e400 and the hours limit was eliminated.
Employers' SSC rate increased to 25%.10 A phase out category was introduced for monthly
gross earnings between e400 and e800, so-called midi-jobs, for which SSC increase linearly
for the worker while employers are subject to the regular 21% rate, and for which the regular
income tax applies. Secondary jobs with a diﬀerent employer than in the main job were
allowed to qualify as mini or midi-jobs if they were complying with the earnings limits for
this particular job, irrespective of total earnings.11
The following example aims at clarifying the importance of the implicit subsidy of the Mini-
Job reform: a single worker whose gross monthly earnings are e400 receives the full amount
in net terms after the reform, in contrast to e316 (after paying SSC) before the reform.
Ceteris paribus, this implies a subsidy of slightly above e1,000 per year. The subsidy is
even larger if the worker was subject to income tax before the reform.12 While the e400
threshold might seem low for a worker, the wage mini-jobbers receive is not unusual: mini-
jobbers usually work around 15 hours a week, which yields an hourly wage of e7 for it to be
compatible with the earnings limit of e400 (see Table (2.21) in the Appendix). The average
hourly wage of mini-jobbers is thus similar to the after-tax hourly wage of full-time regular
workers, even without controlling for education or other productivity characteristics.13
After the reform, the number of workers holding a mini-job surged, from approximately 13%
of private wage-employment in the years before to 19% after, though the increase is more
modest for workers with mini-job as main employment (15.5%), as shown in Figure (1.1).
since the introduction of the welfare state in the late XIX century (Schiller, 2016). In 1999 a reform attempted
to bring them into the social security system and limit their scope. The hours limit was introduced, and it
was further required that earnings from all jobs were considered before determining eligibility. Only if total
earnings and hours were below the cutoﬀs, the worker was eligible for the tax beneﬁt.
10A further raise to 30% in employers' rate of SSC on mini-jobs was introduced in July 1, 2006, simulta-
neously with a decrease in the workers' and employers' rate for regular jobs to 19.5%.
11See Table (1.A1) for the evolution of SSC rates. A special mini-job regime applies for private households.
They however represent a very small amount of mini-jobbers (1.5% in 2004).
12The income tax exemption is relevant for mini-jobbers only if they hold a main regular job that surpasses
a limit of non-taxable income (between e7,235 and e7,664 in the years around the reform) or if the spouse's
earnings are such that jointly they surpass twice this amount. This is not the case for a single mini-jobbers,
whose annual earnings are as much as e4,800. There was a Tax Reform in 2003-2004 which raised the
minimum exempt and the progressivity in the income tax, but the changes were substantially small as
compared with the modiﬁcations in the Mini-Job design.
13Controlling for observed characteristics (education, square polynomial of age and tenure, and part-time
status) and unobserved time invariant heterogeneity, the penalty of mini-jobs in terms of daily wages is 6%,
according to social security records.
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Figure 1.1: Proportion of marginal workers out of total employment
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Including midi-jobs, marginal employment aﬀects more than 20% of workers in the private
sector. The proportion of workers with a tax-advantaged job hence is comparable to the
incidence of EITC in the US, and doubles the number of workers with temporary contracts
in Germany.
The distribution of earnings is aﬀected by the mini-job design, as shown in Figure (2.21). In
particular, there is a strong spike at the mini-job threshold, at e325 before the reform and
e400 after the reform. The additional spike at the e165 level reﬂects an earnings disregard
for the unemployment insurance, a feature that did not change with the reform. The change
in the location of the spike happens the year of the reform, 2003, which rules out signiﬁcant
anticipation eﬀects (see Figure (1.B2) in the Appendix).14
Marginal workers are entitled to most of the beneﬁts of regular employees in Germany,
including holidays, paid sickness days, employment protection against dismissal and parental
leave. They do not have full pension entitlement though, but they can opt to contribute to
the pension insurance system voluntarily.15 Employers only pay insurance for work-related
14The Mini-Job Reform was announced, jointly with the other Hartz reforms, during the discussion of
Chancellor Schroeder's 2010 Agenda on March 14, 2003. Stock prices reacted strongly to this announcement,
indicating that agents were not anticipating the reform (German recovery: it's the supply side, VoxEU
column by Michael Burda).
15Employers pay 15% on gross earnings to the pension system for mini-jobbers, which implies a diﬀerence
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Figure 1.2: Gross monthly earnings in 2002 (before the reform) and 2004 (after the reform)
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Source: SIAB, annual data, main spell, gross monthly earnings computed from daily wages.
accidents for mini-jobbers, and they do not automatically provide health insurance. However,
it is common that mini-jobbers have access to health insurance through their family members.
It is worth clarifying that at the time of the reform, Germany was undergoing a recession
which had started at the beginning of 2000. The turning point in terms of labor market
indicators coincides with the Hartz reforms, in particular the Hartz IV, which curtailed
unemployment beneﬁt and assistance entitlement for long-term unemployed workers. As this
reform also aﬀected incentives of low-earning workers, a natural concern is that it confounds
eﬀects of the Mini-Job reform. I argue that it is unlikely that conclusions drawn in this paper
about the eﬀects of in-work beneﬁts that are aﬀected by this additional reform. First, Hartz
IV was introduced in 2005, two years after the Mini-Job Reform, while my empirical results
show that the eﬀects of the Mini-Job reform could already be noticed in 2003. Second, to
the extent that the introduction of Hartz IV aﬀected labor supply incentives by curtailing
unemployment assistance, the reform should be seen as a complementary measure to the
in-work beneﬁts generated by the Mini-Job reform (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009).16
of 4.9 pp. with respect to the 19.9% contribution in regular employment. Only 3% of mini-jobbers contribute
voluntarily paying this diﬀerence to gain full-pension entitlement (Guardiancich, 2010).
16Unemployment insurance and assistance were approximately e700 at the time of the reform. Beneﬁts
for long-term unemployed in Germany were much more generous than in the rest of the OECD countries
before Hartz IV (see e.g. Engbom et al., 2015).
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The remainder of the Hartz reforms were related to diﬀerent aspects of the labor market,
with little reason to believe that their introduction could confound the eﬀects of the Mini-Job
reform. Hartz I (introduced in January 1, 2003) included active labor market policies and
obligations for job seekers to keep unemployment insurance, and extended the potential for
temporary employment.17 Hartz III (January 1, 2004) focused on improving the eﬃciency
of the Public Employment Agency. Hartz II (the Mini-Job reform) also included the cre-
ation of a centralized oﬃce to simplify administrative tasks regarding marginal employment
(Minijob-Zentrale) and the introduction of subsidies for entrepreneurs coming from unem-
ployment. Intuitively, all of these labor market policies aﬀected the German labor market
without a clear focus on the bottom of the earnings distribution, as it is indeed the case with
the Mini-Job reform.
Another relevant factor is the incorporation of several Eastern European countries to the
European Union in 2004. Given the free movement of people, this may have induced entry of
low-skilled workers into Germany. However, the eﬀects could only be seen since 2004, with
a reasonable lag due to lagged eﬀects on migration. Since I already note eﬀects in 2003, this
event is unlikely aﬀecting the conclusions.
To sum up, I argue that the Mini-Job reform acted as the main activation measure for low-
earning workers, in particular in a small horizon around the implementation of the reform.
This is a relevant observation to interpret the results observed on labor demand as a result
of the expansion of tax beneﬁts for low-earning workers.
1.2.2 Data
My empirical analysis is based on linked employer-employee data provided by the Institute
for Employment Research of the German Federal Employment Agency (IAB). These data
are available through on-site visits and remote access provided by the Research Data Centre
(FDZ) of the IAB. The ﬁrm-level analysis draws on the so-called Linked Employer-Employee
(LIAB) data, Cross-Sectional Model 1993-2010. Assembled by the FDZ / IAB, it combines
administrative social security data on individuals from the Integrated Employment Biogra-
phies (IEB) with establishment data from both the Establishment History Panel (BHP) and
the IAB Establishment Panel through a unique establishment identiﬁer. The main advan-
tage of the LIAB is that it allows to follow establishments in time, providing individual
17Many aspects of temporary work were deregulated by the Hartz reforms. Although an important group
of temporary workers are in the low-earning segment, the limited scope of temporary work compared to
mini and midi-jobs (approximately 7.5% of workers in ﬁxed-term contracts and 2.5% in temporary agency
work) and the lack of change around the Mini-Job reform (see e.g. Eichhorst and Tobsch, 2014) potentially
dissipate doubts about the possibility to act as confounders.
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information about their employees.18 Further details are available in Heining et al. (2013)
and Heining et al. (2014).
The IAB Establishment Panel, available for West Germany since 1993 and for East Germany
since 1996, consists of an annual survey (on June 30th each year) on a representative sample
of approximately 16,000 establishments. There are periodical refreshments for establishment
death and birth. The sampling design is stratiﬁed by establishment size, industry and federal
state, it over-samples large establishments, and it excludes unipersonal and informal ﬁrms.
Diﬀerent longitudinal sections are constructed by the IAB. The longitudinal sections follow
establishments that respond every year and account for establishment death and birth. In-
ference about the population of establishments requires the use of weights constructed by
the IAB to correct for the disproportionate sampling design. The information on establish-
ments includes a wide range of subjects related to the establishments' employment and some
elements of their balance sheets, such as investment and business volume.
For the LIAB Cross-Sectional Model, the IAB draws the social security records of all the
workers employed in the sampled establishments on June 30th each year (between 1.6 million
and 2.5 million workers per year). Social security records in the IEB contain spells of em-
ployment, unemployment beneﬁt receipt and job search. Employment spells are generated
from notiﬁcations that employers send to the system. In absence of a major event, these
notiﬁcations are sent annually. They are also sent in the case of new hires, terminations,
interruptions, changes in contribution group or health insurance company of the employee,
or changes in the payroll system of the employer. Civil servants, self-employed, short-term
and family workers are not present in these data since their earnings are not reported via
the social security system. The social security records hence cover 80% of the workers in
Germany. Information about workers includes basic demographics (age, gender and edu-
cation), daily earnings and beneﬁts, and occupation, including whether it is part-time or
full-time. Additional workplace information, such as industry branch and geographic loca-
tion is available from the aggregation of social security records in the Establishment History
Panel (BHP), which corresponds to June 30th each year.
Although I use the establishment level data for most of the analysis, I also draw descriptives
from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB) 1975-2010, which is a 2%
random sample from the IEB (1.6 million workers). The SIAB allows to perform longitudinal
analysis about workers as it contains all the spells of the labor history for each worker in the
sample. More details are in vom Berge et al. (2013).
18The unit of observation in the data is the establishment (local economic unit) and not the ﬁrm, which
may comprise several establishments. I use the words ﬁrms and establishments interchangeably in the
analysis to refer to the later.
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The ﬁrst year in which marginal workers are included in the social security system is 1999.
The window of analysis hence spans from that year to 2007, before the onset of the in-
ternational crisis, and corresponds to the longitudinal section 2000-2007. Two important
limitations of the data is the lack of information on hours worked and the censoring of
earnings at the maximum for social security contributions (approximately e61,000 of annual
gross earnings). My analysis relies on measures of employment, hence the lack of information
on hours worked is relevant. To circumvent it, I generate a measure of full-time equivalent
employment which consists in attributing part-time workers a weight lower than one. Re-
garding the censoring of earnings (which aﬀects approximately 5% of the observations), I
apply an imputation procedure modeling log-daily earnings using Tobit models by education
and age groups (see e.g. Card et al., 2013; Dustmann et al., 2009; Gartner, 2005). It is worth
noting that the censoring of earnings is not crucial for my analysis, as the upper limit for
social security contributions is beyond the limit for tax-advantaged jobs. I provide more
details about the data and these adjustments in section (1.C) of the Appendix.
1.3 Descriptives
In this section, I outline the main characteristics of the mini-jobbers relying on SIAB data. I
discuss how they diﬀer from other workers in Germany and how labor supply was aﬀected by
the Mini-Job reform. The goal of this section is to show that the Mini-Job reform eﬀectively
stimulated labor supply at the bottom of the earnings distribution, and that tax advantaged
and non tax advantaged workers are not perfect substitutes through the lens of the ﬁrms'
production function.
1.3.1 Who are the mini-jobbers?
Table (1.1) shows the characteristics of marginal workers, comparing them to regular workers
and unemployed, for the year after the reform (the classiﬁcation is in function of their main
job). I focus on the contrast between mini-jobbers and regular workers, as midi-jobbers
typically display characteristics in between the other two types.
Mini-jobbers are deﬁned by a threshold of earnings. As earnings are the product of hours
and wage, one would expect that they are characterized by either low hours worked, or low
wages (skills or productivity), or both. Conﬁrming this intuition, a salient characteristic of
mini-jobbers is that they are eminently part-time (90% compared to 16.4% among regular
workers). Part-time mini-jobbers represent about half of total part-time workers in the
economy. The education level is also lower for mini-jobbers: one third of them do not have
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Abitur (higher secondary school certiﬁcate) compared to 13% of regular workers.
There are some demographic groups that stick out among mini-jobbers, and this is associ-
ated to their sensitivity to the incentives created by the tax design. The over-representation
of women among mini-jobbers (three out of four mini-jobbers are women) is in line with the
well-documented fact that tax beneﬁts are particularly relevant for secondary workers within
households, especially in Germany due to the income tax exemptions and the joint taxation
system. Previous non-participation seems a relevant trait among mini-jobbers, as suggested
by the lower work experience and tenure, and similar average age and duration of reception
of unemployment beneﬁt of mini-jobbers as compared to regular workers. Long-term unem-
ployed do not seem represented strongly among mini-jobbers (the history of unemployment
beneﬁt reception is much shorter for mini-jobbers than for unemployed). Younger (below 30
years old) and older (above 55 years old) workers constitute more than half of mini-jobbers,
compared to one third of regular workers. This is not surprising as students and individuals
in partial retirement usually work part-time. Furthermore, these groups are often entitled
to particular beneﬁts (BaföG for students and disability insurance or stipends for partial
retirement for older workers) subject to e400 means-tests.
There are also large diﬀerences in the type of jobs that marginal and regular workers perform.
Mini-jobbers carry out more interactive and manual non-routine tasks (15% and 49% of
mini-jobs respectively, compared to 10% and 26% of regular workers), and less cognitive
tasks (6% are in analytical non-routine tasks and 22% in cognitive routine tasks, compared
to 18% and 33% of regular workers). Mini-jobbers work disproportionately in the service
sector and less in manufacturing. They also have a higher representation in younger and
smaller establishments.
The previous description highlights that there are systematic diﬀerences in workers' charac-
teristics across job types, i.e. regular jobs and mini- or midi-jobs. The earnings test for tax
beneﬁts results in mini-jobbers being usually unskilled part-time workers, whereas regular
workers are skilled or full-time. This diﬀerentiation is related to a well-known segmentation
in the German labor market between regular and atypical employment (see e.g. Eichhorst
and Tobsch, 2013; Keller and Seifert, 2012). Although atypical employment includes other
types of workers (part-time above the mini-job threshold), temporary and agency employ-
ment, the so-called marginal employment (mini- and midi-jobs) is quantitatively the most
important form of atypical employment.
As the reform also allows secondary jobs to be tax advantaged, as long as the income from
the second job complies with the earnings limits, an important proportion of mini-jobs
(between one ﬁfth and one fourth) are secondary jobs. Table (1.2) shows the characteristics of
secondary job holders, contrasting secondary mini-jobs with secondary regular jobs (included
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of workers according to status: unemployed, mini-job, midi-job
and regular employment
Unemployed Mini-job Midi-job Regular
Female 46.8% 71.3% 76.2% 43.0%
(0.499) (0.453) (0.426) (0.495)
Age 40.9 43.1 40.0 40.1
(12.37) (17.05) (11.53) (11.39)
Young (< 30) 22.0% 27.1% 22.2% 20.8%
(0.414) (0.444) (0.416) (0.406)
Prime age (30-55) 62.7% 43.9% 68.1% 69.7%
(0.484) (0.496) (0.466) (0.459)
Old (>55) 15.2% 29.0% 9.6% 9.5%
(0.359) (0.454) (0.295) (0.293)
No Abitur 21.7% 31.2% 20.6% 13.3%
(0.412) (0.463) (0.404) (0.339)
With Abitur or apprentices 72.4% 65.4% 75.3% 74.4%
(0.447) (0.476) (0.431) (0.437)
Professionals 5.9% 3.4% 4.2% 12.4%
(0.236) (0.181) (0.200) (0.329)
Daily wage/beneﬁt 18.8 8.8 19.9 81.0
(11.97) (3.74) (10.07) (45.54)
Second job holder 0.4% 4.6% 8.5% 4.8%
(0.065) (0.208) (0.279) (0.214)
Part-time 90.0% 61.9% 16.4%
(0.300) (0.486) (0.371)
Employment experience (years) 8.1 8.4 9.2 13.1
(7.559) (7.546) (6.865) (8.710)
Tenure (years) 3.1 4.4 7.3
(3.864) (5.058) (7.272)
Duration of beneﬁt receipt (months) 40.9 9.1 12.5 8.0
(44.845) (18.678) (21.902) (16.187)
Analytical non-routine tasks 6.4% 7.7% 18.3%
(0.245) (0.267) (0.387)
Interactive non-routine tasks 15.3% 15.0% 10.1%
(0.360) (0.357) (0.302)
Cognitive routine tasks 22.0% 25.4% 33.2%
(0.414) (0.435) (0.471)
Manual routine tasks 7.1% 4.2% 12.2%
(0.257) (0.201) (0.328)
Manual non-routine tasks 49.2% 47.7% 26.1%
(0.500) (0.499) (0.439)
Establishment size (n. workers) 202 339 969
(766.9) (1528.7) (4093.2)
Establishment age (years) 14 15 18
(10.42) (10.13) (10.53)
Median full-time wage 66 58 86
(26.08) (32.17) (30.48)
Agriculture, primary 1.9% 2.3% 2.6%
(0.137) (0.149) (0.161)
Manufacturing 12.6% 8.0% 26.4%
(0.331) (0.271) (0.441)
Construction 3.3% 3.2% 6.4%
(0.178) (0.176) (0.245)
Retail, repair 22.5% 17.6% 14.7%
(0.418) (0.381) (0.354)
Transport, communication 5.4% 5.5% 5.5%
(0.225) (0.228) (0.228)
Financial intermediation 1.2% 2.0% 3.9%
(0.109) (0.139) (0.193)
Services for businesses 19.7% 20.2% 11.6%
(0.398) (0.402) (0.320)
Other services 27.4% 35.7% 20.3%
(0.446) (0.479) (0.403)
Source: SIAB, annual data (2004), main spell. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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midi-jobs), and compares them to workers who do not hold a secondary job. 91% of secondary
jobs are mini-jobs. Age and gender diﬀerences across the groups are not as pronounced as
those between regular workers and workers with a mini-job as a main occupation. Some
disparities in the education level still remain, however, with more low and medium educated
workers (workers without and with Abitur respectively) in the group holding a mini-job
as their secondary job, and more professionals in the group holding a regular job as their
secondary job.
Table 1.2: Characteristics of secondary job holders
Secondary job holders
No secondary job Mini-job Regular-job
Female 47.3% 55.5% 55.6%
(0.499) (0.497) (0.497)
Age 40.6 39.8 40.6
(12.42) (11.65) (11.94)
Young (<30) 21.8% 22.1% 20.9%
(0.413) (0.415) (0.406)
Prime age (30-55) 65.4% 68.7% 66.5%
(0.476) (0.464) (0.472)
Old (>55) 12.9% 9.2% 12.6%
(0.335) (0.289) (0.332)
No Abitur 16.6% 18.3% 13.8%
(0.372) (0.387) (0.345)
With Abitur or apprentices 73.0% 75.8% 65.5%
(0.444) (0.428) (0.475)
Professionals 10.4% 5.9% 20.7%
(0.305) (0.236) (0.405)
Daily wage, second job 7.6 40.3
(4.045) (51.96)
Monthly earnings, second job 231.6 1,203.7
(123.4) (1342.4)
Part-time, main job 23.3% 32.5% 50.0%
(0.300) (0.486) (0.370)
Source: SIAB, annual data (2004). Standard deviations in parenthesis.
1.3.2 Labor supply expansion with the Mini-Job Reform
The type of ﬁrms' responses to the Mini-Job reform analyzed in this paper requires an ex-
pansion of the labor supply in the bottom of the earnings distribution. I here show some de-
scriptive statistics suggesting this was indeed the case.19 First, I perform a simple accounting
exercise based on changes in the earnings distribution to gauge the supply expansion caused
by the Mini-Job reform. Intuitively, the mass of employment below the mini-job threshold
after the reform comprises workers from three groups: (1) workers who were already below
19The article in the British newspaper The Telegraph, Our jobs market is broken - and Germany may
have the answer explains in plain words the labor supply incentives provided by the reform: Take a lone
mother who works 10 hours a week on the minimum wage. If she works 15 hours, she is no better oﬀ, because
the extra money she earns is oﬀset by the welfare she loses. [...] If the single mother in question were allowed
to work under a mini-job contract, she could keep every penny..
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that earnings' level before the reform, (2) workers who were in non-employment and now
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to work with lower taxes, and (3) workers whose earnings were above the
new threshold before the reform and who work reduced hours or for lower gross wages to
qualify for the tax exemptions. Assuming that most workers from the last category had
earnings only moderately above the new threshold, the change in the mass below the mini-
job threshold, net of the change in the mass moderately above the threshold, must represent
additional workers who are incorporated into employment (details are in the Appendix in
section (1.D.1)). For the speciﬁc empirical exercise, I set e1,200 as the upper limit for the
mass that is moderately above the threshold. This choice can be justiﬁed by the observation
that the earnings distribution above this value are approximately the same. The calculation
suggests that the labor supply in the mini-job segment augmented by about 3.6%.20
Another way of gauging the degree in which new workers entered the workforce in the bottom
of the earnings distribution is to look at the transitions from non-employment to diﬀerent
types of employment that occurred between 2002 and 2004 (Table (1.A3)). 40% of the
workers in mini-jobs in 2004 were not employed in 2002, while only 13% of the workers
who are in regular part-time or full-time employment in 2004 were not employed in 2002.
This indicates a higher proportion of inﬂux of new workers into the mini-job segment. More
than one third of the transitions out of non-employment between 2002 and 2004 are through
mini-jobs, who represent 15% of workers.21
Besides the entry new workers, the supply of mini-jobs increased due to secondary job holders.
The proportion of workers with secondary jobs increased by around 50%, from 3.4% before
the reform to 5% after the reform (shown in Table (1.A4)). This increase was particularly
pronounced for women, prime-age and medium educated workers.22
A ﬁnal source of employment in mini-jobs is constituted by workers who were previously
earning above the threshold and whose gross earnings decrease. Looking at the workers
close to the mini-job earnings threshold in 2004 (between e325 and e400) reveals that
whereas 36% were non-employed in 2002, only 13.5% were earning more before the reform.
This proportion is substantially larger among job movers (37%) than between job stayers
(15.5%). The numbers suggest that, ﬁrst, reduction of earnings is not a main source of
20There is an ongoing downward trend in employment and upward in unemployment in the period of
reform. However, the distribution of earnings seems relatively stable in the pre-reform years (see Figures
(1.B3)-(1.B6)), which suggests that the error from ignoring time trends in employment the comparison of
the earnings distribution over a short horizon is likely to be small.
21Transitions vary by age and gender, not shown in the table. In particular, ﬂows from non-employment to
mini-jobs are specially relevant among women, young and old workers, whereas they are lower for prime-age
men. The latter group has a higher participation among workers coming from higher earnings.
22Figure (1.B7) shows the cumulative distribution of earnings, comparing only main jobs and when all
jobs (main or secondary) are included. The cumulative employment mass below the mini-job threshold
increases dramatically when side jobs are included.
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the increased employment mass in the bottom of the earnings distribution. Second, moving
down the gross earnings ladder is not primarily an intra-ﬁrm phenomenon. A substantial
proportion of workers close to the mini-job threshold seem to have experienced a reduction
in hours (11% transit from full-time to part-time) or a change in occupation (23%). Both
events are strongly associated with a change in the employer (see Table (1.A6)).
1.3.3 Low-earning and high-earning workers as production inputs
A key premise of this paper is that mini-jobbers and regular workers are imperfect substitutes.
The observed diﬀerences in the traits of mini-jobbers and regular workers, in particular in
characteristics linked to productivity (such as hours and education), suggest that they can
be considered as diﬀerent inputs that ﬁrms combine for the production of good and services.
This section discusses further this argument. In line with the formal deﬁnition of mini-
jobbers, which depends exclusively on earnings, I refer to mini-jobbers more broadly as
low-earning workers, and high-earning workers are those in regular employment.
Workers in certain occupations (e.g., cooks, assistants, salespersons, drivers, workers in stores
and transportation, oﬃce specialists and household workers) display frequent transitions
between mini-jobs and regular employment. Switch in employment type responds typically
to changes in full-time/part-time status. Hence one possible hypothesis is that, for some
occupations, characterized by low or medium skill requirements, regular employment can
be substituted by mini-jobs by splitting a full-time job into part-time. The type of jobs
typically carried out by mini-jobbers have a large variability in terms of skills requirements
(e.g., around one half of household cleaners, craftsmen, artists and sportsmen, auxiliary oﬃce
workers, and teaching and research assistants at Universities are mini-jobbers). It is feasible
that slight diﬀerences in responsibilities or skill requirements for a given occupation lead to
a diﬀerent wage level, and hence to admit either mini-jobs or regular employment for such
occupation.23 The possibility to substitute between full-time and part-time employment has
been discussed in other contexts (see e.g. Goldin and Katz, 2016), and has been attributed to
technological changes and the improvement in the information ﬂows within the organization,
and to new remuneration schemes that make pay more output dependent, and thus less
directly dependent on the hours worked. Another argument in favor of substitutability of
low-earning workers and high-earning workers is that similar workers in similar ﬁrms can have
23It is possible to ﬁnd references in news articles arguing about this type of substitution. E.g. quoting
The dark side of Germany's job miracle (Reuters, 2012), regular full-time jobs are being split up into
mini-jobs and there is little to stop employers paying mini-jobbers low hourly wages given they know the
government will top them up and there is no legal minimum wage. The article also quotes a worker saying
a lot of my friends work as carpenters, but companies describe them as janitors in their contracts to avoid
paying the salary negotiated in the collective wage agreement.
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very diﬀerent levels of earnings depending on the hierarchy level, or the degree of control
over their own job, as documented by Bayer and Kuhn (2016).
At the same time, this type of substitutability has a limit. Technological constraints may
limit the possibility of splitting occupations in shifts, or certain occupations may require
particular skill levels. The proportion of workers with diﬀerent education levels and hours
worked (and their share in the labor cost) shows a considerable variability across industry
branches even when narrowly deﬁned (see Tables (1.A7) and (1.A8)). This observation
suggests that establishments need to combine both low-earning and high-earning workers to
produce, which act hence as complementary.24
Overall, the discussion in this section supports the premise that mini-jobbers low-earning
workers are imperfect substitutes of regular high-earning workers. As shown in the
next section, the degree of substitutability is important for understanding the labor demand
response to the expansion of in-work beneﬁts.
1.4 A Stylized Model of the Labor Market
Motivated by the evidence discussed earlier, I start from the premise that the Mini-Job
reform stimulates labor supply in the low-earning sector. The theoretical framework then
explains how the reform aﬀects labor demand. To do so, I present a simple model of the
ﬁrms' proﬁt maximization problem, in which I derive the changes in equilibrium wages and
demand for low-earning and high-earning workers. To motivate my empirical strategy, I
focus on the relationship between the ﬁrm response and the pre-reform intensity in diﬀerent
types of labor. A more thorough theoretical analysis that shows that the intuition provided
in this section also holds in general equilibrium is presented at the end of this paper.
1.4.1 Framework
There are two types of jobs, indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}, that are characterized by diﬀerent before-
tax hourly wages w1 and w2, and diﬀerent tax rates, τ1 < τ2. Type-1 jobs comprise workers
with gross earnings below a threshold K, that qualify for a lower tax rate. I delay the
discussion of the individual labor supply decision to the ﬁnal section of the paper. At this
point, it suﬃces to say that individuals in type-1 jobs can be understood as low-educated
part-time workers who in equilibrium have low-earnings, and individuals in type-2 jobs, as
24Furthermore, table (1.A8) in the Appendix shows that there is an important amount of variability in
the use (intensity or cost-ratio) of low-earning and high-earning workers within the same (narrowly deﬁned)
industry, fact that has been shown to indicate that inputs are imperfect substitutes (Raval, 2011).
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highly-educated or full-time workers whose earnings surpass the threshold for being eligible
for tax beneﬁts. This distinction is motivated by the descriptive evidence provided earlier.
The aggregate labor supply (in hours) in type-1 jobs is N s1 , and in type-2 jobs, N
S
2 .
Labor demand for each type of job is determined by a ﬁrm that produces an output Y
sold for consumption at price p. The ﬁrm combines the hours in the diﬀerent jobs with
an elasticity of substitution σ, and θ is the distribution parameter of factor returns, which
captures diﬀerences in productivity across jobs.25 The production function has a standard
though ﬂexible Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) speciﬁcation:26
Y = F (N1, N2) = A[θN
σ−1
σ
1 + (1− θ)N
σ−1
σ
2 ]
σ
σ−1 (1.1)
where A is the total factor productivity, and Nj is the amount of labor (hours) in type-j
jobs.
The ﬁrm solves the static problem of proﬁt maximization: maxY,N1,N2 pY − w1N1 − w2N2,
which yields the standard ﬁrst order condition:
w1
w2
=
θ
1− θ
(
N1
N2
)− 1
σ
(1.2)
From equation (1.2), N1/N2 is increasing in θ, i.e. the relatively more productive are low-
earning workers within the ﬁrm, the higher the importance of these workers with respect to
the rest.
1.4.2 Expansion of in-work beneﬁts and equilibrium wages
The expansion of tax-beneﬁts for workers in low-earning jobs induces an increase in the
labor supply in this segment, NS1 , relative to the high-earning segment, N
S
2 . Overall, the
ratio NS1 /N
S
2 increases. As in equilibrium labor demand and supply for each job are equal,
an increase in NS1 /N
S
2 is only possible if the intensity of the ﬁrm N1/N2 also increases. If
labor in the low-earning segment is not perfect substitute of labor in the high-earning sector
(σ 9∞), from Equation (1.2) it is straightforward to see that w1/w2 decreases.
25The assumption that diﬀerent types of jobs, such as part-time vs. full-time, or skilled vs. unskilled,
have diﬀerent productivity is standard in the literature (see e.g. Kunn-Nelen et al., 2013).
26The CES speciﬁcation nests other common cases as Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1), perfect complements (σ = 0)
or perfect substitutes (σ →∞).
20
1.4.3 Scale and substitution eﬀects
The fall in the relative before-tax wages, w1/w2, in equilibrium leads to the demand for
labor to respond diﬀerently according to the ﬁrm's use of diﬀerent types of labor. I assume
competitive markets and free entry. Using the Hicks-Marshall rules of derived demand, and
assuming without loss of generality that w1 falls and w2 remains constant, the following
expression shows the marginal changes in demand for each type of job (derivations are in
section (1.D.2) in the Appendix, and are based on Hamermesh, 1986):
dlnN1
dlnw1
= −[s1η + (1− s1)σ]
dlnN2
dlnw1
= −[s1η − s1σ]
(1.3)
where η is the absolute value of the price-demand elasticity for each good, and s1 ≡ w1N1/pY
denotes the cost-share of type-1 jobs.
The common term of both equations in (1.3), s1η, captures the scale eﬀect. The lower w1
represents lower labor costs for the ﬁrm. As free entry drives proﬁts to zero, the ﬁrm expands
the production and increases labor demand for both type-1 and type-2 jobs. On the other
hand, the substitution eﬀect, reﬂected in the remaining term in both equations, induces an
increase in labor demand for type-1 jobs, and a reduction in labor demand for type-2 jobs.
The crucial insight from this expression is that the change in the demand for labor in type-1
and type-2 jobs depends on the share of type-1 jobs in total labor costs, s1. Intuitively, s1 is
positively associated with N1/N2 and θ (proof in Appendix (section 1.D.2)). Thus, the scale
eﬀect is strong if the ﬁrm is intensive in N1. The substitution eﬀect is stronger in terms of
changes in N1 (and weaker in terms of changes in N2) if the intensity in N1 is low. Overall,
the demand for type-1 jobs increases unambiguously, mainly driven by the scale eﬀect if the
ﬁrm is N1 intensive, and mainly driven by the substitution eﬀect otherwise. In contrast, what
happens with the demand for type-2 jobs is ambiguous, it increases or decreases depending
on which eﬀect dominates, scale or substitution. For σ < η, the demand for these jobs
increases if the ﬁrm is more intensive in low-earning workers.
To test these predictions empirically, I exploit that diﬀerent ﬁrms have diﬀerent intensities
in low-earning labor at the time of the Mini-Job reform. The measure of low-earning labor
usage at the ﬁrm-level used in the analysis is the proportion of low-earning workers out of
total employment. This formulation is in line with the literature evaluating the eﬀects of
other policies such as minimum wages on labor demand. I show in the Appendix, section
(1.D.2), that there is a positive relationship between the cost-ratio of low-earning workers,
and their proportion.
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1.5 Empirical Strategy
The theoretical framework predicts that the response of ﬁrms to wage changes induced by the
expansion of in-work beneﬁts varies with their pre-reform intensity in low-earning workers.
To test this hypothesis, I use a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach (DiD hereafter), similar
to other studies that have investigated the employment eﬀects of other labor market policies
such as minimum wage changes (Harasztosi and Lindner, 2017; Machin et al., 2003).27 My
results are based on the longitudinal section 2000-2007 of the LIAB. The main speciﬁcation
relates establishment-level outcomes to pre-reform use of low-earning workers as follows:
ykt = αk + λt + βtIntLEk + kt (1.4)
where ykt stands for the outcome of establishment k in period t (mainly employment, but
also wages and workers' ﬂows among others), αk are establishment ﬁxed eﬀects to capture
time-invariant heterogeneity across ﬁrms such as productivity, λt are year ﬁxed eﬀects to
absorb common macroeconomic shocks. IntLEk measures the fraction of workers that were
below the mini-job threshold according to its new deﬁnition in 2003 at the establishment
k in 2002, the year before the reform.28 Standard errors are clustered at the establishment
level to account for auto-correlation. The following discussions focus on the results based on
the speciﬁcation (1.4). I provide later a series of robustness checks that show the results do
not change with less parsimonious speciﬁcations.
The coeﬃcient of interest, βt, is computed for each year by interacting IntLEk with year ﬁxed
eﬀects. Estimates of βt capture diﬀerences in the outcome paths between high-intensity (with
respect to low-earning workers) establishments and low-intensity establishments, relative to
the year before the reform, 2002. βt measures the eﬀect of the Mini-Job reform as the
diﬀerence in the labor demand by ﬁrms with diﬀerent pre-reform intensities, after controlling
for heterogeneity at the establishment level and common macroeconomic shocks. The main
identiﬁcation assumption is that, in the absence of the reform, the evolution of outcomes
would follow parallel trends across establishments with diﬀerent pre-reform intensities. I
27Similar strategy for analyzing ﬁrm proﬁtability and productivity has been applied in Draca et al. (2011)
and Mayneris et al. (2017).
28The threshold eﬀectively used is e400 net-of-SSC earnings, which amounts to e506.33 of gross earnings
under pre-reform regulations (400 = 506.33(1−0.21), where 21% is the pre-reform SSC rate). The regressions
do not include establishment level controls which, since they are relatively constant in time, are highly
collinear with the ﬁxed eﬀects. Since IntLEk is not observable for establishments born after 2002, I also
exclude establishments born in 2000-2002. Establishment death is very low during the observation window.
Still, I perform the analysis on the subgroup of surviving establishments until 2007 as a robustness check.
Along the analysis, I included the 1999 observation for the establishments in the panel for which it is available
(68%) to add one year for pre-trend tests. The results do not change when excluding this year.
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show that this parallel trend assumption is not violated for the pre-reform years, for which
the estimates of βt are small and insigniﬁcant.
It is worth pointing out that in this speciﬁcation, there are, strictly speaking, no treatment
and control groups, and hence the assumption that some production units are not aﬀected by
the reform needs to be dispensed (the stable unit treatment value assumption SUTVA
does not hold). Although establishments with a low pre-reform proportion of low-earning
workers are less exposed to labor costs savings and hence the scale eﬀect is not relevant
for them, as opposed to establishments with high intensity, low intensity establishments are
aﬀected by the substitution eﬀect. In particular, low-intensity establishments have incentives
to increase the use of low-earning workers according to Equation (1.3). Hence, the post-
reform diﬀerences in total employment trends as measured by βt oﬀer a conservative estimate
of the employment eﬀect in the context of the expansion of in-work beneﬁts, as employment
would be increasing in both high-intensity and low-intensity establishments. Diﬀerences in
trends of employment by type (low-earning and high-earning workers) inform about which
eﬀect, scale or substitution, underly the general employment trends. I will discuss this in
more detail when I comment the results.
The sample I use to calculate the eﬀects of the Mini-Job reform comprises 3,770 establish-
ments matched to 621,900 workers. I present here some descriptives using the longitudinal
sampling weights constructed by the IAB for the longitudinal section 2000-2007 to account
for the disproportionately stratiﬁed sampling.29
For the empirical strategy to be successful, the variation in the pre-reform intensity in low-
earning employment has to be suﬃciently large. Figure (1.3) shows that while close to 35%
of the establishments have a very low proportion of low-earning workers in 2002 (0-5%), the
remaining 65% are distributed across a wide range of intensities. Half of the establishments
have more than 21% of their workforce in the low-earning segment, 15% of the establishments
have between 20% and 30% of their workers below the mini-job threshold, while 28% have
more than half of their employees below the mini-job threshold.
Table (1.3) shows summary statistics of the panel of establishments for 2002, according to
the weighted quintiles in terms of the proportion of low-earning workers, Q1 to Q5. Es-
tablishments with diﬀerent pre-reform intensities in low-earning workers diﬀer along several
dimensions. As expected, high-intensity establishments pay lower average daily wages, but
the gap is smaller within workers' groups such as full-time or part-time. It is worth high-
29Table (1.A9) in the Appendix shows summary statistics for 2002 for both the cross-section and lon-
gitudinal section, with and without weights. Characteristics of the cross-section and the panel units are
similar. A comparison of characteristics using weights and not using weights is illustrative of the sampling
(speciﬁcally, the over-sampling of big establishments).
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of establishments according to the proportion of low-earning work-
ers, 2002
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lighting that the proportion of low-earning workers is non-monotonic with respect to key
establishment characteristics, such as size or age. For instance, low-intensity establishments
(quintiles 1 and 2) include both small and big establishments. More generally, there is only
a weak relationship between the intensity in low-earning workers and other establishment
characteristics. This observation lends conﬁdence that the estimated coeﬃcient related to
IntLEk in Equation (1.4) does not pick up establishment traits such age or size, but it cap-
tures diﬀerent trends due to diverse use of low-earning workers, as required by the analyzed
mechanism.
Furthermore, even though the proportion of high-intensity establishments is larger in certain
industries such as services, retail trade and repair, there is a signiﬁcant presence of high-
intensity-establishments in all industries, as shown in Figure (1.4) where the proportion
of intensive establishments (fraction of low-earning workers above the median) ﬂuctuates
between one third and two thirds. This also holds for a ﬁner deﬁnition of industries (224
categories), and suggests that the estimates are also not linked to industry level variation,
but to a variation of low-earning labor intensity.
Importantly, the diﬀerences in characteristics of ﬁrms with diﬀerent intensities in low-earning
workers do not invalidate the DiD identiﬁcation strategy. This strategy is motivated in the
theoretical framework presented before, and relies on the parallel trends assumption, veriﬁed
for the years that preceded the reform. The DiD strategy allows to overcome confounding
eﬀects from macroeconomic shocks, a particularly relevant feature as Germany found itself
in a strong economic slump around the years of the reform. The next section presents the
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Table 1.3: Characteristics of establishments by proportion of low-earning workers (quintiles),
2002
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Proportion of workers below 2003 MJ threshold 0% 6.2% 24.3% 46.3% 83.2%
Proportion of workers below 2003 MidiJ threshold 11.8% 11.2% 34.0% 54.6% 85.7%
Establishment age 14.7 18.5 14.7 13.0 11.8
Establishment size (n. workers) 9.1 97.2 14.6 9.2 6.2
Establishment size (full-time equivalent) 8.4 87.3 11.5 6.3 3.3
Proportion of part-time workers 13.0% 17.7% 28.7% 42.7% 67.9%
Proportion of low-educated workers 9.2% 13.2% 12.2% 13.7% 11.6%
Proportion of medium-educated workers 65.6% 66.2% 60.2% 51.8% 43.2%
Proportion of highly-educated workers 5.6% 9.1% 4.5% 2.9% 0.4%
Vacancies/employment 3.0% 1.6% 1.2% 1.6% 0.7%
Median daily gross wage 59.0 72.8 50.8 31.2 9.9
Median daily gross wage (growth) 19.0% 2.9% 9.6% 22.6% -7.2%
Median daily gross wage of full-time workers 64.5 80.2 63.8 56.2 38.8
Median daily gross wage of full-time workers (growth) 4.2% 2.5% 0.7% 5.6% 4.2%
Median daily gross wage of part-time workers 46.2 33.9 16.4 12.4 9.0
Median daily gross wage of part-time workers (growth) 16.6% 22.0% 10.3% 7.1% 14.5%
Per capita monthly labor cost 1,548 2,148 1,551 1,068 783
Monthly wage bill 23,581 263,505 28,967 11,041 4,878
Inequality (P75/P25) full-time workers 1.38 1.39 1.67 2.30 1.61
Hirings/employment 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.23
Separations/employment 0.30 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.33
Investment (million) 0.057 0.777 0.057 0.033 0.037
Sales (million) 1.627 21.291 1.565 0.566 0.448
Exports/revenues 4.2% 11.8% 2.5% 3.4% 3.1%
Work council 11.2% 37.3% 7.6% 4.5% 1.4%
Collective agreement 47.3% 58.8% 49.6% 40.5% 28.6%
Agriculture, primary 7.9% 1.7% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0%
Manufacturing 13.0% 25.3% 10.5% 13.6% 8.9%
Construction 16.0% 12.9% 12.5% 3.2% 3.6%
Retail, repair 19.4% 12.8% 24.1% 23.6% 24.2%
Transport, communication 6.6% 5.9% 2.5% 2.4% 6.6%
Financial intermediation 3.5% 2.6% 1.9% 1.3% 1.8%
Services for businesses 8.5% 12.3% 18.3% 26.2% 16.4%
Other services 19.1% 18.5% 26.0% 24.8% 27.2%
Public sector 5.9% 8.0% 2.3% 2.5% 8.4%
Workers in analytical non-routine tasks 15.6% 15.2% 9.0% 8.1% 7.2%
Workers in interactive non-routine tasks 9.0% 11.0% 10.2% 12.4% 16.3%
Workers in cognitive routine tasks 32.1% 33.2% 41.2% 38.3% 34.0%
Workers in manual routine tasks 12.2% 10.5% 8.2% 7.3% 3.9%
Workers in manual non-routine tasks 29.8% 27.8% 28.8% 28.5% 35.4%
Observations 1,041 1,288 852 306 283
Note: Panel 2000-2002. Establishments classiﬁed according to the (weighted) quintile of the proportion of
low-earning workers.
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Figure 1.4: Proportion of establishments by intensity in low-earning workers (above/below
median) by industries, 2002
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estimation results of the DiD analysis.
1.6 Results
In this section, I present the estimates of the coeﬃcient βt in equation (1.4) for a variety of
ﬁrm level outcomes. Even though the independent variable IntLEk is continuous (between
0 and 1), I refer to the results as diﬀerence between high-intensity (in low-earning workers)
establishments and low-intensity establishments.30 The results are presented in graphical
format in Figures (1.5) to (1.13); Table (1.A13) shows estimates in a compressed format.
1.6.1 Eﬀects on employment
I ﬁrst discuss the estimates of βt from equation (1.4) for the outcome of total employment,
shown in Figure (1.5). According to the previous discussion, these provide a conservative
estimation of the eﬀect of the reform on the demand for total employment. The left panel
shows the diﬀerential paths in the total number of workers across ﬁrms with diﬀerent pre-
30In the section on robustness checks, I discuss that changing the continuous variable IntLEk for a binary
variable which takes the value 1 for establishments with a pre-reform intensity in low-earning workers above
the median, and 0 for establishments with below median intensity, does not change the results.
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reform intensities in low-earning workers.31 Estimates correspond to the diﬀerence in the
number of workers in each period with respect to the baseline year 2002. High-intensity es-
tablishments, which exhibited similar changes as low-intensity establishments in the number
of workers before 2003, show a noticeable expansion (relative to low-intensity establishments)
after the reform. The estimated coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant for 2005 and 2006 and
borderline signiﬁcant for 2004. Economically, the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients im-
plies an increase of 4% with respect to the average establishment size in the pre-reform year,
and 8% with respect to the size of establishments with above-median intensity in low-earning
workers, by the second year after the reform.
To rule out that the increase in employment is not driven by the substitution of full-time by
part-time positions (which would contradict the mechanism proposed), I conﬁrm that em-
ployment in hours (as measured in full-time equivalent terms) also increases in high-intensity
establishments, relative to low-intensity establishments, as shown by the right panel of Figure
(1.5). The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant for all years following the reform. It repre-
sents 2 full-time equivalent workers more in high-intensity establishments, as compared to
low-intensity establishments, which amounts to 7% of the initial full-time equivalent employ-
ment in the sample, and 22% of the initial full-time equivalent employment in high-intensity
establishments, by the second year after the reform.
Raw trends comparing high-intensity (fraction of low-earning workers above the median)
and low-intensity establishments are shown in the Appendix, Figure (1.B9). Whereas the
number of workers in total and in full-time equivalent employment is declining for low-
intensity establishments, it is slightly increasing for high-intensity establishments in the
post-reform years.32
Figure (1.6) shows the estimates of βt for the growth rate of low-earning and high-earning
31I estimate the eﬀect of the Mini-Job reform on employment level and not growth rates because the
parallel trend assumption, which requires that employment level was changing in similar magnitudes for
establishment with diﬀerent pre-reform intensities in low-earning workers, is veriﬁed empirically. It does not
hold though for growth rates. Intuitively, this implies that the elasticity of total employment with respect
to the wage of low-earning workers (targeted by the reform) is not constant along the labor demand curve.
This is indeed reasonable in a setting in which the labor cost shock induced by the reform impacts high-
intensity ﬁrms more strongly, since these ﬁrms are, on average, smaller than low-intensity ﬁrms. Instead, a
constant elasticity would imply that the impact of the labor cost shock increases with ﬁrm size, which seems
implausible. The speciﬁcation with respect to employment hence assumes an additive treatment eﬀect on
total employment, as opposed to a multiplicative treatment eﬀect (see e.g. Fisher and Ciani, 2014). When
considering low-earning and high-earning workers separately, the parallel trends assumption holds for growth
rates, indicating a constant elasticity within each type of labor and consistent with the theoretical framework
(see Equation (1.3)).
32Average employment in the sample is declining, as it is to be expected due to the cohort nature of the
sample. It is a well known fact that the main contributors to employment growth are new entrants, which
cannot be included in the analysis by construction since the comparison is across establishments according
to their pre-reform intensity.
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Figure 1.5: Eﬀect on total employment
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level.
workers separately. These estimates exclude ﬁrms with only one type of worker (i.e., ﬁrms
that are in the 1st and 5th quintile of the intensity distribution). High-intensity estab-
lishments exhibit a relatively higher growth rate of high-earning workers after the reform
(statistically signiﬁcant for 2003, with point estimates of 44 pp.) and a relatively lower
growth of low-earning workers (signiﬁcant in 2003 and 2005, with point estimates of -78 pp.
and -61 pp., respectively). Figure (1.B10) in the Appendix shows the evolution of both types
of employment across establishment with diﬀerent pre-reform intensities. In high-intensity
establishments, the time trend in low-earning employment seems to change with the reform
(i.e., a noticeable upward trend turns into a downward trend) while the reverse occurs in
low-intensity establishments.
Overall, the estimates suggest that the eﬀect of the reform is a relative expansion in terms
of total employment in high-intensity establishments as compared to low-intensity estab-
lishments.33 Within each establishment type (high-intensity and low-intensity), there is a
relative growth of employment of the less abundant type: high-earning in high-intensity (in
33The fact that the gap closes since 2006 is not surprising, given the reversal in the tax beneﬁts implied
by the increase in the SSC rate for the employer to 30% for mini-jobs, and the decrease of the SSC rate for
both employer and employee to 19.5% for regular jobs. Furthermore, reversal in the incentives even under
the same level of tax beneﬁts would be expected as low-intensity ﬁrms become relatively more intensive in
low-earning workers.
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Figure 1.6: Eﬀect on the growth rate of low-earning and high-earning workers
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Note: Establishments with both low and high earning workers in the pre-reform year (quintiles 2-4 of
intensity). Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level.
low-earning workers) establishments, and low-earning in low-intensity establishments. Going
back to the discussion of the mechanism, these results are actually expected (see expression
(1.3)), and they are consistent with imperfect substitution between the types of jobs per-
formed by low-earning and high-earning workers. The scale eﬀect has a stronger bite on
high-intensity establishments, for whom labor costs are reduced by virtue of the reform.
The substitution eﬀect instead, due to the change in the relative cost of low-earning workers,
induce particularly low-intensity establishments to increase the lists of low-earning workers.
Unfortunately, the empirical strategy does not allow to tier apart scale and substitution
eﬀects, because the DiD coeﬃcients mix up scale and substitution across establishment and
workers' types. A crucial question is whether the empirical results are compatible with only
one of these eﬀects in place. Let us start by discussing the case with only substitution eﬀect,
which would be the case if σ → ∞ in terms of the model presented earlier. Expression
(1.3) suggests that high-earning employment (N2) should decrease more in high-intensity
establishments than in low-intensity ones, which implies a negative coeﬃcient in the DiD
analysis, which is rejected by the results. On the other hand, the case with only scale eﬀect
(σ = 0) is also counterfactual. Employment in both types of workers should increase more in
high-intensity establishments, which should be reﬂected in a positive coeﬃcient in the DiD
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estimates for the growth of both low-earning and high-earning workers. Hence, the negative
coeﬃcient for low-earning workers contradicts the possibility of only scale eﬀect in place.
Table (1.A12) in the Appendix provides more intuition regarding this discussion.
1.6.2 Eﬀects on hours and wages
The relative expansion of high-intensity establishments in terms of high-earning employment
may be driven by either a relative increase in wages (productivity channel, or change in
the education of the workforce) or by an increase in the number of hours per workers (hours
channel, or change in full-time vs. part-time mix). I show here evidence suggestive of both
channels. Figure (1.7) shows that after the reform the number of full-time workers increases
and the number of part-time workers decreases in high-intensity establishments with respect
to low-intensity establishments. The coeﬃcients in 2004 represent 0.8 fewer workers in part-
time jobs in high-intensity establishments than in low-intensity establishments, and 1.6 more
workers in full-time in high-intensity establishments than in low-intensity establishments
(20% and 35% respectively with respect to the baseline number of workers of each type).
Figure (1.B11) in the Appendix shows a pick-up in the trend in part-time employment after
the reform, leaded by establishments with low-intensity in low-earning workers. On the
other hand, high-intensity establishments seem to reduce the speed of the downward trend
in full-time employment.
Figure (1.8) shows that high-intensity establishments increase relatively the number of
medium-educated workers (with Abitur and/or vocational training), with a diﬀerence of
0.6 worker more as compared to low-intensity establishments (3% with respect to the base-
line). High-intensity establishments also experience a relative reduction in the proportion of
low-educated workers (without Abitur) of 3 pp., which represents one fourth of the baseline
proportion in 2002 (see Figure (1.B12) in the Appendix for the trends).
Further support regarding the change in the workforce skill composition, investment in phys-
ical capital (more complementary with skilled labor) increases more in high-intensity estab-
lishments than in low-intensity establishments after the reform, as shown in Figure (1.9).
The DiD coeﬃcient for 2004 (signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0) is e32 thousand, close to the ini-
tial value of investment in high-intensity establishments, and almost one third of the average
amount in the sample (trends are in Figure (1.B13) in the Appendix).
The increase in both hours worked and wages is further supported by a higher growth rate
of median daily wages in high-intensity establishments than in low-intensity establishments
(1.10). The after-reform upward trend holds when splitting between part-time and full-time
workers, though estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant (see Figure (1.B14), and Figures
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Figure 1.7: Eﬀect on employment by part-time and full-time status
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Figure 1.8: Eﬀect on employment by education level
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Figure 1.9: Eﬀect on investment in physical capital
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Note: Using as regressor a binary variable: 1 for above median and 0 for below median intensity in
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Figure 1.10: Eﬀect on median daily wages
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(1.B15) and (1.B16) for trends, in the Appendix).
1.6.3 Eﬀects on workers' ﬂows and promotions
For high-intensity establishments to expand in high-earning workers relative to non-intensive
establishment, they either hire more high-earning workers (net of separations) or upgrade
earnings of incumbent workers.34 Vacancy openings increase more in high-intensity estab-
lishments than in low-intensity establishments after the reform (Figures (1.B17) and (1.B18)
34The results of the DiD estimates in this section become highly imprecise, because workers' ﬂows are
particularly small. I hence show in the text those for which coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, and I discuss more
descriptive evidence observing the raw trends for the rest.
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Figure 1.11: Eﬀect on hirings of workers by gross monthly earnings
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in the Appendix). Diﬀerences in hiring are signiﬁcant for workers with earnings above the
mini-job threshold, as shown in Figure (1.12). Figures (1.B19) and (1.B20) in the Appendix
further show that low-intensity establishments increase hiring of workers below the e400
threshold, whereas separations of these workers seem larger in high-intensity establishments.
Separations of workers above the midi-job threshold appear to decrease in low-intensity es-
tablishments as compared to high-intensity establishments, although there is also less hiring
of these workers.
The raise in full-time workers in high-intensity establishments seems supported by the fact
that these ﬁrms are hiring these workers at lower wages than low-intensity ﬁrms, as shown in
Figure (1.B22). Similarly, inﬂows of part-time workers in low-intensity units is accompanied
by lower relative wages oﬀered to them by these establishments, as compared to high-intensity
establishments.
Incumbent workers seem to be taking part in the process of change in the workers' structure
as well. From Figure (1.13), a smaller proportion of workers suﬀer reduction in gross earnings
in high-intensity establishments than in low-intensity establishments. Wage upgrades also
seem more frequent in high-intensive establishments than in low-intensity establishments
(Figure (1.B21)).
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Figure 1.12: Eﬀect on wages of hirings of part-time and full-time workers
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Figure 1.13: Eﬀect on wage changes for workers within establishments
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1.6.4 Eﬀects on task composition of the workforce
Some trends regarding the task composition appear to change after the reform (see Figure
(1.B23)). It seems that high-intensity establishments increase relatively the proportion of
workers carrying out analytical and manual non-routine tasks, and low-intensity establish-
ments take up in terms of interactive non-routine and cognitive routine tasks. No apparent
diﬀerences in the number of job titles (344 categories) can be seen across establishment inten-
sity in low-earning workers after the reform. However, the downward trend in the number of
occupations within establishments for the years before the reform seems reverted afterwards
in all types of ﬁrms.
1.6.5 Heterogeneous eﬀects
In this section I investigate whether the eﬀects are heterogeneous by industry, establishment
age, size, and status with respect to collective agreements. The outcomes examined are total
employment, part-time and full-time employment, and workforce by education level.35 The
econometric speciﬁcation is a modiﬁcation of equation (1.4), as follows:
ykt = αk +φPostt +
∑
m
βmIntLEk×Postt×Hetermk +
∑
m
γmHetermk +
∑
p
λpt
pIndk + kt
(1.5)
where Postt is a dummy which takes the value 1 after the reform, and 0 otherwise, Hetermk
is a set of dummies that take the value 1 for the establishments which belong to the group m,
and
∑
λpt
p ∗ Indk control for a quadratic polynomial on the industry-level (224 categories)
trend. Table (1.A14) in the Appendix shows the estimates of coeﬃcients βm (the baseline in
each case is speciﬁed, and the coeﬃcients on the remaining categories show the diﬀerences
with respect to the baseline). I base the discussion here on the size of the point estimations. I
discuss statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences in each case, as estimates are highly imprecise
when performing cuts on the data.
Diﬀerences across industries are not statistically signiﬁcant. The point estimates though sug-
gest that the relative changes in employment (in high-intensity establishments with respect
to low-intensity establishments) are stronger within manufacturing than within services.
Employment eﬀects are larger for more mature establishments, statistically diﬀerent for
full-time and part-time employment within establishments above 20 years old. Regarding
establishment size, bigger establishments seem to experience the stronger employment eﬀects.
35These results need to be taken with caution, as the stratiﬁcation of the sample does not consider all
these dimensions (only industry and size).
35
Diﬀerences are signiﬁcant for establishments with more than 200 workers in terms of full-time
workers, and between 20 and 200 workers with respect to total employment and medium-
educated workers.
The relative employment expansion of high-intensity establishments, specially in full-time
employment, is signiﬁcantly higher in establishments under industry or company level collec-
tive agreement. As collective agreements impose limits to wage reductions, this observation
is encouraging regarding the expansionary eﬀect of the reform on labor demand.
1.6.6 Robustness and validity of the empirical results
In this section, I discuss a series of checks for robustness of the results. Regarding the
deﬁnition of the variable of interest IntLEk, I change the speciﬁcation in several ways:
(i) deﬁning low-earning workers as those earning below the midi-job e800 threshold, (ii)
deﬁning IntLEk as a binary variable which takes the value 1 for establishments with an
intensity above the median in the sample, and 0 otherwise, useful exercise to rule out that
outliers are driving the results and conﬁrm the linearity of the eﬀects, (iii) excluding younger
and older workers, who were disproportionately aﬀected by the policy, from the deﬁnition
of the intensity in low-earning workers, and (iv) using the intensity in part-time and low-
educated workers at the ﬁrm and industry level. In all the cases, results do not change
qualitatively. Furthermore, for (i)-(iii), coeﬃcients estimates and signiﬁcance are virtually
the same to the benchmark estimation. In the case of (iv), point estimates are very similar
to the main estimates, but precision is much lower as expected, since low-earning workers do
not correspond exactly with the group of low-educated part-time workers. The invariance of
results to these diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the variable IntLEk reinforces its interpretation as
capturing a feature of the production function of ﬁrms. Results of these robustness checks
are available upon request.
Although the longitudinal section 2000-2007 is meant to avoid attrition between one wave
and the following, and I exclude establishment birth during the whole observation window
in the main estimations, some establishments die during the period (7%). I verify that
the analysis does not change if I use the subgroup of establishments which survived until
2007 (3,494). The invariance of the results also suggests that the eﬀects of the reform on
establishment death may have been negligible. To maximize the pre-reform period, I use the
observation in 1999 when it is available for establishments in the 2000-2007 panel.36 Even
36The Establishment Panel provides a limited number of longitudinal sections, and there is no section
which comprises the reform period and starts in 1999, ﬁrst year for which marginal employment is available
in the social security records.
36
though one-third of them does not have information for 1999, estimates for 2000 on do not
change when excluding this year. These results are also omitted and available upon request.
I further estimate a variant of equation (1.4) controlling for speciﬁc trends. I perform several
exercises, following the speciﬁcation:
ykt = αk + λt + βtIntLEk +
∑
p
λpt
p × Indicatork + kt (1.6)
First, I control for quadratic trends at the industry level, where Indicatork is a set of binary
variables which take the value 1 for the industry (224 categories) to which the establishment
corresponds. Second, I do a similar exercise but for diﬀerent levels of pre-reform intensity in
low-earning workers (quintiles). A third exercise controls for a establishment speciﬁc linear
trend, by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of (1.6):
∆ykt = ∆λt + ∆βtIntLEk + kt (1.7)
Furthermore, I control for variables that are arguably exogenous to the eﬀect of the reform
at the establishment level, by estimating the following speciﬁcation:
yktci = αk + λt + βtIntLEk + φ0Inti(−c) + φ1Intc(−i) + ktci (1.8)
where Inti(−c) is the proportion of low-earning workers in industry i in all commuting zones
except where the establishment is, and Intc(−i) is the proportion of low-earning workers in
the commuting zone c in all industries except the one in which the establishment operates.
This exercise is aimed at controlling for omitted trends in local labor markets and industry
level, which can be considered related to labor supply shifts. Tables (1.A15) to (1.A23)
in the Appendix show the estimates for βt for all these speciﬁcations, as compared to the
benchmark from equation (1.4). The main lesson from these exercises is that estimates
remain virtually unaﬀected after controlling for speciﬁc trends in a variety of ways. The
speciﬁcation in ﬁrst diﬀerences to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc trends though yields lower point
estimates and precision levels, given the variations are year to year and not with respect to
the pre-reform year as in the rest of the estimations.
Finally, I address concerns about potential biases in the estimators that would arise if the
dependent variables were persistent (Nickell, 1981). The speciﬁcation with lagged dependent
variable is:
ykt = αk + ρykt−1 + λt + βtIntLEk + kt (1.9)
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Due to the endogeneity introduced by the lagged dependent variable in the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation, I estimate this model using dynamic panel data techniques. The system of
equations in levels and in diﬀerences is estimated by General Method of Moments (GMM),
instrumenting diﬀerenced lags and lagged levels of the dependent variable by further lags
of this variable. I also use lags of other covariates (average gross wages and investment) to
improve eﬃciency, following the approach by Blundell and Bond (1998), with the Arellano
and Bover (1995) transformation to use forward orthogonal deviations (the implementation
follows Roodman, 2009). Estimates of βt are shown in Figures (1.B24) to (1.B26) in the
Appendix. Results hold qualitatively, as point estimates generally preserve the signs reported
in the main results. However, there is an important loss of precision due to the use of
instruments and most estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. An important exception
is the results regarding the diﬀerential evolution of part-time and full-time workers, which
remain statistically signiﬁcant.
I further estimate the model both via OLS (ignoring the establishment ﬁxed eﬀects) and
introducing the lagged dependent variable in the within estimation directly. According to
Angrist and Pischke (2009), these two estimates should provide bounds for the true value
of the parameter, as the former is downward biased and the latter upward biased. Point
estimates are in Figures (1.B24) to (1.B26) in the Appendix, and they show that conclusions
hold for estimates within these bands.
1.6.7 Discussion and interpretation
The empirical ﬁndings suggest that the Mini-Job reform had important consequences for
employment, no only for workers who were targeted (low-earning) but also for workers who
were outside the scope of the policy (high-earning). Actually, establishments intensive in
one type of worker seem to lean towards employment of the opposite worker type after the
reform. Intuitively, this would lead to a convergence, establishments decreasing the gap in
terms of intensity and becoming more similar to each other. Some pieces of evidence seem
to support this intuition.
Figure (1.B27) in the Appendix shows that within the panel of establishments used for
estimation, there is more mass with medium levels of low-earning workers and less mass with
low levels of them. Changes in the earnings distributions of workers across establishment
pre-reform intensity in low-earning workers (Figure (1.B28)) also point in the direction of
production units become more similar in their payroll, and establishments in the bottom of
the intensity in low-earning employment to respond stronger in terms of bunching at the
threshold than more intensive establishments.
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Figure (1.B29) shows that within the panel of establishments 2000-2007, the proportion of
those which are highly intensive in low-earning workers decreases after the reform in indus-
tries in which they were initially abundant, such as services and retail commerce. At the
same time, some originally high-paid activities, such as agriculture or primary, see an aug-
mented portion of establishments with a high-intensity in low-earning workers. This does not
hold when looking at the whole universe of establishments (cross-sections of the LIAB), as
shown in Figure (1.B30). Most industry branches seem to be either keeping or increasing the
proportion of high-intensity establishments in low-earning workers. This is the case if lower
labor costs in certain industries due to the reform not only induce incumbents to expand,
but also encourages entry of new establishments with similar characteristics. The number
of establishments in fact increases in industries with initially high intensity in low-earning
workers relative to industries initially less intensive, as shown in Figure (1.B31). Establish-
ments in services and retail commerce represent 60.5% of the total number of establishments
in 2002, and 62.8% in 2007, whereas the share of production units in manufacturing and
construction shrink from 22.7% in 2002 to 21.6% in 2007.
Complementing the evidence about convergence at the industry level, the proportion of low-
earning workers increases more in local labor markets with initially low presence of these
workers. The maps in Figures (in Figures (1.B32) and (1.B33) in the Appendix show that
whereas the German Northwest had a higher presence of low-earning workers in 2002, the
increase is stronger in the Northeast. Table (1.A24) in the Appendix conﬁrms this result,
showing that the correlation between the initial proportion in low-earning workers and its
variation at the local labor market level, is negative (-0.33 for 2002-2004, and -0.71 for
2002-2007).
These signs of slight convergence across establishment types (high and low-intensity) is con-
sistent with, and supports, the results from both the theoretical and empirical analysis.
Furthermore, the fact that the data seems to indicate that entry of establishments with
high-intensity in low-earning workers is encouraged by the expansion of in-work beneﬁts,
raises questions about the allocation eﬃciency of such a policy, a point that is discussed in
the following section.
1.7 Implications
The empirical strategy does not allow to evaluate total employment eﬀects within each ﬁrm
class, as it provides relative statements. To discuss the implications of the results in terms
of employment levels and output, I enrich the theoretical framework used for the discussion
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about the mechanism. I introduce the labor supply decision, following the literature on labor
supply and taxation (see e.g. Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Tazhitdinova, 2017). I further
model the product market and the government budget. I compute the general equilibrium
of the model and discuss the role of the degree of substitution between diﬀerent workers.
1.7.1 Framework
Labor supply: There is a continuum of workers, who are heterogeneous in a parameter
α that captures taste for work. α is distributed with a cumulative distribution function
F (α) and a density function f(α). Workers choose whether to participate or not in the
labor market, and the number of hours worked depending on the take-home wage and their
taste for work. Their labor supply decision determines their sorting in two jobs, indexed by
j ∈ {1, 2}. Jobs diﬀer in the before-tax hourly wage w1 and w2, and in the tax rate on gross
earnings, τ1 < τ2.37
The utility maximization problem of the worker is:
max
c,n
U(c, n) = c− α− 1 n
1+ 1

1 + 1

− βI{n > 0} (1.10)
s.t.
c =

b+ tr if n = 0
(1− τ2)w2n = wˆ2n+ tr if n > 0
(1− τ1)w1n = wˆ1n+ tr if n > 0 and w1n ≤ K
(1.11)
where c is consumption, n is hours of work in eﬃciency units, β is a ﬁxed cost of working,
b is the income in case of non-employment (unemployment beneﬁt or social assistance), and
tr is a lump-sum transfer from the government. I denote the take-home hourly wage as
wˆj ≡ wj(1 − τj). The utility function is quasi-linear and hence implies no income eﬀects,
and  is the constant elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage. This speciﬁcation
is standard in the literature of labor supply and taxation. I extend the model to include the
participation decision (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2011), as it is relevant for the discussion of
in-work beneﬁts.
37The tax rates are deﬁned as τj ≡ (τ
w
j +τ
e
j )
(1+τej )
, where τwj and τ
e
j are the worker and employer paid tax rates
respectively, in type-j job. There is a direct relation between τj and τw. The purpose of this simpliﬁcation
is to deﬁne the take-home (or net) wage of the worker as a linear function of the tax rate and the before-tax
wage (labor cost per hour). In this section, I use the terms before-tax and gross interchangeably for
simpliﬁcation, as they move one-to-one with the labor costs for the employer, for whom taxes barely change
with the reform.
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As pointed out by Tazhitdinova (2017), the interesting case for the Mini-Job setting is such
that (1− τ1)w1 = wˆ1 > wˆ2 = (1− τ2)w2. Otherwise, all workers would take up type-2 jobs,
which are not subject to the earnings means test K. There exist α∗0, α
∗
1 and α
∗
2 such that
the individual labor supply is (derivations are in section (1.D.2) in the Appendix):
n =

0 if α ≤ α∗0
αwˆ1 if α
∗
0 < α ≤ α∗1
Kˆ/wˆ1 if α∗1 < α < α
∗
2
αwˆ2 if α ≥ α∗2
(1.12)
where Kˆ = (1 − τ1)K. The region between α∗1 and α∗2 corresponds to the bunching in the
earnings distribution at the cutoﬀ K of gross earnings. The aggregate labor supply is:
NS1 =
∫ α∗1
α∗0
αwˆ1f(a)da+
∫ α∗2
α∗1
Kˆ
wˆ1
f(a)da
NS2 =
∫∞
α∗2
αwˆ2f(a)da
(1.13)
It is straightforward to show that when there is an expansion in tax beneﬁts for low-earning
workers, given the wages, aggregate supply in jobs type 1 increases, while aggregate supply
in jobs type 2 decreases (derivations in section (1.D.2) in the Appendix). As a result, NS1 /N
S
2
increases.
Labor demand, product market and government budget: Both the output and the
labor market are competitive. There are two ﬁrms, indexed by k ∈ {H,L}, and they produce
two diﬀerentiated goods, YH and YL. H and L stem for high-intensity and low-intensity
in low-earning workers respectively. The prices in the output market are pH and pL, with
pL = 1 as a normalization. The production function of the ﬁrms is deﬁned by equation (1.1),
to which I add some ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Output is heterogeneous Yk, and potentially
total factor productivity, Ak. Importantly, ﬁrms diﬀer in the distribution parameter of factor
returns, such that θH > θL. This means that ﬁrm H has a comparative advantage in low-
earning workers, while ﬁrm L in high-earning workers. The production function including
these heterogeneities across ﬁrms is: Yk = Fk(N1k, N2k) = A[θkN
σ−1
σ
1k + (1 − θk)N
σ−1
σ
2k ]
σ
σ−1 .
From the ﬁrst order condition of the ﬁrms (see e.g. Equation (1.2)), the intensity in low-
earning jobs with respect to high-earning jobs is higher in ﬁrm H, N1H/N2H > N1L/N2L.
Aggregate labor demand is: ND1 = N1H +N1L and N
D
2 = N2H +N2L. Aggregate output is:
Y = YH + YL. Aggregate income in the economy, Inc, equals consumption. The goods are
imperfect substitutes at the aggregate level, and each of them faces an aggregate downward
sloping demand. The government collects revenues from payroll taxes, T , and ﬁnances
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Table 1.4: Simulation of the Mini-Job reform in the model vs. DID estimates
Model Data
In terms of baseline averages (2002)
DiDlow-earning employment -2.8% -18.5%
DiDhigh-earning employment 4.3% 12.4%
DiDtotal employment 4.1% 7.0%
Changes in % of pre-reform levels
Low-earning in Intensive ﬁrm 46.2%
Low-earning in Non-intensive ﬁrm 36.3%
High-earning in Intensive ﬁrm 5.4%
High-earning in Non-intensive ﬁrm -1.7%
Total employment in Intensive ﬁrm 8.9%
Total employment in Non-intensive ﬁrm -1.1%
Note: Mini-Job reform simulated by setting: K = 400, τ1 = 20%, τ2 = 35%. The DiD estimates in the top
panel are the values of the coeﬃcient estimates of regression (1.4) corresponding to 2004, as a proportion of
the pre-reform average across ﬁrms, both in the model and the data. I use the estimates corresponding to
the number of part-time and full-time workers for low-earning and high-earning respectively, and for
full-time equivalent employment for total employment. The bottom panel shows the changes simulated by
the model in terms of the pre-reform employment of each ﬁrm.
the beneﬁts for non-employed workers with them, distributing the remainder in lump-sum
transfers. All these elements are speciﬁed in the Appendix, section (1.D.2).
Equilibrium: The competitive equilibrium of this economy is deﬁned as the set of prices,
w1, w2 and pH , such that the labor market for each job clears, the output market clears,
workers and ﬁrms optimize, and proﬁts are zero.
1.7.2 Simulation exercises
The model is solved and parameterized as explained in the Appendix, section (1.D.2). I set
the parameter values to match the moments in the data for the pre-reform period. Then I
simulate the reform by changing the earnings limit K up to which workers receive the lower
tax rate τ1. Table (1.4) shows that this framework is able to generate qualitatively the results
obtained by the DiD analysis. In terms of the pre-reform averages, the model accounts for
60% of the change in hours in the high-intensity ﬁrms with respect to low-intensity ﬁrms.
The relative increase in high-earning employment is 4% in the model and 12% in the data,
and the relative decrease in low-earning employment is 3% in the model and 19% in the
data.
Importantly, the simulation of the reform using the model allows to tier apart the changes
in employment by type (bottom panel of Table (1.4)), which was not feasible using the
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DiD strategy. According to the model, total employment in ﬁrm H increases by 9%, with
a 46% increase in hours in low-earning jobs, and 5% in hours in high-earning jobs. Total
employment in ﬁrm L shrinks by 1%, through a reduction in the hours in high-earning jobs
(-2%) which more than compensates the increase in the hours in low-earning jobs (36%) as
the latter are more scarce to begin with.
It is worth noting that the key parameters for these results are σ and κ, given that they drive
the scale and substitution eﬀects, as explained in section (1.4). In this exercise, σ = 2.462,
a value which is pinned down from the estimation of the equation corresponding to the ﬁrst
order condition of the ﬁrms. I set κ = 10 for this exercise. Table (1.A28) in the Appendix
shows that if the elasticity of substitution is much higher (20 times more), representing a case
where the substitution eﬀect is very strong, the model generate counterfactual predictions.
Importantly, in this case the ﬁrm which is expanding is L whereas H is contracting. This
point is important, since understanding what is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent
types of labor and its role facing policy changes has generated a substantial amount of interest
in labor economics (Hamermesh and Grant, 1979; Hamermesh, 1982).
Table (1.5) shows further insights from the theoretical framework. In the ﬁrst column, I
show the benchmark for which the model is computed, the pre-reform period, in which
tax-beneﬁts exist already. The second column contains the values of the simulation of the
Mini-Job reform, the reform counterfactual. The third column shows the counterfactual
results in absence of in-work beneﬁts, denoted no policy scenario (although N1 is delimited
by monthly gross earnings of e325, as before the reform, all the workers pay the SSC rate
of regular workers). The other two columns show the variation in the two simulations with
respect to the benchmark. The no-policy and reform counterfactuals are particularly
interesting as they illustrate the changes in employment (and output) across diﬀerent ﬁrms
for diﬀerent levels of in-work beneﬁts. Whereas the comparison of the benchmark to the
simulated reform shows the eﬀects of expanding in-work beneﬁts, the contrast between the
benchmark and the no-policy scenario is illustrative of the introduction of in-work beneﬁts.
Let us focus on the consequences of the Mini-Job reform as compared to the pre-reform
scenario (columns 1 and 2, and 4). The comparison is of particular interest as it allows
to understand the potential general equilibrium eﬀects of the policy, that were not possible
to disentangle in the empirical analysis. The model predicts that before-tax wages of low-
earning workers drops by 12%, whereas the before-tax wage of high-earning workers remains
constant. The drop in w1 embeds the tax beneﬁt shifting from the workers to the employers,
and is driven by a stronger increase in labor supply than in labor demand for these workers.
In equilibrium, both the total number of hours and of workers in tax-advantaged occupations
increases. The constant w2 is accompanied by a decrease in the total number of workers in
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Table 1.5: Simulation of the model
Pre-Reform Mini-Job Reform No-Policy Variation Variation
(benchmark) (counterfactual 1) (counterfactual 2) Count. 1 vs. Benchm. Benchm. vs. Count. 2
w1 24.5 21.5 30.5 -12% -24%
w2 24.8 24.8 24.8 0% 0%
w1/w2 1.0 0.9 1.2 -12% -24%
wˆ1 20.1 17.2 19.8 -14% 1%
wˆ2 16.1 16.1 16.1 0% 0%
Employment rate 94.6% 93.3% 94.5% -1.2pp. 0.1pp.
Workers in mini-jobs (%) 14.9% 16.9% 10.1% 14% -32%
N1 1.6 2.3 0.9 40% 43%
N2 63.6 63.0 64.4 -1% -1%
N1/(N1 +N2) 2.5% 3.5% 1.4% 40% -43%
N1 +N2 65.2 65.3 65.3 0.1% 0%
N1H 0.7 1.0 0.4 46% 46%
N2H 7.4 7.8 6.8 5% 8%
N1L 0.9 1.3 0.6 36% 40%
N2L 54.7 53.7 56.3 -2% -3%
N1/N2 in H 0.092 0.127 0.054 39% 42%
N1/N2 in L 0.017 0.023 0.010 39% 42%
T 558 557 568 -0.1% -2%
Inc 1,614 1,614 1,623 0% -1%
Y 1,570 1,567 1,581 -0.1% -1%
pH 1.25 1.24 1.27 -1% -2%
YH/Y 10.2% 11.1% 8.9% 9% 13%
YL/Y 89.8% 88.9% 91.1% -1% -1%
Note: No-Policy: K = 325, τ1 = τ2 = 35%. Pre-reform: K = 325, τ1 = 18%, τ2 = 35%. Mini-Job reform:
K = 400, τ1 = 20%, τ2 = 35%. Comparison is inverted in the last column, to be comparable to the eﬀects
of the column before.
these occupations, particularly due to the receding labor supply.
An important prediction of the model is that, as a consequence of the labor expansion in
ﬁrm H and contraction in L, the conﬁguration of total output shifts towards the former.
This is not trivial as ﬁrms have diﬀerent productivity for diﬀerent workers and ﬁrm H has
a lower total factor productivity, as suggested by the data. Overall, the model predicts that
total employment in hours should increase (due to a big expansion of hours in low-earning
jobs which more than compensates a small decline in high-earning jobs), and total output
should decline.
Shifting attention to the no-policy scenario (columns 3 and 5) adds the interesting insight
with respect to the total employment eﬀect of the reform. Even though the before-tax wage
for low-earning workers falls as a consequence of the introduction of in-work beneﬁts, the net
wage remains above the no-policy level. There is then a positive eﬀect on the employment
rate of the introduction of in-work beneﬁts. There is still though a negative eﬀect on output
due to the reallocation towards the least productive ﬁrm.
To sum up, these exercises provide valuable insights with respect to the labor demand side
responses when in-work beneﬁts are introduced and expanded. In particular, they show how
production and employment reallocate across ﬁrms as a consequence of the policy. Wages
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are depressed for the low-earning segment, without changes for high-earning workers.38
1.8 Conclusions
This paper analyzes ﬁrm responses to an expansion of in-work beneﬁts in the form of lower
taxes for low-earning workers. Unlike the existing literature, which has focused mainly on
labor supply responses to such interventions, I provide an analysis of the labor demand re-
sponses. The paper shows that in-work beneﬁts do not only aﬀect employment of targeted
low-earning workers, but also generate spillovers on the employment of higher-earning work-
ers who are not directly targeted by the policy. The empirical analysis focuses on the German
Mini-Job reform of 2003, which had a dramatic impact on the German labor market. After
the reform, about 20% of all private sector workers hold so-called marginal jobs that qualify
for the tax beneﬁts.
The existing literature has documented that employers share part of the tax beneﬁts provided
to workers, which results in a change in labor costs when in-work beneﬁts are expanded. In
this paper, I show that ﬁrm responses are aﬀected both by the implied decrease in total labor
costs (and thus a scale eﬀect), and the change in the relative costs of tax-advantaged versus
non-tax-advantaged workers (and thus a substitution eﬀect). To motivate my empirical
analysis, I ﬁrst present a simple theoretical framework that relates the strength of the scale
and substitution eﬀects of a particular ﬁrm to its pre-reform intensity in low-earning workers.
The theoretical analysis suggests that the scale eﬀect is stronger in ﬁrms which are more
intensive in low-earning workers, whereas the substitution eﬀect dominates in ﬁrms with a
relatively low intensity in low-earning workers.
I then test these predictions using a panel of establishments matched to administrative data
of workers. The identiﬁcation strategy relies on a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach that
exploits the expansion of in-work beneﬁts with the Mini-Job reform and the pre-reform
intensity in low-earning workers across establishments. I document that establishments with
a high intensity of low-earning workers prior to the reform expand relative to low-intensity
establishments. Importantly, this relative expansion of initially high-intensity establishments
is concentrated in high-earning, non-tax advantaged workers. On the other hand, initially
low-intensity establishments seem to substitute employment towards low-earning workers
without expanding total employment at the same pace. These changes in ﬁrms' workforce
are the result of changes within ﬁrms in the relative importance of part-time and full-time
employment, in the skill level of the workforce, and in the type of tasks that workers perform.
38Interpretation of aggregate employment levels, income and total output in this version of the model are
aﬀected by the parsimonious modelling of the extensive margin decision of the labor supply.
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While the relative responses of initially high-intensity and initially low-intensity ﬁrms provide
evidence on the presence of both the scale and the substitution eﬀects, the diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences approach does not allow to analyze employment levels and output in each
type of ﬁrms. To provide some sense of the implications of the empirical ﬁndings in these
dimensions, I extend the simple theoretical framework, which focuses on labor demand, to a
general equilibrium model by adding the labor supply-side and introducing two types of ﬁrms.
Simulations of the Mini-Job reform suggest that the equilibrium wages of low-earning workers
decline, whereas the wages of high-earning workers remain constant. In this framework, the
diﬀerential responses in terms of employment across ﬁrms that are observed in the data are
driven by an increase in employment in the low-earning segment across all ﬁrms, and by a
reallocation of high-earning workers from ﬁrms in which they are more abundant to ﬁrms
in which high-earning workers are scarcer. There is also reallocation of production from
low-intensity (in low-earning workers) ﬁrms to high-intensity ﬁrms. Since the data seem to
suggest that high-intensity ﬁrms are less productive, this reallocation has a cost in terms of
lower total output.
The eﬀects documented in this paper are inherently important for the design of in-work
beneﬁts, and more broadly, for any type of labor market intervention that targets workers
that are imperfect substitutes to the rest of the workforce. My ﬁndings suggest that labor
supply incentives targeting low-earning workers can have non-trivial labor demand eﬀects
and can create spillovers to employment not targeted by the policy. Finally, the results help
to shed light on the ongoing debate regarding the pervasive eﬀects of the German Mini-
Job reform, which is often cited as a major cause of the observed increase in precarious
employment in Germany, and which is considered as a potential role model by several other
countries that are seeking to implement labor market reforms.
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Appendix
1.A Additional Tables
Table 1.A1: Social Security average tax rates and monthly gross earnings limits
Earnings Worker rate Employer rate Income tax
Regular Jobs
1999-30 Mar 2003 e326+ 21% 21% YES
1 Apr 2003-30 Jun 2006 e801+ 21% 21% YES
1 Jul 2006-31 Dec 2007 e801+ 19.5% 19.5% YES
Mini-Jobs
1999-30 Mar 2003 e0-e325 0% 22% NO
1 Apr 2003-30 Jun 2006 e0-e400 0% 25% NO
1 Jul 2006-31 Dec 2007 e0-e400 0% 30% NO
Midi-Jobs
1999-30 Mar 2003 -
1 Apr 2003-30 Jun 2006 e401-e800 4.1%-21% 21% YES
1 Jul 2006-31 Dec 2007 e401-e800 4.1%-19.5% 19.5% YES
Note: Only for the period 1999-2007. SSC rates are in terms of gross earnings, income tax rates (to which
mini-jobs are exempted) are not included.
Table 1.A2: Hours of work by type of worker, 2005
Type of job Hours a week Hourly (net) wage
Regular part-time 13 19
(5.68) (21.20)
Regular full-time 41 9
(9.50) (4.16)
Mini-job (main) 14 10
(12.00) (25.59)
Mini-job (secondary) 40 9
(13.97) (6.59)
Midi-job (main) 26 8
(13.86) (16.41)
Midi-job (secondary) 36 15
(16.96) (12.38)
Total 34 10
(15.21) (11.94)
Note: Data from G-SOEP. Standard errors in parenthesis. Hours worked and hourly net earnings for valid
responses. Workers 17-65 years old.
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Table 1.A3: Transitions between 2002 and 2004
Row totals Inactive Unemployed Mini-job Midi-job Regular PT Regular FT Total
Inactive 20% 21% 23% 2% 6% 27% 100%
Unemployed 1% 64% 7% 2% 5% 21% 100%
Mini-job 6% 4% 79% 2% 4% 5% 100%
Regular PT 1% 9% 4% 6% 72% 8% 100%
Regular FT 0% 9% 1% 1% 3% 86% 100%
Total 4% 16% 12% 2% 12% 54% 100%
Column totals Inactive Unemployed Mini-job Midi-job Regular PT Regular FT Total
Inactive 81% 23% 34% 21% 9% 9% 17%
Unemployed 3% 40% 6% 9% 4% 4% 10%
Mini-job 11% 2% 52% 9% 3% 1% 8%
Regular PT 2% 6% 4% 36% 70% 2% 11%
Regular FT 3% 29% 5% 25% 14% 85% 54%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Note: SIAB, annual, main spell. Inactivity is inferred if the worker either appears or disappears from the
social security records.
Table 1.A4: Proportion of workers with secondary job
Total Men Women Young
(<30)
Prime-
age
Old
(>55)
Low-
educated
Medium-
educated
Highly-
educated
Before (2002) 3.4% 3.0% 3.8% 3.8% 3.3% 3.0% 4.2% 3.4% 2.4%
After (2004) 5.0% 4.3% 5.7% 5.1% 5.1% 4.1% 5.6% 5.0% 3.6%
Var (pp.) 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.2
Var (%) 45.5% 42.0% 48.0% 33.1% 53.7% 37.2% 33.3% 49.7% 49.6%
Note: SIAB, spell data.
Table 1.A5: Mini-jobbers close to the threshold in 2004
Status/Earnings in 2002 Total mini-jobs earning 325-400 in 2004
Mini-jobs earning 325-400 in 2004, employed in 2002
Do not change job Change job
out of total employed 73.5% 26.5%
Inactive 30.7%
Unemployed 5.2%
(0, 325] 45.6% 76.3% 56.6%
(325, 400] 5.0% 8.3% 6.6%
(400, 800] 5.6% 7.8% 11.5%
more than 800 7.9% 7.7% 25.4%
Note: SIAB, annual data, main spell.
Table 1.A6: Mini-jobbers close to the threshold in 2004, employed in 2002
Mini-jobs earning 325-400 in 2004 (changes
with respect to 2002)
Full-time to
Part-time
Diﬀerent occupation
Total 11.3% 23.1%
Of those who do not change establishment 7.6% 7.6%
Of those who change establishment 21.8% 62.9%
Note: SIAB, annual data, main spell.
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Table 1.A7: Proportion of workers by education and part-time/full-time status (2002)
Tasks Low-educated Medium-educated Highly-educated Total
Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time Full-time (% workers)
Primary activities and construction
Analytical non-routine 5.3% 52.9% 1.7% 37.9% 7.6%
Interactive non-routine 29.2% 57.8% 1.1%
Cognitive routine 2.0% 2.7% 16.9% 72.3% 0.8% 5.3% 23.3%
Manual routine 2.9% 12.4% 6.0% 77.3% 9.9%
Manual non-routine 2.0% 8.9% 4.7% 83.8% 58.1%
Manufacturing
Analytical non-routine 0.5% 2.3% 3.8% 52.5% 1.5% 39.3% 15.5%
Interactive non-routine 5.3% 3.0% 26.8% 57.2% 0.4% 7.2% 4.9%
Cognitive routine 1.2% 5.1% 9.6% 73.0% 0.7% 10.4% 35.0%
Manual routine 2.8% 21.6% 4.6% 70.3% 0.1% 0.5% 33.0%
Manual non-routine 11.6% 15.3% 12.3% 59.9% 0.2% 0.6% 11.6%
Services
Analytical non-routine 1.4% 2.3% 12.2% 48.2% 7.3% 28.6% 18.6%
Interactive non-routine 7.2% 2.6% 34.9% 42.3% 3.0% 10.0% 14.3%
Cognitive routine 3.0% 2.6% 24.4% 60.8% 1.6% 7.6% 31.3%
Manual routine 10.0% 13.4% 15.9% 59.7% 0.2% 0.8% 3.5%
Manual non-routine 14.8% 8.9% 26.8% 47.2% 0.9% 1.4% 32.3%
Note: SIAB, annual data, main spell. Low-educated correspond to individuals without Abitur (upper
secondary certiﬁcate), medium-educated to individuals with Abitur or apprentices and highly-educated to
individuals with a higher-education degree.
Table 1.A8: Dispersion (inter-quartile range) in low-earning labor/high-earning labor and
cost ratio within industries (2002)
Median P25 P75 Min Max
Low-earning / high-earning workers 0.250 0.040 0.60 0.000 9.667
... (in full-time equivalent) 0.077 0.002 0.211 0.000 4.000
Factor cost ratio (in FTE) 0.030 0.004 0.110 0.000 8.959
Note: LIAB, cross-section of establishments. Industries are classiﬁed in 224 categories.
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Table 1.A9: Characteristics of establishments in 2002, cross-section and panel (2000-2007),
weighted/unweighted
Cross-section Panel
Unweighed Weighted Unweighed Weighted
Establishment age 15.2 13.2 14.5 14.2
Establishment size (n. of workers) 164.4 15.6 161.6 18.5
Proportion of workers below 2003 MJ threshold 15.5% 27.8% 16.0% 29.2%
Proportion of workers below 2003 MidiJ threshold 21.4% 37.7% 21.4% 37.6%
Proportion of marginal part-time workers 9.9% 18.6% 10.5% 20.4%
Proportion of part-time workers 23.2% 31.2% 23.0% 32.1%
Proportion of temporary workers 5.7% 3.0% 5.3% 3.1%
Proportion of low-educated workers 13.8% 13.0% 12.6% 11.5%
Proportion of medium-educated workers 62.7% 58.6% 65.9% 58.0%
Proportion of highly-educated workers 7.5% 3.7% 7.5% 4.3%
Proportion of female workers 46.2% 55.1% 46.4% 56.7%
Proportion of working proprietors 8.4% 20.4% 9.5% 19.8%
Proportion of trainees/apprentices 5.1% 4.6% 5.0% 4.7%
Median daily gross wage 61.2 44.3 58.3 45.0
Median daily wage full-time 72.6 59.7 68.9 61.5
Median daily wage part-time 32.8 20.0 32.8 19.6
Median daily wage low-earnings 9.2 9.1 8.9 9.2
Median daily wage high-earnings 68.0 56.8 65.1 58.8
Monthly per capita labor cost 1,865.2 1,353.1 1,748.3 1,396.3
Total monthly labor cost 479,785 33,551 478,390 43,405
Investment (million) 2.146 0.116 1.877 0.118
Sales (million) 37.483 2.493 29.975 2.967
Exports/revenues 10.9% 4.2% 10.5% 4.1%
Hirings/employment 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.19
Separations/employment 0.60 0.32 0.25 0.26
Work council 40.4% 10.2% 38.7% 9.9%
Collective agreement 57.8% 43.5% 57.3% 44.6%
Agriculture, primary 4.3% 3.7% 4.4% 4.0%
Manufacturing 26.1% 11.9% 28.6% 12.9%
Construction 8.9% 10.8% 9.7% 10.5%
Retail, repair 13.0% 22.1% 12.5% 21.5%
Transport, communication 3.6% 5.1% 3.1% 4.8%
Financial intermediation 3.0% 2.3% 2.6% 2.3%
Services for businesses 11.4% 15.3% 8.3% 15.7%
Other services 19.4% 23.5% 18.3% 23.2%
Public administration 10.4% 5.3% 12.5% 5.0%
Proportion of workers in analytical non-routine tasks 14.8% 10.6% 13.5% 11.1%
Proportion of workers in interactive non-routine tasks 8.9% 12.0% 8.7% 11.3%
Proportion of workers in cognitive routine tasks 31.5% 34.6% 31.4% 35.9%
Proportion of workers in manual routine tasks 12.8% 8.2% 14.5% 8.7%
Proportion of workers in manual non-routine tasks 28.5% 31.5% 28.2% 30.1%
New ﬁrm (Estab. Panel) 2.5% 9.2%
Firm death 1.6% 2.9%
Observations 14,591 3,770
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Table 1.A10: Characteristics of establishments by proportion of low-earning workers (be-
low/above median), 2002
Below median Above median
Proportion of workers below 2003 MJ threshold 4.6% 53.8%
(0.0685) (0.251)
Proportion of workers below 2003 MidiJ threshold 14.5% 60.7%
(0.234) (0.251)
Establishment age 15.6 12.9
(9.088) (8.328)
Establishment size (n. of workers) 28.4 8.5
(132.2) (28.88)
Employment, full-time equivalent 25.2 5.8
(120.7) (20.59)
Proportion of part-time workers 16.5% 47.7%
(0.251) (0.318)
Proportion of low-educated workers 10.8% 12.2%
(0.201) (0.206)
Proportion of medium-educated workers 64.6% 51.4%
(0.350) (0.349)
Proportion of highly-educated workers 6.2% 2.4%
(0.171) (0.0904)
Vacancies/employment 2.5% 1.1%
(0.0884) (0.0494)
Median daily gross wage 61.4 28.5
(24.88) (21.36)
Median daily gross wage (growth) 12.2% 10.0%
(0.959) (0.643)
Median daily gross wage of full-time 68.6 53.3
(26.10) (26.60)
Median daily gross wage of full-time (growth) 2.9% 3.7%
(0.165) (0.285)
Median daily gross wage of part-time 32.7 11.8
(22.94) (9.733)
Median daily gross wage part-time (growth) 18.5% 9.3%
(0.716) (1.009)
Median daily gross wage of low-earning workers 9.3 9.1
(3.600) (3.043)
Median daily gross wage of low-earning workers (growth) 9.5% 7.1%
(1.460) (0.900)
Median daily gross wage of high-earning workers 62.9 53.9
(24.98) (22.06)
Median daily gross wage of high-earning workers (growth) 2.0% 4.6%
(0.172) (0.229)
Average monthly labor cost 1,720 1,071
(1,044.6) (749.4)
Monthly wage bill 75,929 10,725
(471,472.9) (45,367.3)
Inequality (P75/P25) full-time workers 1.41 1.93
(0.512) (20.17)
Observations 2,746 1,024
Note: Panel 2000-2007. Establishments classiﬁed according to whether they are below or above the
(weighted) median of the proportion of low-earning workers (20%). Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 1.A11: Characteristics of establishments by proportion of low-earning workers (be-
low/above median), 2002 (continuation)
Below median Above median
Hirings/employment 0.16 0.22
(0.206) (0.244)
Separations/employment 0.25 0.27
(0.481) (0.564)
Investment (million) 0.200 0.036
(2.159) (0.256)
Sales (million) 5.328 0.667
(60.039) (1.777)
Exports/revenues 5.2% 3.0%
(21.94) (19.01)
Work council 16.5% 3.4%
(0.372) (0.180)
Collective agreement 49.6% 39.5%
(0.500) (0.489)
Agriculture, primary 5.5% 2.5%
(0.228) (0.158)
Manufacturing 15.5% 10.3%
(0.362) (0.305)
Construction 15.4% 5.5%
(0.361) (0.229)
Retail, repair 18.7% 24.4%
(0.390) (0.430)
Transport, communication 5.6% 4.0%
(0.230) (0.196)
Financial intermediation 3.0% 1.7%
(0.170) (0.130)
Services for businesses 11.7% 19.7%
(0.321) (0.398)
Other services 19.3% 27.1%
(0.395) (0.445)
Public administration 5.4% 4.7%
(0.226) (0.211)
Workers in analytical non-routine tasks 14.6% 7.6%
(0.268) (0.181)
Workers in interactive non-routine tasks 9.9% 12.8%
(0.240) (0.272)
Workers in cognitive routine tasks 32.7% 39.2%
(0.361) (0.371)
Workers in manual routine tasks 11.4% 6.1%
(0.262) (0.184)
Workers in manual non-routine tasks 29.4% 30.8%
(0.374) (0.354)
Observations 2,746 1,024
Note: Panel 2000-2007. Establishments classiﬁed according to whether they are below or above the
(weighted) median of the proportion of low-earning workers (20%). Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 1.A12: Empirical test: variations in employment by type
Coexistence of scale and substitution eﬀect (0 < σ < η)
Intensive Non-intensive Diﬀ. (Int. - Non Int.)
Low-earning employment ↑ (scale) ↑ (substitution) ≶ 0
High-earning employment ↑↑ ↑ > 0
Total employment ↑↑ ↑ > 0
Only substitution eﬀect (σ > η)
Intensive Non-intensive Diﬀ. (Int. - Non Int.)
Low-earning employment ↑ ↑↑ < 0
High-earning employment ↓↓ ↓ < 0
Total employment ↓↑ ↑↓ ≶ 0
Only scale eﬀect (σ = 0)
Intensive (s1H) Non-intensive (s1L) Diﬀ. (Int. - Non Int.)
Low-earning employment ↑↑ ↑ > 0
High-earning employment ↑↑ ↑ > 0
Total employment ↑↑ ↑ > 0
Note: The direction and magnitudes of the eﬀects correspond to the expression:
dlnN1
dlnw1
= −[s1η + (1− s1)σ]
dlnN2
dlnw1
= −[s1η − s1σ]
Total employment is inferred intuitively. The change in total employment should be approximately equal
to the change in each employment type weighted by the respective proportion of each type of worker.
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Table 1.A13: Estimates of the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients
1999-2002 2002-2004 2002-2007
βˆ1999 βˆ2000 βˆ2001 βˆPost
Total employment -0.063 -0.289 -0.344 0.463 0.873*
(0.8148) (0.5562) (0.3313) (0.2577) (0.3632)
Total full-time equivalent employment 0.651 0.136 -0.134 0.763*** 1.370***
(0.7153) (0.4749) (0.2692) (0.2238) (0.2912)
Low-earning workers (growth) -0.127 -0.488 -0.447* -0.413**
(0.3555) (0.3351) (0.2149) (0.1558)
Higher-earning workers (growth) 0.170 0.067 0.300 0.103
(0.1694) (0.1449) (0.1596) (0.1093)
Part-time workers -0.178 0.105 -0.069 -0.723*** -0.852***
(0.3878) (0.2911) (0.1825) (0.1608) (0.1961)
Full-time workers 0.586 -0.030 -0.118 1.182*** 1.873***
(0.5732) (0.3638) (0.2463) (0.2069) (0.2711)
Proportion of low-educated workers -0.014 -0.014 -0.004 -0.038* -0.042*
(0.0312) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0187) (0.0204)
Number of medium-educated workers 0.794 0.236 0.052 0.578** 0.963***
(0.6540) (0.4179) (0.2219) (0.1865) (0.2453)
Median gross daily wage (growth) 0.175 0.235 0.497*** 0.324***
(0.1756) (0.1588) (0.1144) (0.1084)
Median gross daily wage full-time (growth) 0.057 0.002 0.134 0.093
(0.1056) (0.0570) (0.0730) (0.0482)
Median gross daily wage of part-time (growth) 0.103 -0.151 0.451*** 0.054
(0.1408) (0.0982) (0.1279) (0.2144)
Total investment (euros) -61,213 -45,864 -61,997 9,235 6,408
(40870.5) (34493.8) (43756.7) (32644.1) (32603.5)
Vacancies (ln) 0.092 0.411 0.395 0.269
(0.2960) (0.3240) (0.2017) (0.1817)
Hirings of workers earning 800-1200 0.024 -0.045 0.069 0.117***
(0.0598) (0.0525) (0.0402) (0.0340)
Hirings of workers earning 1600-2000 0.052 -0.107 0.163** 0.189***
(0.0970) (0.0919) (0.0541) (0.0571)
Wage of part-time hiring 7.121 0.124 1.692 4.524*
(3.7899) (3.1635) (2.2834) (2.2909)
Wage of full-time hiring -9.124 5.391 -0.587 -10.362
(8.3273) (7.8964) (5.5420) (6.6588)
Frequency of wage upgrade 0.148* 0.164* 0.098 0.069
(0.0673) (0.0705) (0.0524) (0.0440)
Frequency of wage downgrade -0.037 -0.031 -0.062 -0.098
(0.0734) (0.0496) (0.0690) (0.0572)
Proportion of workers in analytical non-routine tasks 0.019 0.023 0.010 0.011 0.016
(0.0250) (0.0176) (0.0121) (0.0089) (0.0096)
Proportion of workers in interactive non-routine tasks 0.009 0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.0165) (0.0102) (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0100)
Note: Estimates from equation (1.4). Diﬀerent rows correspond to diﬀerent outcomes. Columns 1-3 shows
estimates of β over the 1999-2002 period. Column 4 shows estimates of β for the 2002-2004 period
(short-run), and column 5, for 2002-2007 (medium-run), both using an indicator variable Post that takes
the value 1 for 2003 on. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Growth rates
of low-earning and high-earning workers are estimated on the subsample of establishments with both types
of workers (quintiles 2 to 4 of intensity in low-earning workers).
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Table 1.A14: Estimates of the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients, heterogeneous eﬀects
Employment FTE employment Part-time Full-time Low-educated (proportion) Medium-educated
Industry
IntLE 1.65* 1.68** 0.02 1.64** -0.09 1.19*
(baseline: Primaries, construction) (0.688) (0.583) (0.434) (0.522) (0.110) (0.480)
IntLE × Manufacturing 0.88 1.65 -1.16 2.43 0.15 1.31
(1.912) (1.676) (0.968) (1.610) (0.113) (1.394)
IntLE × Services -0.39 -0.25 -0.41 0.03 0.04 0.19
(0.878) (0.726) (0.521) (0.655) (0.112) (0.612)
R2 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.09
Establishment age
IntLE 0.90 0.67 0.22 0.54 -0.02 0.91
(baseline: 0-9 y.o.) (0.730) (0.588) (0.370) (0.528) (0.022) (0.515)
IntLE × 10-19 y.o. 0.70 1.45 -0.56 1.79 -0.05 1.33
(1.237) (1.015) (0.514) (0.956) (0.059) (0.869)
IntLE × 20-29 y.o. 0.72 1.54 -1.68** 2.55** -0.02 0.47
(1.139) (0.972) (0.564) (0.908) (0.052) (0.751)
R2 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.09
Establishment size
IntLE 0.35 0.34 -0.25 0.44 -0.05 0.56
(baseline: 1-5 work.) (0.410) (0.359) (0.196) (0.325) (0.028) (0.317)
IntLE × 6-20 work. 1.03 0.55 1.13 -0.09 0.03 0.72
(0.839) (0.665) (0.610) (0.618) (0.031) (0.613)
IntLE × 21-200 work. 5.23 7.18* 2.22 6.04 0.09 7.05*
(5.217) (3.483) (3.381) (3.115) (0.051) (2.980)
IntLE × 201 or more work. 20.21 41.93 -4.72 48.29** 0.07 24.24
(37.146) (23.775) (31.229) (17.603) (0.039) (15.611)
R2 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.09
Collective agreement (industry or company level)
IntLE 0.73 0.83 -0.21 0.90* -0.04 1.07**
(baseline: No agreement) (0.515) (0.436) (0.258) (0.406) (0.025) (0.361)
IntLE × Agreement 1.66 1.92* -0.51 2.38** -0.00 0.91
(0.994) (0.784) (0.523) (0.730) (0.051) (0.619)
R2 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.09
Note: Estimates from equation (1.6.5). Diﬀerent columns correspond to diﬀerent outcomes, and diﬀerent
panels correspond to diﬀerent variables in the heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Controlling for industry speciﬁc (224 categories) quadratic trends.
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Table 1.A15: Estimates for βˆt for total employment - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
1999 -0.109 2.819 0.114 -0.121
(0.8734) (2.1425) (0.7532) (0.8745)
2000 -0.409 1.229 -0.522 -0.496 -0.411
(0.5696) (1.2483) (0.5381) (0.5147) (0.5692)
2001 -0.472 0.182 -0.491 -0.395 -0.469
(0.3362) (0.6493) (0.3398) (0.6099) (0.3362)
2002 baseline
2003 0.276 -0.049 0.406 -0.058 0.286
(0.2140) (0.4726) (0.2302) (0.3990) (0.2127)
2004 0.666 0.304 0.914** 0.070 0.677*
(0.3400) (0.9055) (0.3478) (0.4347) (0.3398)
2005 1.246** 1.120 1.569*** 0.262 1.243**
(0.4326) (1.2710) (0.4602) (0.4419) (0.4327)
2006 1.325** 1.748 1.767*** -0.220 1.297**
(0.4755) (1.6606) (0.5366) (0.4028) (0.4822)
2007 0.891 2.147 1.374* -0.760 0.867
(0.5657) (2.2076) (0.6290) (0.4124) (0.5692)
LE industry (other commuting zones) -7.263
(7.0162)
LE commuting zone (other industries) -0.480
(1.9197)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 1.A16: Estimates for βˆt for total full-time equivalent employment - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
1999 0.506 2.145 0.799 0.489
(0.7722) (1.8038) (0.6559) (0.7739)
2000 -0.077 0.824 -0.141 -0.537 -0.081
(0.4881) (1.0433) (0.4710) (0.4366) (0.4884)
2001 -0.264 0.065 -0.241 -0.416 -0.267
(0.2752) (0.5404) (0.2748) (0.4817) (0.2756)
2002 baseline
2003 0.434* 0.344 0.529** 0.329 0.441*
(0.1849) (0.3896) (0.1941) (0.3138) (0.1836)
2004 1.087*** 1.105 1.285*** 0.566 1.091***
(0.2917) (0.7457) (0.2945) (0.3486) (0.2900)
2005 1.783*** 2.105* 2.056*** 0.588 1.776***
(0.3324) (0.9797) (0.3512) (0.3514) (0.3333)
2006 1.903*** 2.748* 2.307*** 0.055 1.885***
(0.3796) (1.2435) (0.4080) (0.3236) (0.3886)
2007 1.678*** 3.251* 2.159*** -0.338 1.659***
(0.4450) (1.5847) (0.4696) (0.3186) (0.4507)
LE industry (other commuting zones) -4.404
(6.4675)
LE commuting zone (other industries) 0.376
(1.6108)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 1.A17: Estimates for βˆt for growth rate of low-earning employment - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
2000 -0.066 -1.142 -0.125 -0.075
(0.3293) (0.6044) (0.3278) (0.3312)
2001 -0.414 -0.869* -0.451 -1.061 -0.408
(0.3258) (0.3612) (0.3382) (0.8706) (0.3250)
2002 baseline
2003 -0.775** -0.498 -0.776** -1.065* -0.782**
(0.2654) (0.3013) (0.2697) (0.4971) (0.2660)
2004 -0.186 0.199 -0.200 0.288 -0.187
(0.3003) (0.3528) (0.3005) (0.5066) (0.2997)
2005 -0.609** -0.290 -0.645* -0.708 -0.605**
(0.2329) (0.3433) (0.2514) (0.5341) (0.2322)
2006 -0.205 -0.124 -0.222 -0.059 -0.198
(0.1758) (0.4351) (0.1946) (0.4197) (0.1771)
2007 -0.409 -0.737 -0.403 -0.709 -0.396
(0.2233) (0.5995) (0.2423) (0.4517) (0.2208)
LE industry (other commuting zones) 2.067
(1.2267)
LE commuting zone (other industries) -0.204
(0.4018)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 1.A18: Estimates for βˆt for growth rate of high-earning employment - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
2000 0.117 0.423* 0.143 0.122
(0.1610) (0.2135) (0.1667) (0.1580)
2001 0.025 0.140 0.035 -0.069 0.029
(0.1504) (0.1695) (0.1493) (0.2740) (0.1502)
2002 baseline
2003 0.443* 0.398 0.453* 0.530 0.444*
(0.1966) (0.2091) (0.1988) (0.3232) (0.1961)
2004 0.237 0.219 0.242 -0.302 0.241
(0.1609) (0.1862) (0.1589) (0.1926) (0.1610)
2005 0.093 0.174 0.097 -0.203 0.094
(0.1515) (0.1798) (0.1547) (0.2369) (0.1510)
2006 -0.168 0.084 -0.163 -0.298 -0.162
(0.1237) (0.1633) (0.1284) (0.1846) (0.1220)
2007 0.007 0.499* -0.023 0.020 0.008
(0.1219) (0.2148) (0.1339) (0.1949) (0.1226)
LE industry (other commuting zones) -0.524
(0.8959)
LE commuting zone (other industries) -0.445*
(0.2204)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 1.A19: Estimates for βˆt for number of part-time workers - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
1999 -0.103 0.639 -0.470 -0.118
(0.4192) (1.1710) (0.3412) (0.4191)
2000 0.123 0.573 -0.168 0.264 0.119
(0.3003) (0.6870) (0.2588) (0.2751) (0.3000)
2001 -0.105 0.131 -0.246 -0.193 -0.108
(0.1856) (0.3513) (0.1951) (0.3574) (0.1856)
2002 baseline
2003 -0.635*** -0.878** -0.526*** -0.669* -0.630***
(0.1471) (0.2738) (0.1550) (0.2641) (0.1471)
2004 -0.811*** -1.306** -0.618** -0.233 -0.809***
(0.2069) (0.4883) (0.2087) (0.2522) (0.2080)
2005 -0.688** -1.451 -0.420 0.092 -0.694**
(0.2561) (0.7634) (0.2601) (0.2604) (0.2560)
2006 -0.969*** -2.002 -0.649* -0.332 -0.982***
(0.2692) (1.1142) (0.3029) (0.2299) (0.2659)
2007 -1.168*** -2.489 -0.823* -0.245 -1.182***
(0.2939) (1.6077) (0.3357) (0.2000) (0.2911)
LE industry (other commuting zones) -2.948
(2.9340)
LE commuting zone (other industries) 0.474
(1.1140)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 1.A20: Estimates for βˆt for number of full-time workers - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
1999 0.384 1.588 0.963 0.374
(0.6264) (1.7176) (0.5887) (0.6288)
2000 -0.260 0.379 -0.111 -0.680 -0.262
(0.3801) (0.9966) (0.4205) (0.4120) (0.3811)
2001 -0.235 -0.045 -0.110 -0.246 -0.235
(0.2514) (0.5083) (0.2490) (0.3460) (0.2521)
2002 baseline
2003 0.786*** 0.841* 0.802*** 0.675* 0.791***
(0.1695) (0.3631) (0.1745) (0.2787) (0.1683)
2004 1.575*** 1.889** 1.634*** 0.710* 1.579***
(0.2711) (0.6959) (0.2680) (0.3132) (0.2691)
2005 2.198*** 2.974*** 2.281*** 0.512 2.194***
(0.2983) (0.8853) (0.3136) (0.3257) (0.2998)
2006 2.475*** 3.937*** 2.654*** 0.220 2.462***
(0.3548) (1.0831) (0.3625) (0.3013) (0.3645)
2007 2.375*** 4.738*** 2.616*** -0.209 2.362***
(0.4122) (1.2957) (0.4179) (0.2904) (0.4191)
LE industry (other commuting zones) -3.273
(6.1716)
LE commuting zone (other industries) 0.135
(1.5413)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 1.A21: Estimates for βˆt for proportion of low-educated workers - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
1999 -0.018 0.054 -0.029 -0.018
(0.0313) (0.0822) (0.0305) (0.0314)
2000 -0.008 0.029 -0.011 -0.002 -0.008
(0.0192) (0.0492) (0.0199) (0.0349) (0.0192)
2001 -0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.008 -0.003
(0.0164) (0.0263) (0.0166) (0.0215) (0.0164)
2002 baseline
2003 -0.039* -0.042 -0.040* -0.046 -0.039*
(0.0179) (0.0268) (0.0182) (0.0243) (0.0179)
2004 -0.028 -0.023 -0.030 0.008 -0.028
(0.0212) (0.0381) (0.0217) (0.0192) (0.0212)
2005 -0.022 -0.000 -0.027 -0.005 -0.022
(0.0235) (0.0449) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0235)
2006 -0.055* -0.005 -0.064* -0.043 -0.055*
(0.0253) (0.0541) (0.0263) (0.0253) (0.0251)
2007 -0.062* 0.026 -0.074* -0.003 -0.062*
(0.0280) (0.0704) (0.0316) (0.0220) (0.0278)
LE industry (other commuting zones) 0.056
(0.1900)
LE commuting zone (other industries) 0.007
(0.0546)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 1.A22: Estimates for βˆt for number of medium-educated workers - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
1999 0.675 1.664 0.350 0.672
(0.7014) (1.5966) (0.5483) (0.7049)
2000 0.107 0.707 -0.182 -0.489 0.108
(0.4257) (0.9230) (0.4162) (0.3802) (0.4258)
2001 -0.012 0.252 -0.109 -0.112 -0.009
(0.2240) (0.4737) (0.2457) (0.4476) (0.2238)
2002 baseline
2003 0.503** 0.332 0.692*** 0.559 0.508**
(0.1706) (0.3469) (0.1846) (0.2861) (0.1695)
2004 0.653** 0.359 1.013*** 0.204 0.659**
(0.2370) (0.6522) (0.2530) (0.3041) (0.2350)
2005 1.236*** 0.859 1.756*** 0.651* 1.236***
(0.2730) (0.8547) (0.3088) (0.2864) (0.2732)
2006 1.364*** 0.975 2.084*** 0.213 1.351***
(0.3285) (1.0800) (0.3637) (0.2893) (0.3375)
2007 1.074** 0.722 1.933*** -0.235 1.065**
(0.3805) (1.3552) (0.4112) (0.2868) (0.3861)
LE industry (other commuting zones) -3.414
(6.0019)
LE commuting zone (other industries) -0.475
(1.4333)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 1.A23: Estimates for βˆt for growth rate of median daily wage - Speciﬁc trends
Benchmark Quadratic trend Quadratic trend Linear trend Controls for
quintiles LE share industry ﬁrm-speciﬁc (FD) pre-trend
2000 0.173 0.546 0.126 0.173
(0.1449) (0.3644) (0.1499) (0.1431)
2001 0.249 0.386* 0.203 0.344 0.248
(0.1511) (0.1926) (0.1546) (0.2802) (0.1497)
2002 baseline
2003 0.665*** 0.617*** 0.690*** 0.917*** 0.666***
(0.1309) (0.1591) (0.1337) (0.2669) (0.1310)
2004 0.333** 0.326* 0.372** -0.121 0.334**
(0.1160) (0.1650) (0.1189) (0.2003) (0.1150)
2005 0.261* 0.388* 0.299** 0.169 0.258*
(0.1103) (0.1856) (0.1126) (0.1806) (0.1083)
2006 0.292* 0.646** 0.311* 0.258 0.285*
(0.1226) (0.2408) (0.1281) (0.1813) (0.1227)
2007 0.049 0.718** 0.032 -0.026 0.042
(0.2107) (0.2677) (0.1939) (0.2762) (0.2067)
LE industry (other commuting zones) -1.524
(1.3901)
LE commuting zone (other industries) 0.040
(0.5315)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 1.A24: Correlation between proportion of low-earning workers in 2002 and variation
(%) in the proportion of low-earning workers in 2004/2007
2002-2004 2002-2007
Industry level (41 categories) 0.33* 0.06
(0.0327) (0.7130)
Commuting zone of residence (142 categories) -0.33*** -0.71***
(0.0001) (0.0000)
Note: SIAB data. p-values in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 1.A25: Comparison of ﬂows and occupational structure in 2002 and 2004
2002 2004 Diﬀ. 2002-2004
Below med. Above med. Below med. Above med. Below med. Above med.
Proportion of low-earnings workers 3.4% 51.3% 10.9% 44.4% 7.5 -6.9
(0.0569) (0.255) (0.181) (0.301)
Intensity 0.018 0.456 0.083 0.618 0.065 (361%) 0.162 (35.5%)
(0.038) (0.622) (0.239) (1.355)
Wage of hirings
Total 56.1 25.0 46.3 25.3 -9.8 0.3
(30.63) (22.67) (32.16) (22.95)
Part-time 31.0 12.5 23.0 12.0 -11.0 -0.5
(20.86) (10.94) (20.25) (11.97)
Full-time 70.0 52.4 68.8 47.4 -1.2 -5
(31.19) (28.70) (34.15) (26.53)
Total with respect to incumbents 0.91 0.98 0.79 0.69 -0.22 -0.29
(0.455) (0.905) (0.370) (0.728)
Wage of separations
Total 32.1 16.8 32.5 17.1 -0.4 0.3
(33.99) (24.49) (39.53) (24.39)
Part-time 7.2 4.2 7.4 3.4 0.2 -0.8
(17.44) (9.87) (19.96) (8.291)
Full-time 34.6 17.3 34.5 18.5 -0.1 1.2
(39.45) (29.36) (44.07) (31.65)
Total with respect to incumbents 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.49 0.03 0.01
(0.514) (0.703) (0.622) (0.756)
Occupational distribution
Analytical non-routine tasks 14.7% 7.9% 14.3% 8.4% -0.4 0.5
(0.273) (0.181) (0.259) (0.186)
Interactive non-routine tasks 9.7% 12.9% 9.8% 12.6% 0.1 -0.3
(0.236) (0.273) (0.238) (0.274)
Cognitive routine tasks 32.7% 38.8% 33.0% 37.7% 0.3 -1.1
(0.265) (0.184) (0.352) (0.354)
Manual routine tasks 11.5% 6.2% 10.6% 6.5% -0.9 0.3
(0.377) (0.353) (0.248) (0.187)
Manual non-routine tasks 29.4% 30.7% 29.4% 31.0% 0.0 0.3
(0.377) (0.353) (0.367) (0.354)
Number of job titles 4.6 2.9 4.7 3.0 0.1 0.1
(6.612) (2.503) (6.529) (2.503)
Observations 2,682 1,088 2,667 1,082
Note: LIAB, panel 2000-2007. Standard error in parentheses.
Table 1.A26: Parameter values
Parameter Meaning Value
σ Elasticity of substitution N1 w.r.t. N2 2.462
θH Productivity N1 in ﬁrm H 0.273
θL Productivity N1 in ﬁrm L 0.159
AH TFP ﬁrm H 32.00
AL TFP ﬁrm L 33.57
 Elasticity of supply of hours w.r.t. wage 0.2
β Fixed cost of work 10
µ Scale parameter in Weibull F (α) 40
γ Shape parameter in Weibull F (α) 1.2
b Non-employment beneﬁt 100
κ Elasticity of substitution of YH w.r.t. YL 10
Note: The value of  is obtained from Tazhitdinova (middle point of the range of elasticities [0.07− 0.32]).
Values of σ, θH , θL, AH and AL are computed by estimating equation (1.52) and the production function
normalized to 2002, using LIAB cross-sectional data at the industry level (224 categories) for 1999-2007.
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Table 1.A27: Comparison of moments data vs. model
Moments Data (1999-2002) Model
Employment rate 87.1% 94.6%
Proportion of mini-jobs 12.6% 14.9%
Mini-jobs in bunch/total employment 4.2% 7.8%
N1/N2 in industries H 0.155 0.092
N1/N2 in industries L 0.035 0.017
Note: Data from SIAB (1999-2002) is used for the moments. The policy parameters of the model are set to
the pre-reform levels: K = 325, τ1 =18%, τ2 =35%.
Table 1.A28: Simulation of the Mini-Job Reform in the model vs. DID estimates
Scale + substitution Substitution Data
(σ = 2.465) (σ = 50)
In terms of baseline averages (2002)
DiDlow-earning employment -2.8% 123.3% -18.5%
DiDhigh-earning employment 4.3% -19.0% 12.4%
DiDtotal employment 4.1% -10.0% 7.0%
Changes in % of pre-reform levels
Low-earning in Intensive ﬁrm 46% 62%
Low-earning in Non-intensive ﬁrm 36% 159%
High-earning in Intensive ﬁrm 5% -34%
High-earning in Non-intensive ﬁrm -2% 5%
Total employment in Intensive ﬁrm 9% -5%
Total employment in Non-intensive ﬁrm -1% 5%
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1.B Additional Figures
Figure 1.B1: Gross and net (of SSC) earnings of a worker as implied by the payroll tax
schedule before (left) and after (right) the Mini-Job Reform
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Figure 1.B2: Gross monthly earnings in 2000-2005
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Source: SIAB, annual data, main spell, gross monthly earnings computed from daily wages.
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Figure 1.B3: Employment rate and labor force participation
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Figure 1.B4: Unemployment, non-employment and inactivity rate
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Figure 1.B5: Employment, full-time and part-time
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Figure 1.B6: Distribution of monthly gross earnings
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Gross monthly earnings
2000 2001
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Gross monthly earnings
2000 2002
Source: SIAB, annual, main spell, gross monthly earnings computed from daily wages.
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Figure 1.B7: Cumulative distribution of monthly gross earnings
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Source: SIAB, annual (left) and spell (right), gross monthly earnings computed from daily wages.
Figure 1.B8: Accounting exercise on the earnings distribution: expansion of in-work beneﬁts
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Figure 1.B9: Evolution of establishment-level employment
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Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
68
Figure 1.B10: Evolution of low-earning and high-earning workers per establishment
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Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B11: Evolution of part-time and full-time workers per establishment
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Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B12: Evolution of medium-educated and low-educated workers per establishment
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Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
Figure 1.B13: Evolution of investment in physical capital per establishment
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Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B14: Eﬀect on median daily wages of full-time and part-time workers
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level.
Figure 1.B15: Evolution of median wages within establishments
30
40
50
60
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Median daily wage
Non−intensive in LE workers Intensive in LE workers
Total
Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B16: Evolution of median wages within establishments, for full-time and part-time
workers
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Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
Figure 1.B17: Eﬀect on vacancies
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level.
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Figure 1.B18: Evolution of vacancies
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Note: Panel 2000-2007. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B19: Evolution of hirings by gross monthly earnings
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Note: Panel 2000-2002. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B20: Evolution of separations by gross monthly earnings
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Note: Panel 2000-2002. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B21: Evolution of wage changes for workers within establishments
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Note: Panel 2000-2002. Intensive and non-intensive establishments in low-earning workers (LE) refer to
whether they are above or below the (weighted) median of the proportion of these workers.
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Figure 1.B22: Eﬀect on daily wages of workers ﬂows with respect to average wage within
the establishment
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level.
Figure 1.B23: Evolution of occupational structure (proportion of workers in each task, and
number of job titles)
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Figure 1.B24: Eﬀects on employment, model with LDV
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level, only reported for Blundell-Bond estimates. Hansen
statistic for overidentifying restrictions is not signiﬁcant for full-time employment (at the 5% level), but it
is for employment. Diﬀerences-in-Hansen statistics for tests of validity of both GMM and IV instruments
are not signiﬁcant for full-time employment, and only for IV instruments for employment. Hypothesis of
autocorrelation of residuals for more than 1 period is rejected (at the 5% level for employment and at any
level for full-time equivalent employment).
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Figure 1.B25: Eﬀects on part-time and full-time employment, LDV
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level, only reported for Blundell-Bond estimates. Hansen
statistic for test of overidentifying restrictions is signiﬁcant, and diﬀerences-in-Hansen statistics for tests of
validity of both GMM and IV instruments are not signiﬁcant for full-time employment, and only for IV
instruments for part-time employment. Hypothesis of autocorrelation of residuals for more than 1 period is
rejected.
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Figure 1.B26: Eﬀects on employment by education level, LDV
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level, only reported for Blundell-Bond estimates. Hansen
statistic for test of overidentifying restrictions is not signiﬁcant for medium-educated workers, and it is
signiﬁcant for low-educated workers. Diﬀerences-in-Hansen statistics for tests of validity of both GMM and
IV instruments are not signiﬁcant for both. Hypothesis of autocorrelation of residuals for more than 1
period is rejected.
Figure 1.B27: Distribution of establishments according to the proportion of low-earning
workers, 2002 vs. 2007
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Figure 1.B28: Earnings distribution by establishment pre-reform intensity in low-earning
workers, 2002 vs. 2004
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Note: LIAB, panel 2000-2007. Quintiles are deﬁned according to the intensity in 2002, and establishments
are followed to 2004
Figure 1.B29: Proportion of establishments by intensity in low-earning workers, panel 2000-
2007
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Figure 1.B30: Proportion of establishments by intensity in low-earning workers, all estab-
lishments
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Figure 1.B31: Industrial composition of establishments, all establishments
3.4
11.4
12.2
22.8
5.1
22.4
14.9
7.8
3.3
11.1
12.1
23.8
5.2
22.5
14.6
7.4
3.7
10.8
11.9
23.5
5.3
22.1
15.3
7.4
3.7
10.5
11.7
23.7
5.0
21.6
16.1
7.8
3.7
10.4
11.7
24.1
3.8
21.5
16.8
7.9
3.8
10.3
11.9
24.0
3.8
21.6
16.6
7.9
3.9
10.2
11.5
24.2
3.8
22.1
16.5
7.8
3.9
10.3
11.3
24.1
3.8
21.5
17.2
8.0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 e
st
ab
lis
hm
en
ts
 (%
)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture, primary Construction
Manufacturing Other services
Public sector Retail, repair
Services for businesses Transport, communication
Note: LIAB, cross-sections. Financial intermediation excluded due to insuﬃcient number of observations.
83
Figure 1.B32: Proportion of low-earning workers by commuting zones in 2002
(.1771934,.2342626]
(.1623718,.1771934]
(.1345116,.1623718]
[.0938389,.1345116]
2002
Note: SIAB data. Values for commuting zones of residence.
Figure 1.B33: Variation (in pp.) in the proportion of low-earning workers by commuting
zones
(.0179318,.0429869]
(.0141342,.0179318]
(.0090349,.0141342]
[−.0131299,.0090349]
Var. 2002−2004 in p.p.
Note: SIAB data. Values for commuting zones of residence.
Note: Conﬁdence intervals correspond to 95% level, only reported for Blundell-Bond estimates.
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1.C Additional Details on the Data
I perform a set of preparation and cleaning procedures in both the SIAB and the LIAB
which follows the recommendations and instructions provided by the IAB. First, I correct
for the excess missing values and inconsistencies in the education variables, due to the fact
that the reporting of these variables is done by employers but it has not consequences for
social security. I follow the criterium 2B in Fitzenberger et al. (2005), which uses all
the information for the same individual (forward and backward extrapolation, assignment
of the maximum value for parallel spells), and considers the possibility of both under and
over reporting. I adapt the code provided by the IAB, by using information coming from
unemployment or training spells as well.
Another important adjustment I perform is imputation of daily earnings when they are right
censored (above the social security contribution limit). Right censoring aﬀects fewer than 5%
of the observations in my sample and, in particular, it does not aﬀect low-earning workers.
The deﬁnition of low-earning and high-earning workers, crucial for the ﬁrm level analysis,
is binary and hence does not incorporate measurement error coming from this limitation.
However, to count with a reliable measure of earnings, I impute top coded wages using a
series of Tobit models to ﬁt to log-daily earnings by education and age groups following
the methodology in Card et al. (2013) (see also Dustmann et al., 2009; Gartner, 2005)
adapted to processing constraints imposed by remote and on-site access of the data. The
uncensored imputed value is the prediction of the model according to the covariates. I
use four groups of education (no degree or primary/lower secondary or intermediate school
leaving certiﬁcate without vocational training, intermediate school leaving certiﬁcate with
vocational training -apprentices-, upper secondary school certiﬁcate - Abitur - with or
without vocational certiﬁcate, and degree from technical school or University) and seven age
groups of 10 year-range (in the ﬁrst I include all people below 20 and in the last, all above 80
years old). The explanatory variables include age in years, an indicator for ﬁrms with more
than 10 employees, the average proportion of right censored observations and average log
daily wage within the establishment, a second degree polynomial of the number of workers
at the establishment, an indicator for unipersonal establishments, the average proportion of
workers with university degree and the average years of schooling by establishment.
An important feature of the SIAB is that it is spell data, which means that every time there
is a notiﬁcation by the employer (annually, or in the event of changes in contribution group or
health insurance company, or changes in the payroll system of the employer), or a change in
the status as recipient of unemployment beneﬁts or as job seeker, a new observation is added
to the data-set. I use spell data in particular to compute transitions across employment
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and unemployment states. In such cases, I consider all the spells during each year of the
time series. Some of the descriptives are based on a transformation of the data to annual
frequencies, according to the methodology proposed by the IAB. I keep all the spells which
contain June 30 each year. I further restrict to one spell per worker-year (I eliminate parallel
spells) for some of the descriptives, keeping the observation with highest amount of earnings
or beneﬁt reception. I explicit which version of the data I use in each case: spell data,
annual data, or annual data, main spell respectively. Finally, I exclude employment spells
with 0 daily earnings.
With respect to the LIAB, I do not impose exclusions of any type on establishments. Typ-
ical exclusions in the literature vary according to the topic, and consist of excluding small
establishments (17% of the establishments in the Establishment Panel have two employees),
establishments in the agricultural sector (6.7%) and in the public administration (9.6%).
I avoid restrictions as the sample is meant to be representative of all establishments in
Germany. Furthermore, I am agnostic about how establishments typically excluded in the
literature aﬀect the results.
Regarding the variables used in the analysis, the data from IEB contains direct report of
whether the employment spell comes from regular employment, mini-job (marginal part-
time) or midi-job (in transition zone), and I use this deﬁnition for the descriptives. I use
monthly gross earnings, in particular for the deﬁnition of intensity in low-earning workers
at the establishment level (proportion of workers in the pre-reform year who were below the
after-reform threshold in earnings) and for the analysis of the earnings' distributions. As
the data only provides daily (in calendar days) earnings, I generate a monthly conversion
following Tazhitdinova (2017). For workers with a single employment spell covering the
whole year, I multiply the daily earnings by the average number of days in a month (30.4).
For individuals with multiple employment periods in a year, I compute average daily earnings
in the year, and I multiply it by the average number of days in a month.
Full-time equivalent employment, as a proxy for hours, is constructed by attributing a weight
below 1 to part-time workers. In particular, IEB diﬀerentiates between mini part-time
workers (hours worked below half full-time, corresponding to 18 hours a week), and midi
part-time workers (hours worked above half full-time and below full-time). I assign a weight
of 0.5 to mini part-time workers, and 0.75 to midi part-time workers. Even though weights
are somewhat arbitrary, I conﬁrm that results are the same if I change the weights (for eg.,
assigning 0.25 to mini part-time employment and 0.5 to midi part-time workers).
Regarding the classiﬁcations used along the analysis, I use the most recent time-consistent
industry classiﬁcation provided by the IAB (Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities, 1993 ver-
sion, 3-digits, 224 categories). I perform groupings of this classiﬁcation for some of the
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analysis, where I indicate it. Occupations are categorized according to the German Classi-
ﬁcation of Occupations (KldB) 1988, comprising 344 categories, and are grouped according
to complexity and routinization following Dengler et al. (2014). The classiﬁcation is based
on the BERUFENET data collected by IAB containing expert knowledge about competen-
cies and skills. For the deﬁnition of local labor markets, I use the classiﬁcation of districts
(kreis) in commuting zones in Kosfeld and Werner (2012).
Finally, the response rate in the IAB Establishment Panel is stable over the years and
higher than 80%. For longitudinal analysis, the IAB constructs several longitudinal sections,
with the corresponding weights. These sections, besides including new establishments and
establishments going out of operation, keep the establishments which have continuity in the
response to the survey from one year to the next, being then free of survey non-response.
I focus on the longitudinal section 2000-2007 which is the most suitable for the period of
the reform. I provide some descriptives though using the cross-section of the Establishment
Panel, duely clariﬁed in the text. Even though there is no survey non-response in the
longitudinal analysis, the survey is subject to item non-response by certain establishments.
However, most of the variables in the analysis such as employment, wages, occupations
and industries are drawn from the social security records from IEB and BHP linked to the
Establishment Panel.39 I consider therefore that measurement error is not a major issue for
the analysis in this paper.
39One important exception is investment, which is reported by establishments in the survey and it is
subject to non-negligible item non-response.
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1.D Additional Derivations
1.D.1 Accounting exercise on the earnings distribution
Figure (1.B8) explains schematically the main ideas for this exercise. Let's denote the change
in the mass of workers below the mini-job threshold as follows:
∆Emp(MJ) ≡ Emp1(MJ)− Emp0(MJ)
Emp0(MJ)
(1.14)
where Empt(MJ) denotes employment below earnings threshold introduced by the reform
(e400), and t is 0 for before and 1 for after. The mass is normalized by the employment
level below the threshold in case of absence of reform. The mass below the threshold after
the reform comprises: (1) workers who retain their job (potentially improving earnings), (2)
workers who transit from non-employment to employment, denoted by Emp+1 (MJ), and (3)
workers pulled from above the earnings distribution, Emp−1 (MJ). Decomposing Emp1(MJ)
into the sum of Emp+1 (MJ) and Emp
−
1 (MJ)
∆Emp(MJ) =
Emp+1 (MJ) + Emp
−
1 (MJ)− Emp0(MJ)
Emp0(MJ)
(1.15)
The fraction of entrants from non-employment is then:
∆Emp+MJ ≡
Emp+1 (MJ)− Emp0(MJ)
Emp0(MJ)
= ∆Emp(MJ)− Emp
−
1 (MJ)
Emp0(MJ)
(1.16)
which is the excess mass of workers below the threshold netted out from the proportion pulled
down. The fraction of workers coming from the upper segment of the earnings distribution
is proxied by the missing mass close to the threshold:
Emp−(MJ) ≡ emp0(w > MJ)− emp1(w > MJ) (1.17)
where empt(w > MJ) denotes the number of workers with wages above the mini-job thresh-
old. Using annual data (considering individuals only according to the main job), and e1,200
as upper limit (where visually the pre and post reform distributions of earnings converge),
the quantities are: ∆Emp(MJ)/Emp0(MJ) =7.8% and Emp−(MJ)/Emp0(MJ) =-4.1%,
which yields ∆Emp+MJ =3.6%. This excess mass is even larger when considering only the
prime-age population (9.8%), and more so if all spells (secondary jobs included) are consid-
ered (41.7%).
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1.D.2 Derivations regarding the theoretical framework
Partial equilibrium: Labor supply decision
The ﬁrst order condition for the solution of the problem (1.10) in the absence of non-
linearities is:
n = αwˆ (1.18)
Note that wˆ = α−
1
n
1
 , is positively related to the disutility of work. Net earnings, α−
1
n
1+
 ,
are a not-linear function of hours.40 The take-home wage of the worker is below her produc-
tivity, wˆ < w, as a consequence of the tax.
With non-linear taxes, wages, ﬁxed costs of work and non-labor income, there exists α∗0 such
that U(b, 0) = U(c, n) (for n > 0):
α∗0 =
(+ 1)(b+ β)
wˆ+11
(1.19)
Let's deﬁne α∗1 as the value of α such that workers choose n which yields K before-tax
earnings (Kˆ after taxes):
α∗1 ≡
Kˆ
wˆ+11
(1.20)
Finally, there exists α∗2 that solves U(Kˆ, Kˆ/wˆ1) = U(αwˆ
+1
2 , αwˆ

2):
(+ 1)Kˆ − α∗−
1

2
(
Kˆ
wˆ1
)1+ 1

− α∗2wˆ+12 = 0 (1.21)
Let us consider the relevant case of wˆ1 > wˆ2. For individuals with α ≤ α∗0, the ﬁxed cost of
working and the loss of non-labor income are suﬃciently high that the net earnings in job
type 1 cannot compensate for them, if they were to supply their preferred number of hours,
and as a consequence they do not work. For α∗0 < α ≤ α∗1, individuals optimally choose their
number of hours and sort into jobs type 1, with α∗1 corresponding to the individual for which
the optimal n is such that gross earnings are exactly K. Individuals with α∗1 < α < α
∗
2 would
like to work more hours at the take-home wage wˆ1, but cannot do it because their earnings
would surpass K and the wage they receive is wˆ2 < wˆ1. These agents bunch at the threshold
40The formulation with non-linear earnings in function of hours is typical in the literature dealing with
intensive and extensive margins of labor supply (see e.g. Erosa et al., 2016). Note that earnings are increasing
in the disutility for labor, to compensate the individual for the utility cost of supplying more hours of work.
The non-linear speciﬁcation penalizes individuals with low number of hours, bounding intensive margin
decisions away from zero.
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supplying n = K/w1 at w1 and subject to τ1. Individuals with α ≥ α∗2 supply their optimal
number of hours at w2 and are subject to τ2.
Comparative statics: change in labor supply when tax beneﬁts change
Given w1 and w2, when τ1 decreases, (1− τ1) increases one to one. The change in α∗0 is:
∂α∗0
∂(1− τ1) = −
(+ 1)2(b+ β)
(1− τ1)+2w+11
(1.22)
which is negative. For α∗1:
∂α∗1
∂(1− τ1) = −
K
wˆ+11
(1.23)
is also negative. For α∗2, renaming equation (1.21) as the implicit function F˜ (α
∗
2, (1− τ1)):
∂α∗2
∂(1− τ1) = −
∂F˜ /∂(1− τ1)
∂F˜ /∂α∗2
(1.24)
where:
∂F˜
∂(1− τ1) = (+ 1)K (1.25)
∂F˜
∂α∗2
= α
∗− 1

−1
2
(
K
w1
)1+ 1

− wˆ+12 (1.26)
Equation (1.25) is positive. To derive the sign of equation (1.26), note that the ﬁrst term is
lower than the second because: (
Kˆ
α∗2wˆ
+1
1
) 1

<
wˆ2
wˆ1
(1.27)
α∗2wˆ
+1
1 are the net earnings the individual with the initial α
∗
2 would have if she could supply
the optimal number of hours at wˆ1, which are higher than Kˆ by construction. The factor
in the left hand side is hence lower than one, the same as the factor in the right hand side
as we are in the case where wˆ2 < wˆ1. Besides, the exponent 1/ > 1 means that the left
hand side is smaller than the right hand side. Hence, expression (1.26) is negative and
∂α∗2/∂(1 − τ1) > 0. As a consequence of the expansion of the in-work beneﬁt (modelled as
a decrease in τ1), given the wages, NS1 increases due to both the inﬂow of new entrants into
employment (α∗0 decreases) and workers previously in jobs type 2 (α
∗
2 increases), whereas N
S
2
decreases, pushing upwards the ratio NS1 /N
S
2 in partial equilibrium.
This parsimonious way of modelling the expansion of an in-work beneﬁt, by a reduction in
τ1, is particularly insightful about the introduction of in-work beneﬁts. However, it does
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not reﬂect exactly the Mini-Job reform case. With the reform, K increased leaving τ1
virtually unaﬀected. The result of this modiﬁcation is also an increase in NS1 /N
S
2 in partial
equilibrium, but the channel is diﬀerent. α∗0 does not change, whereas:
∂α∗1
∂K
=
1
w+11 (1− τ1)
(1.28)
is positive, and:
∂α∗2
∂K
= − ∂F˜ /∂K
∂F˜/∂α∗2
(1.29)
is also positive. Note that in equation (1.29) the denominator is the same as in equation
(1.24), and the numerator is:
∂F˜
∂K
= (+ 1)(1− τ1)− α∗−
1

2
(
1 +
1

)(
K
w1
) 1

(1.30)
For this expression to be positive, (1− τ1)w+11 α∗2 > K. This is indeed the case because the
left hand side is the total before-tax earnings of individual with α∗2 if she were to supply her
preferred hours at the take-home wage wˆ1. This amount is higher than K by construction.
Hence, equation (1.29) is positive. This means that the change in NS1 /N
S
2 with the Mini-Job
reform under this framework responds exclusively to a reallocation of workers, both within
the low-earning sector (the increase in α∗1 means that workers already in jobs type 1 supply
more hours), and coming from the high-earning sector (the increase in α∗2 captures that
workers previously in jobs type 2 sort into jobs type 1 by reducing hours). Although these
eﬀects are not unreasonable for many workers, there is a dimension the model is missing:
the entry from secondary workers who may have higher ﬁxed costs of work and would be
induced to enter after the reform given the higher net wage. There is also new low-earning
jobs taken up as second job, something also not captured in the model. These caveats are
important, as pointed out in section (1.3.2). Although I do not introduce them in the model
yet, I consider them when discussing the results from the quantitative exercise.
Equilibrium wages
As previously showed, the expansion of an in-work beneﬁt induces NS1 /N
S
2 to increase. In
equilibrium, supply and demand for each of the jobs, and relative wages, need to adjust for
the labor market to clear. These changes are simultaneous but I show them sequentially. I
ﬁrst use the fact that ND1 /N
D
2 needs also to increase to match the labor supply, to show the
direction of the change in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc intensities. And then I show that w1/w2 will fall
to accommodate the changes in quantities.
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From the ﬁrst order condition in equation (1.2), it must hold:(
θH
1− θH
)−σ
N1H
N2H
=
(
θL
1− θL
)−σ
N1L
N2L
(1.31)
Taking derivatives in both sides with respect to ND1 /N
D
2 :(
θH
1− θH
)σ
∂(N1H/N2H)
∂(ND1 /N
D
2 )
=
(
θL
1− θL
)σ
∂N1L/N2L
∂ND1 /N
D
2
(1.32)
Equation (1.32) shows that the direction of change in the intensities of each ﬁrm is the same
as in the aggregate intensity because θk/(1 − θk) > 0. For a higher ND1 /ND2 to match the
increase NS1 /N
S
2 due to the expansion of the tax beneﬁt, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc intensities need to
increase.
Knowing that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc intensity moves in the same direction as the aggregate inten-
sity in labor demand, without loss of generality I can derive the direction of the change in
w1/w2 in equilibrium, by deriving both sides of the ﬁrst order condition for the ﬁrm H with
respect to the change in NS1 /N
S
2 , which in equilibrium is equal to the change in N
D
1 /N
D
2 :
∂(w1/w2)
∂(ND1 /N
D
2 )
= − 1
σ
(
θH
1− θH
)(
N1H
N2H
)−σ+1
σ ∂(N1H/N2H)
∂(ND1 /N
D
2 )
(1.33)
All the factors in the right hand side have a positive sign, except for −1/σ < 0. Hence, for
ND1 /N
D
2 to increase to equate the labor supply, w1/w2 needs to fall. Note that the lower is σ
(the more complements are low-earning and high-earning workers), the bigger the response
on wages due to a change in the relative supply, and the smaller the changes in relative
quantities. On the other hand, the only case in which the change in the relative supply does
not exert any eﬀect on relative wages is when low-earning and high-earning jobs are perfect
substitutes (σ →∞).
Decomposition in scale and substitution eﬀect
The Hicks-Marshall rules of derived demand allow to decompose the change in the labor
demand of each task when there is a change in the price of one input, in terms of elasticities
and cost factor shares. Let's assume perfect competition and free entry.41 For simplicity, I
skip the index for the ﬁrm k, but all derivations need to hold for both k ∈ {H,L}.
Let s1 ≡ w1N1pY = θ
(
N1
Y
)σ−1
σ and s2 ≡ w2N2pY = (1 − θ)
(
N2
Y
)σ−1
σ be the cost share of labor in
41Harasztosi and Lindner (2017) derive an analogous decomposition under imperfect competition.
92
type-1 and type-2 jobs respectively.
Totally diﬀerentiating Y = F (N1, N2):
dY = Y
1
σ θN
− 1
σ
1 dN1 + Y
1
σ (1− θ)N−
1
σ
2 dN2
dY
Y
=
Y
1
σ θN
− 1σ
1 N1
Y
dN1
N1
+
Y
1
σ (1−θ)N−
1
σ
2 N2
Y
dN2
N2
dlnY = s1dlnN1 + s2dlnN2
(1.34)
Since the production function is constant returns to scale, s1 = 1− s2:
dlnY = s1dlnN1 + (1− s1)dlnN2
dlnN1 = dlnY + (1− s1)(dlnN1 − dlnN2)
(1.35)
Dividing by dlnw1:
dlnN1
dlnw1
=
dlnY
dlnw1
+ (1− s1)dlnN1 − dlnN2
dlnw1
(1.36)
A similar expression can be derived for N2:
dlnN2
dlnw1
=
dlnY
dlnw1
− s1dlnN1 − dlnN2
dlnw1
(1.37)
These expressions decompose the change in the demand for both factors N1 and N2 when
the price of one of them changes, w1, in a scale eﬀect (ﬁrst term) and a substitution eﬀect
(second term). Whereas the scale eﬀect has the same direction in both the demand of N1
and N2, the substitution eﬀect acts in opposite direction.
Next, I express equations (1.36) and (1.37) in terms of elasticities. For the scale eﬀect, I
use the fact that under perfect competition and free entry, ﬁrms make zero-proﬁts: pY =
w1N1+w2N2. Deﬁning as η ≡ −dlnYdlnp the elasticity of demand for output (in absolute value),
and plugging dlnY = −ηdlnp in equation (1.36):
dlnN1
dlnw1
= −η dlnp
dlnw1
+ s2
dlnN1 − dlnN2
dlnw1
(1.38)
Diﬀerentiating the zero-proﬁt condition, for the case that only w1 changes, and using equation
(1.34):
dlnp = s1dlnw1 (1.39)
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For the substitution eﬀect, using the ratio of ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm's problem:
N1
N2
=
(
θ
1− θ
)σ (
w1
w2
)−σ
(1.40)
Taking logs and diﬀerentiating:
dlnN1 − dlnN2 = −σdlnw1 (1.41)
The elasticities of the demand for labor in each type of jobs when the price of type-1 jobs
changes are:
dlnN1
dlnw1
= −[s1η + (1− s1)σ]
dlnN2
dlnw1
= −[s1η − s1σ]
(1.42)
Intensities and cost-shares
From the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm, N1H
N2H
> N1L
N2L
. From the deﬁnition of s1 omitting
the indices k.
s1 = θ
(
N1
Y
)σ−1
σ
= θ
{
A
[
θ + (1− θ)
(
N1
N2
)− (σ−1)
σ
]}−1
(1.43)
Deriving with respect to N1/N2:
∂s1
∂(N1/N2)
= θ(1− θ)σ − 1
σ
(
N1
N2
)− 2σ−1
σ
{[
θ + (1− θ)
(
N1
N2
)− (σ−1)
σ
]}−2
(1.44)
where the right hand side is positive.
Let's deﬁne φk ≡ N1kN1k+N2k as the proportion of hours in the ﬁrm by low-earning workers out
of total number of hours. I skip the k indices, and express N1/N2 in terms of φ:
N1
N2
=
φ
1− φ (1.45)
Deriving this expression in terms of φ
∂(N1/N2)
∂φ
=
1
1− φ (1.46)
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which is a positive expression, as ∂s1/∂(N1/N2) showed before. Hence:
∂s1
∂φ
=
∂s1
∂(N1/N2)
∂N1/N2
∂φ
> 0 (1.47)
The insight from this expression is that there is a positive relationship between the cost-
share, which is the relevant variable when considering the heterogenous strength of scale
and substitution eﬀects, and the fraction of labor in low-earning jobs, closely related to the
variable used in the empirical analysis.
Consumption and government budget
Aggregate income is:
Inc = (b+ tr)F (α∗0)
+
∫ α∗1
α∗0
(αwˆ+11 + tr)f(α)dα +
∫ α∗2
α∗1
(Kˆ + tr)f(α)dα
+
∫∞
α∗2
(αwˆ+12 + tr)f(α)dα
(1.48)
Total income in the economy is exhausted in the demand for goods: Inc = pHYH + YL. I
model the demand for each good using a CES aggregation at the economy-wide level.
YH =
1
pH
Inc
1+pκ−1H
YL =
Inc
1+pκ−1H
(1.49)
Balance of the government budget implies T = G, where:
T =
∫ α∗1
α∗0
αw+11 (1− τ1)τ1f(α)dα +
∫ α∗2
α∗1
Kτ1f(α)dα
+
∫∞
α∗2
αw+12 (1− τ2)τ2f(α)dα
(1.50)
and:
G = tr + bF (α∗0) (1.51)
Parameterizations and solution
To solve the model, I start in partial equilibrium (w1 and w2 ﬁxed), and I obtain NS1 and
NS2 , Inc, YH , YL, N1H , N1L, N2H , and N2L. Using the zero-proﬁt condition of the ﬁrm H, I
further obtain pH . Finally, I iterate on w1 and w2 until the excess supply for both types of
job is zero.
The parameters for the labor demand are selected as follows. I estimate an industry-level
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regression using the ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrms (in logs):
ln
(
N1it
N2it
)
= λi − σln
(
w1it
w2it
)
+ pit+ ξit (1.52)
where i is the industry (224 categories). I use data from LIAB, cross-section, for the period
1999-2000. I measure N1it and N2it as the annual average by industry of the total full-time
equivalent employment in the low-earning and high-earning segment respectively (as before,
I use the post-reform mini-job threshold for this deﬁnition). I measure w1it and w2it in
a similar way, corresponding to the industry-level average of the full-time equivalent daily
wage of workers in each group. I further include a linear trend. Expression (1.52) allows to
retrieve an estimation of the parameter σ. In order to address the endogeneity due to the
omission of important variables in the production function (such as capital for example, not
directly available in the data), I instrument ln
(
w1kt
w2kt
)
with a Post indicator, that takes the
value 1 for the years after the reform. The estimation suggests σ = 2.462, higher than for a
Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation and low enough such that low-earning and high-earning workers
are not perfect substitutes.
I retrieve the parameters θk using the ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression, and their correspondence
with the model speciﬁcation: λˆi = σˆln
(
θi
1−θi
)
. I take the average for the industries which
were above the median in the proportion of low-earning workers in 2002 to obtain θH , and
the similarly but for below median industries to obtain θL. I further estimate the CES
speciﬁcation of the production function using the parameters retrieved, the sales in real
terms as measures for Yit, and the employment measures (all normalized for the year 2002),
from which I obtain the relation of magnitudes between AH and AL using averages across
industries similar as before. This exercise suggests that AL is 5% higher than AH . The values
obtained in this way imply that θH > θL and AH < AL, which is sensible since H ﬁrms are
intensive in low-earning workers and they are likely to have lower total factor productivity.
For the labor supply side of the model, I assume F (α) follows a Weibull distribution, char-
acterized by parameters µ and γ. The parameter  is set to the average of estimates by
Tazhitdinova (2017). The rest of the parameters (β, µ, γ, b, κ) are selected such that
the model provides reasonable approximations to the employment rate, the proportion of
mini-jobbers with respect to the total number of workers, the proportion of workers in the
bunching at e400, and the average across highly intensive and low intensity (as of 2002)
establishments. Parameters values are shown in table (1.A26) and the comparison of the
moments of the model, in table (1.A27).
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Chapter 2
The German Mini-Job reform: Intended
and unintended consequences for
low-earning workers
2.1 Introduction
Welfare-to-work programs have become particularly widespread in developed countries in the
last decades. They are intended to help economically poor people while encouraging labor
participation and self-suﬃciency by providing beneﬁts conditional on employment. One
such a program is the Mini-Job Reform which took place in Germany in April 1, 2003. The
explicit objectives discussed in the legislation are to (1) reduce unemployment, (2) increase
competitivity, and (3) stimulate both labor supply and demand. Exemptions and subsidies
of social security contributions (SSC) and income tax paid by workers were expanded in the
low-earning segment of the labor market, yielding a considerable expansion of the so-called
mini and midi jobs. These types of employment are deﬁned by a maximum amount of
gross monthly earnings (e400 in the mini-jobs and e800 in the midi-jobs), and they are
characterized by a lower tax burden.
The existing literature about the reform has focused on its eﬀect on labor supply and em-
ployment, as aﬀecting these variables is one of the main objectives of the policy. On the
contrary, potential issues such as higher in-work poverty and increase in labor precarious-
ness have been extensively debated in the media and the public discourse, but have received
less attention in the academic research.1 This paper aims at providing empirical evidence
1The article The dark side of Germany's job miracle (Reuters, 2012) is particularly insightful:
Economists say it was Schroeder's intention to bring about a rapid expansion of these sectors (mini-jobs
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regarding these side-eﬀects of the expansion of mini and midi-jobs.
The ﬁrst question this paper addresses is whether the promotion of low-earnning jobs by tax
incentives results in improved earnings for workers in the bottom of the distribution, being
eﬀective then as an anti-poverty policy. Mechanically, since these workers pay lower taxes
after the reform, their take-home wage should improve. However, as predicted by the theory
of tax incidence, the lower tax burden is shared by employers and employees depending on
the relative elasticities of supply and substitution between workers in low-earning and high-
earning employment. Thus, the theoretical prediction regarding the eﬀect on net earnings is
ambiguous, and remains an empirical question.
A second question tackled by this paper is whether tax incentives for mini and midi-jobs
improve employment prospects of targeted workers. This should be the case if they represent
a way for inactive and unemployed workers to accumulate human capital or signal their
skills and motivation. If after a spell in these jobs workers have higher chances to transit
to employment with higher earnings, mini or midi-jobs constitute a stepping-stone. On
the contrary, working for reduced hours or low hourly wages may exert a negative signal
regarding productivity or motivation. Hence mini or midi-jobs might potentially represent
a dead-end. Which of these two forces prevail remains an empirical question as well.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence in response to these
questions. I use survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for 2000-
2007 and I estimate ﬁxed eﬀects models to assess the eﬀect of taking up a mini or midi-
job on earnings, wages and transition probabilities. I exploit the change in incentives for
labor supply and demand induced by the Mini-Job Reform, and compare across groups in a
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DiD) setting to address selection into tax-advantaged jobs.
First, I compare groups typically targeted by similar welfare-to-work policies (e.g. the Earned
Income Tax Credit in the US) to non-targeted groups. The ﬁndings suggest that after the
reform earnings, employment and job stability improves for young people and, to a lesser
extent, for women. On the other hand, earnings of single parents do not improve, as an
increase in hours worked is oﬀset by a decrease in hourly wages. For low-educated individuals,
earnings even decrease after the reform.
and temporary employment) in order to get the poorly-qualiﬁed and long-term unemployed back into the
workforce. Critics say Germany's reforms came at a high price as they ﬁrmly entrenched the low-wage
sector and depressed wages, leading to a two-tier labor market. New categories of low-income, government-
subsidized jobs - [...] were created to help those with bad job prospects eventually become reintegrated into the
regular labor market, but surveys show that for most people, they lead nowhere. [...] Regular full-time jobs
are being split up into mini-jobs, said Holger Bonin of the Mannheim-based ZEW think tank. And there
is little to stop employers paying "mini-jobbers" low hourly wages given they know the government will top
them up and there is no legal minimum wage.
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I use a second approach comparing workers in tax-advantaged jobs to those in non-tax ad-
vantaged jobs with similar observable characteristics. Similar workers are deﬁned by using
matching on pre-treatment characteristics. The results suggest that mini and midi-jobbers
experience a reduction in net earnings mainly due to a decrease in hours worked. The net
hourly wage does not signiﬁcantly change despite these workers having a lower tax bur-
den. This is consistent with ﬁrms beneﬁting from lower taxes more than workers, and raises
doubts about the eﬀectiveness of such an institutional design as an antipoverty instrument.
On the other hand, estimates for people out of employment before the reform suggest that
low-earning jobs can lead to better future employment possibilities when they are held tem-
porarily.
Related literature
Welfare-to-work policies have attracted a lot of attention in the literature since the introduc-
tion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US in mid 1970's. A big bulk of studies
has focused on the eﬀects on participation and employment, exploiting changes in the gen-
erosity across time and states and variation in beneﬁts by demographic characteristics. The
ﬁndings suggest a positive eﬀect on labor participation (mitigated at the family level) and
a negative and rather small eﬀect on hours worked, consistent with a theoretical framework
of labor supply decision (see e.g. Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001;
Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). The Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) in UK has a design
similar to the EITC, and the research has shown comparable results (see e.g. Blundell, 2006;
Blundell et al., 2000b). The German mini-job design diﬀers from these tax credits in two
main ways: (1) the earnings test for eligibility are at the individual and not the family level,
and (2) generosity does not vary with demographic characteristics. These features challenge
the analysis of the causal eﬀects of the German Mini-Job Reform.
The eﬀects of welfare-to-work policies have been tested through a few random experiments.
One example is the Self Suﬃciency Program (SSP) in Canada. Conducted between 1992
and 1995, the experiment consisted in oﬀering a temporary earnings' supplement to a ran-
dom sample of welfare recipients, conditional on the beneﬁciaries holding a full-time job.
Michalopoulos et al. (2005), Robins et al. (2008), Michalopoulos et al. (2002) ﬁnd large
eﬀects of the policy in employment and earnings, lower welfare receipt, higher family in-
come and lower poverty during the implementation time. The eﬀects vanish shortly after
the exhaustion of the beneﬁt. The German mini-job design diﬀers from the SSP as there
is no restrictions in hours worked or full-time requirement. As a matter of fact, the vast
majority of mini-jobs is part-time employment. Furthermore, the tax beneﬁts in Germany
are permanent, favoring a persistence in the eﬀects.2
2The lack of long-lasting eﬀects and, in general, the timing of the eﬀects in the SSP were explained in a
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Recently, few studies have addressed the eﬀect of tax credits on wages, more related to
the question in this paper. Leigh (2010) exploits variation in the EITC state supplements,
ﬁnding that the generosity of the tax credit is positively associated with lower hourly wages
of unskilled workers. Similarly, exploiting the expansion of the federal EITC in the middle of
the 90s, Rothstein (2010) ﬁnds that the wage of single mothers, entitled to higher beneﬁts, has
a slower growth rate compared to single women without children. The proposed mechanism
behind ﬁndings in both studies is an outwards movement in labor supply that shifts the
beneﬁt from workers to employers. A similar result but diﬀerent explanation is provided
by Azmat (2014) for the WFTC in UK. The WFTC, diﬀerently from the EITC and its
predecessor Families Tax Credit, is liquidated in the wage package, giving more information
to the employer regarding eligibility and amount received. This salience of the tax beneﬁt
for the employer ampliﬁes the shifting of the tax beneﬁt from workers to employers. This
paper contributes to this literature by showing that a big part of the German tax beneﬁts
for low-earning workers are shifted to the employers, which is consistent with the ﬁndings
for other in-work beneﬁts and with the fact that the mini-job design has a high salience for
employers. Furthermore, I provide evidence of eﬀects on transition probabilities after holding
a tax advantaged job, a question for which there is very scarce evidence in the context of
in-work beneﬁts.
The German mini-job reform, which does not provide beneﬁts in function of the family
structure and applies homogenously nationwide, is particularly challenging for impact evalu-
ation due to the lack of a natural counterfactual. The literature on the eﬀects of the reform
on labor market outcomes (see e.g. Akyol et al., 2013; Jacobi and Kluve, 2007; Eichhorst
and Zimmermann, 2007) has pointed out this limitation. The reduced form branch relies
on diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DID) techniques and propensity score matching to address this
problem.
Fertig and Kluve (2006) analyze the impact of the reform on the labor structure by estimating
a ﬁxed eﬀects model with administrative data provided by the IAB (the German Employment
Agency). They ﬁnd that the share of atypical employment increases as a consequence of the
reform. Caliendo and Wrohlich (2010), using the SOEP, exploit the variation in the months
of the interview to analyze the impact of the reform in the probability of having a marginal
or secondary job. They deﬁne as treatment group people interviewed between April and
October 2003, and control between January and March. With the cross section in the same
dates for 2002, they perform a DID to control for seasonal variation. They ﬁnd that the
reform increases the propensity of single men who hold secondary jobs, while they do not
ﬁnd an eﬀect on the share of marginal employment.
searching-matching model context by Card and Hyslop (2005).
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Another strand of studies uses structural estimations of labor supply and ex-ante micro-
simulations of the reform to infer potential eﬀects on participation and employment compo-
sition (Bargain et al., 2010; Steiner and Wrohlich, 2005). The simulations predict a moderate
positive eﬀect on labor participation, coming mostly from an inﬂow of secondary workers,
and a negative eﬀect on hours, a standard result of the neoclassical labor supply model.
Encouraging results regarding the eﬀects on the speed of the matching process are reported
by Fahr and Sunde (2009), who structurally estimate the matching function using adminis-
trative data on job seekers and vacancies by occupation for 2000-2006. Overall, the literature
on the Mini-Job Reform has focused on the changes induced in labor market participation
and employment. This paper instead focuses on the consequences on earnings and employ-
ment prospects of targeted workers, outcomes for which there is no evidence to the best
of my knowledge. The strategy I apply is in line with the techniques used in the existing
reduced-form literature.
Related to the question addressed by this paper, there is evidence about the potential of
marginal employment in Germany to serve as stepping-stone. However, the analysis is limited
to the pre-reform period and to workers already in the social security registers. Caliendo
et al. (2012) use a sample of unemployed workers from the IAB data for 2001-2004 and
analyze the eﬀect of taking up a mini-job on the unemployment duration and the ex-post
job matching quality. They exploit the existence of a disregard level of e165 a month
for unemployment beneﬁt claim. They ﬁnd that holding a mini-job increases the outﬂow
probability of the long-term unemployed and towards more stable jobs. They also document
a high correlation between the sector and ﬁrm of mini-jobs and subsequent employment,
suggesting human capital accumulation. Freier and Steiner (2008) focus on unemployed men,
using quarterly administrative data from the Employment Panel of the Federal Employment
Agency (EP-FEA) for 1999-2003. Using propensity score matching on recent employment
history and duration of the unemployment spell, they ﬁnd no eﬀect on the probability of
regular employment, but a reduction in the likelihood of re-entering unemployment and a
slight improvement in earnings. In this paper I analyze instead the changes in the transition
probabilities after the reform. Diﬀerently from these studies, I use survey data which, despite
the smaller sample size, allows to include inactive people in the analysis, an important group
given the activation purpose of the in-work beneﬁts.
The question regarding the potential of welfare-to-work policies as stepping-stones or dead-
ends is related to the relationship between in-work beneﬁts and human capital accumulation
(Blundell et al., 2013; Riddell and Riddell, 2012). The literature documents that higher
labor participation induced by tax beneﬁts may increase human capital through on-the-job
training. However, since jobs taken are mostly part-time, human capital accumulation is not
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as high as in full-time employment. There might also be a negative eﬀect if the incentives
to enter the labor market promote withdrawal from formal education.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I discuss the details of the insti-
tutional background and some relevant facts. Section 3 explains the theoretical background
behind the empirical investigation. I describe the data in Section 4 and the the empirical
strategy in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results using the strategy of comparison across
targeted and non-targeted groups, and Section 7 the ﬁndings by applying the matching strat-
egy. Robustness checks and discussion of the results are included in Section 8, and Section
9 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
The Mini-Job Reform and other details of the institutional context at that time was already
discussed in the previous chapter, so I will skip the details here, and I will concentrate in
the discussion of descriptive evidence related to this chapter. Using survey data from the
G-SOEP (to be detailed later), the pre and post-reform aggregate labor market numbers
provide a mixed picture regarding its potential eﬀects, as shown in Table (2.A1) in the
Appendix. While both participation and unemployment increased between 2002 and 2005,
average hours per worker remained constant and monthly after-tax earnings increased. The
number of mini- and midi-jobs in this survey date (diﬀerent from the previous data, which is
administrative) is consistent with the ﬁgures reported in Chapter 1 (see Figures (2.A1) and
(2.A2) in the Appendix).3 Earnings distribution look similar as well, as Figures (2.22) and
(2.A3) show.
Table (2.21) shows the composition of the working age population in Germany in 2005,
after the reform, as well as average hours and earnings of each employment type. Mini-
jobs are comparable to regular part-time employment in average hours (14 and 13 a week
respectively), though the dispersion is much higher (the standard deviation is 12 compared
to 5.7 for regular part-time jobs). However, average hourly earnings of regular part-timers
double mini-jobbers' (19 and 10 respectively). For midi-jobs, average hours worked, 26, are
below the full-time workers', 41, while double those of part-timers. The dispersion is higher
as well (13.9, 9.5 and 6.7 of standard deviation respectively). The hourly net earnings are
comparable to full-time workers in terms of mean (8 and 9) while they are more disperse (the
standard deviation is 16.4 and 4.2 respectively). Finally, 2% of the working age population
3These numbers are not exactly the same as in oﬃcial statistics due to the survey nature of the data and
that I use deﬁnitions of mini and midi-jobs. However, they capture the important facts such as the jump in
the number of mini-jobs and the share of total private employment.
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Figure 2.21: Distribution of gross monthly earnings in main job
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Figure 2.22: Distribution of weekly working hours and hourly net earnings in all occupations
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holds a mini or midi-job as a secondary employment. This group resembles full-time workers,
except for a higher hourly earnings for those whose second job is a midi-job.
Mini and midi-jobs in 2004-2007 absorb two thirds of the people who were inactive or un-
employed before the reform (table (2.A2) in the Appendix), while only the remaining one
third goes directly to regular employment. Tables (2.22) and (2.23) show the observed prob-
ability of transition between states for before the reform (2001/2002) and after (2004/2005)
respectively. Outﬂow from mini-jobs to better-paid employment decreases (33% to 21%),
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Table 2.21: Composition of working age population (17-65) in Germany, 2005.
Prop. (%) Hours/ week Hr. wage Month. gross earn.
Inactive 15.1
Studying 3.4
Unemployed 5.0
Irregularly employed 2.4
Part-time 6.7 13 19 1,640
(5.68) (21.20) (1114.38)
Full-time 49.1 41 9 2,634
(9.50) (4.16) (1564.93)
Mini-job (main) 10.4 14 10 267
(12.00) (25.59) (161.51)
Mini-job (secondary) 1.9 40 9 2,456
(13.97) (6.59) (1214.64)
Midi-job (main) 5.8 26 8 626
(13.86) (16.41) (166.63)
Midi-job (secondary) 0.3 36 15 3,123
(16.96) (12.38) (1101.77)
Total 100.0 34 10 2,021
(15.21) (11.94) (1625.73)
Note: Hours worked, hourly net earnings and monthly gross earnings are reported only for those who have
a positive declaration.
while the persistence in mini-jobs increases (48% to 63%). Mini-jobs display a considerable
persistence (45%), being the outﬂows to better-paid employment 28%. On the other hand,
the outﬂows from full-time employment to inactivity and unemployment decrease slightly
(2.6% to 2%). The ﬂow from regular part-timers to mini-jobs decreases (9.4% to 8.4%), not
giving signs of precarization of part-time workers.
To sum up, mini and midi-jobs have particular characteristics in terms of hours and hourly
earnings compared to regular employment both part-time and full-time. The ﬂows into and
out of them suggest that they are a cushion between unemployment and inactivity and
regular employment.
Table 2.22: Transition table: Probability (%) of going from state in row to state in column.
2001/2002
2001/2002 Inactive
not
stud.
Studying Unempl. Irregular
employm.
Working
PT
Working
FT
Mini-
Job
(main)
Total
Inactive not stud. 87.86 0.71 1.83 1.42 3.75 1.46 2.96 100
Studying 4.9 48.4 3.62 6.18 10.02 17.27 9.59 100
Unemployed 19.42 1.94 57.28 2.27 7.77 7.77 3.56 100
Irregular employm. 23.62 19.93 6.64 17.71 9.59 10.7 11.81 100
Working PT 8.75 1.28 4.91 2.85 38.51 34.31 9.4 100
Working FT 1.3 0.37 1.32 0.47 6.85 88.66 1.02 100
Mini-Job (main) 6.86 2.67 1.63 8.14 20.7 12.09 47.91 100
Total 18.16 2.66 4.37 1.91 10.46 56.87 5.57 100
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Table 2.23: Transition table: Probability of going from state in row to state in column.
2004/2005
2004/2005 Inactive
not
stud.
Studying Unempl. Irregular
employm.
Working
PT
Working
FT
Mini-
Job
(main)
Mini-
Job
(secondary)
Midi-
Job
(main)
Midi-
Job
(secondary)
Total
Inactive not stud. 86.08 0.91 2.94 2.58 1.47 0.96 3.95 0.15 0.91 0.05 100
Studying 4.04 54.83 2.46 5.1 3.69 3.87 18.1 0.35 7.56 0 100
Unemployed 21.77 1.09 55.99 2.49 4.67 3.42 7.47 0.47 2.64 0 100
Irregular employm. 23.28 17.24 8.62 18.53 3.45 3.45 17.67 0 7.76 0 100
Working PT 13.46 1.89 6.42 3.14 34.21 27.3 8.43 0.63 4.28 0.25 100
Working FT 0.9 0.07 1.08 0.18 4.74 89.54 0.61 1.41 1.23 0.24 100
Mini-Job (main) 5.17 2.04 2.59 6.5 4.78 4.08 63.48 1.25 10.03 0.08 100
Mini-Job (secondary) 1.01 0 0 0.67 3.7 40.07 4.38 43.77 1.35 5.05 100
Midi-Job (main) 2.09 2.21 3.84 2.56 9.3 18.14 15.47 0.81 45.12 0.47 100
Midi-Job (secondary) 2.08 0 0 0 2.08 39.58 2.08 22.92 0 31.25 100
Total 16.17 3.29 4.77 2.1 6.19 49.67 9.93 2.02 5.45 0.4 100
2.3 Theoretical Discussion
In this section, I discuss the theoretical mechanisms underlying the variation in earnings and
employment prospects of workers after to the Mini-Job Reform. For simplicity, let's think in
a static partial equilibrium model of the labor market, segmented in a low-earnings' sector,
which in the case of interest comprises mini and midi-jobs, and a high-earnings' sector or
regular employment.4 The Mini-Job Reform implies a reduction on the tax (SSC and income
tax) paid by workers in the low-earnings' sector and a consequent decrease in the tax wedge
on equilibrium.5 Without any movement in supply or demand (left panel), two eﬀects are in
place as shown in the left panel in ﬁgure (2.31): (i) the labor cost paid by ﬁrms W falls to
W ′, and (ii) the take-home or net wage of workers w increases to w′. The variation depends
on the sensitivity of demand and supply.
However, the modiﬁcation in the tax wedge in the low-earnings' sector induces responses
by agents. On the demand side, ﬁrms might create more low-paid jobs because now is less
expensive, or substitute more costly regular employment with low-earnings' workers. This
would imply a shift outwards in the demand for low-earnings' workers and, depending on
the substitution with regular employment, a shift in the demand in this sector. The result
is an upward pressure on wages and employment level in the low-earnings' sector.
On the other hand, supply of workers is also expected to respond. The left panel of ﬁgure
(2.32) shows the labor supply decision by an individual with an homogeneous labor tax. The
4The implicit assumption is that there are two well deﬁned types of labor, each traded in a diﬀerent
sector of the labor market (for example, high skilled and unskilled). Even if in practice there is not a clear
cut between low and high-earnings' capacity workers, the simpliﬁcation is useful for understanding the basic
eﬀects.
5I mostly abstract from the fact that the tax rate on mini and midi-jobbers, and within the latter group,
is heterogeneous, but I simply consider a sector with lower taxes than the other.
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upper indiﬀerence curve determines the hours worked by an agent who decides to supply
labor, while the lower one represents an agent who does not participate in the labor market.
The tax reduction represents an increase in the take-home wage and a steeper budget line as
shown in the right panel.6 This change induces some people not participating in the labor
market to work a positive amount of hours. However, some agents reduce hours worked to
proﬁt from the lower taxes paid by mini and midi-jobbers. Labor supply shifts outwards in
the low-earnings' sector, and inwards in the sector of regular employment. This induces a
downwards pressure of wages in the ﬁrst sector, and upwards in the second, and the opposite
with respect to the amount of labor.
The right panel in ﬁgure (2.31) shows the eﬀect of the shift outwards in the labor supply,
while ignoring the movements in demand.7 In this case, there will be downwards pressures
on the take-home wage of the workers in the low-earnings' sector even if they are paying
lower taxes. The ﬁnal direction and magnitude of the variations in labor cost, take-home
wage and employment in the low-earnings' sector and regular employment depends on the
sensitivity of supply and demand for labor, as well as on the relative magnitudes of the shifts
in the curves.
Figure 2.31: Partial equilibrium in the labor market of the low-earnings' sector
In the formal framework of the theory of tax incidence of Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), let's
assume an economy with competitive markets and a single ﬁnal good produced using labor
from two sectors j = {1, 2}. The Mini-Job Reform implies a reduction in the tax wedge
for the sector of low-paid workers, j = 1. Let τ1 be the tax rate paid by employers and
employees in mini and midi-jobs, while τ2 applies for regular employment, such that τ1 < τ2.
The net or take-home wage received by workers is wj = Wj(1 − τj), where Wj is the labor
cost for the ﬁrm. The tax wedge τj, independent of the statutory incidence (who pays
the tax), generates a diﬀerence between the net wage and the labor cost. It is possible
6I do not consider that the change in the tax rate for single and married people is diﬀerent due to the
joint income taxation of couples.
7This is analogous to the case of dominant eﬀect on labor supply, reasonable in the case of in-work
beneﬁts, in which the main objective is to increase participation.
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Figure 2.32: Labor supply decision
to deﬁne an implicit subsidy s derived from the diﬀerence between τ1 and τ2: (1 + s) ≡
(1 − τ1)/(1 − τ2). Using this deﬁnition, log-linearizing the equation for net wage in sector
1 and totally diﬀerentiating (note dτ2/(1 − τ2) = 0 because there is no change in taxes in
sector 2):
Wˆ1 = wˆ1 − sˆ (2.1)
where Wˆ1 ≡ dW1/W1, wˆ1 ≡ dw1/w1, sˆ ≡ ds/(1 + s) represent percentage changes of the
labor cost, net wage and implicit subsidy respectively. Similar derivations yield:
Wˆ2 = wˆ2 (2.2)
Assume a constant returns to scale production functionX = F (N1, N2), whereX is the single
consumption good produced using labor Nj from sectors j = {1, 2}. Totally diﬀerentiating
X and expressing the percentage change of X in terms of percentage changes in the labor
inputs:
Xˆ =
F1N1
X
Nˆ1 +
F2N2
X
Nˆ2 (2.3)
where Fj ≡ ∂F (N1, N2)/∂Nj. Under perfect competition, the problem of the ﬁrm maximiz-
ing beneﬁts yields Wj = Fj for j = {1, 2}. Let θ ≡ (W1N1)/X be the share of product
corresponding to workers in sector 1, and (1− θ) ≡ (W2N2)/X the analogous for sector 2:
Xˆ = θNˆ1 + (1− θ)Nˆ2 (2.4)
The elasticity of substitution is deﬁned as:
σ =
d(N1/N2)/(N1/N2)
d(W2/W1)/(W2/W1)
=
Nˆ1 − Nˆ2
Wˆ2 − Wˆ1
(2.5)
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Hence:
Nˆ1 − Nˆ2 = σ(Wˆ2 − Wˆ1) (2.6)
The labor supply is derived from the individual's static problem, in which we assume a
quasi-linear utility over a numeraire consumption good c and hours of work N s:8
max
c,Ns
c− α 1γ N
s(1+ 1
γ
)
1 + 1
γ
s.t.c = wN s (2.7)
where α denotes the disutility from labor, and γ is the constant elasticity of labor supply.
Note that the individual makes the labor supply decision depending on w, which varies
according the sector where he supplies labor. For simplicity, I assume each agent supplies
labor in a diﬀerent sector. The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to labor yield: N s = 1
α
wγ.
Log-linearizing and using αˆ = 0 (it is a parameter) yields:
Nˆ s = γwˆ (2.8)
where γ = Nˆ s/wˆ is the labor supply elasticity with respect to net wage, typically assumed
not negative. Deriving the labor supply for sector 1 and 2 in terms of the constant elasticity
and the respective net wages yields:
Nˆ1 = γwˆ1 = γ(Wˆ1 + sˆ)
Nˆ2 = γwˆ2 = γ(Wˆ2) (2.9)
Plugging equation (2.9) in (2.5) and deriving the diﬀerence in the growth rates of the net
wage with respect to the implicit subsidy:
wˆ1 − wˆ2
sˆ
=
σ
γ + σ
(2.10)
Assuming γ is positive, the right hand side of the expression can be either negative or positive
depending on the sign and the size of σ relatively to γ. For the case in which labor from
both sectors are substitutes in production (σ > 0), the net wage in sector 1 is expected to
grow by more when the subsidy increases, and the magnitude of the variation is increasing
in σ and decreasing in γ. If σ < 0, then the direction of the change is ambiguous. Similarly,
the relative growth rate of the amount of labor in both sectors when the subsidy increases
8This formulation of the problem is fairly standard in the public ﬁnance literature.
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is:
Nˆ1 − Nˆ2
sˆ
=
σ + γ
σγ
(2.11)
The amount of labor in the sector which receives the subsidy is also expected to increase by
more when σ > 0, and is ambiguous if σ < 0. Using this expression, it is possible to derive
the relative growth in the gross wages:
Wˆ1 − Wˆ2
sˆ
= − γ
γ + σ
(2.12)
where the right hand side is negative for σ > 0. Diﬀerently from net earnings, the cost paid
by ﬁrms is expected to fall in the subsidized sector relative to the other when the subsidy
increases, reﬂecting the employer appropriates part of the tax beneﬁt. If σ < 0 the change
is ambiguous.
Within this simpliﬁed static framework, it is clear that the eﬀect of reducing the tax rate
in the low-earnings' sector on labor cost, wages and employment depends on the sign and
the size of the elasticity of substitution and of labor supply. Who is appropriating the tax
reduction, the worker or the ﬁrm, is an empirical question. Independently of the mechanism,
if the tax reduction implies an increase in the workers' take-home wage, the policy is eﬀective
as an antipoverty instrument. If, on the contrary, the implicit subsidy allows the ﬁrm to
reduce the labor cost without improving workers' net earnings, then it is not possible to
conclude that workers are better oﬀ.
Now I shift attention to the inactive and unemployed workers. As shown in ﬁgure (2.32),
they face higher incentives to participate in the labor market due to a higher take-home wage
implied by the lower tax burden. Let's think in three periods in a very simpliﬁed scheme,
t = {0, 1, 2}. In t = 0, all workers are unemployed or inactive. Let's assume all workers start
with the same reservation wage and they hence accept the ﬁrst oﬀer they get.9 Abstracting
from labor demand determination, let's assume that the oﬀers include mini or midi-jobs and
regular employment. While from the former it is feasible to transit to regular employment,
the latter is an absorbing state. Regular employment is more costly for ﬁrms (higher tax
wedge), hence the probability of receiving such an oﬀer is lower than a mini or midi-job.
In t = 1, a randomly selected group obtains an oﬀer for a mini or midi-job, with probability
αMJ = 1. The remaining workers face a lower probability αE < 1 of receiving an oﬀer of
regular employment and (1− αE) of not receiving any oﬀer. If they remain unemployed or
inactive, in t = 2 they face the same lottery. Hence, the probability of obtaining a regular
9This is a simpliﬁcation useful for the analysis. If all unemployed and inactive workers are homogenous
ex-ante, the reservation wage is the same and oﬀers below it would not be taken. Hence, all oﬀers are above
the reservation wage and are taken by the worker.
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employment for this group which do not get a mini or midi-job oﬀer in t = 1 is:
αNME = αE + (1− αE)αE = αE(2− αE) (2.13)
The workers that enter mini or midi-jobs might develop higher labor market attachment
through better access to information, working habits or possibilities of promotion, than the
unemployed or inactive. On the other hand, they bear costs such as less time for searching
for a regular employment, or stigma or bad signal about their productivity or motivation
(Moﬃtt, 1983), which may reduce their possibility to transit into regular employment. These
factors determine the probability of transiting to regular employment in t = 2, denoted
αME . The relevant comparison is then between this probability and expression (2.13). If
αME ≥ αNME , then mini or midi-jobs are stepping-stones, and they are dead-ends otherwise.
Again, the relative size of these probabilities remains an empirical question.
The implicit assumption in this analysis is that agents prefer regular employment to mini
and midi-jobs. As discussed earlier, mini and midi-jobs are not exclusively deﬁned by the
amount of hours worked, in this sense a regular employment can entail the same amount of
eﬀort with a better hourly wage. Overall, regular jobs by deﬁnition imply higher earnings,
and the implicit assumption is that workers prefer to earn more. If holding a mini or midi-job
improves the future possibilities of transition to regular employment for workers, then there
is some evidence that a policy promoting these type of jobs might help workers to improve
their employment prospects. In the next sections, I provide some evidence regarding these
empirical questions.
2.4 Data and Descriptives
The data used in this paper is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a yearly survey
covering a wide set of socio-economic and demographic characteristics at the individual and
household level, on a representative sample of German population. It has a panel structure
and responds to a stratiﬁed sampling. I use the balanced panel for 2000-2007.10
Table (2.41) shows the main characteristics of mini and midi-jobbers compared to the rest
of workers and jobless population according to their labor situation in 2004-2007.11 Some
demographic groups are over-represented among mini and midi-jobbers compared to both
10The weights provided by the survey are used throughout the analysis, which adjust for the diﬀerent
probabilities of selection and for the probability of attrition.
11Here and in the rest of the analysis self-employed and civil servants are excluded, because their behavior
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent compared to wage-workers in private-sector.
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workers in regular employment and jobless population: women, single (without a partner),
workers who are not head of households, low educated. They are also concentrated in poorer
households and with more children. Mini and midi-jobbers have a larger share of previously
welfare-state dependent workers, i.e. receiving unemployment insurance or assistance or
other public transfers, compared to workers in regular employment, though lower if compared
to the group with no employment. Workers starting their ﬁrst job are more concentrated in
mini and midi-jobs.
Considering the recent labor history (2000-2002), mini and midi-jobbers have a longer expe-
rience in part-time employment, and shorter in full-time jobs than jobless and rest of working
population. They have been unemployed for more time than other workers, though shorter
than jobless population. Working hours and gross monthly earnings are in between those
of jobless population and rest of the workers, while the hourly net wage is the lowest and
the rate of job change the highest among mini and midi-jobbers. The gap between mini and
midi-jobbers and regular workers in labor market outcomes increases after the reform.
Given their particular characteristics, mini and midi-jobbers are not a random sample of the
population. The probability of taking a mini-job depends on pre-treatment characteristics
(see table (2.B1) in the Appendix). The resulting selection bias needs to be addressed to
approximate the causal eﬀect of taking up a mini or midi-job.
Exploiting the panel structure of the data, I estimate ﬁxed eﬀects models which allow control-
ling for unobservable factors constant in time potentially generating diﬀerences in levels of
outcomes among individuals. In the following section, the identiﬁcation of an eﬀect by com-
paring trends in the outcomes of a treatment and comparison group is explained. Regarding
the construction of these groups, I explore two diﬀerent alternatives: (i) using groups which
the literature on welfare-to-work policies mention as targets and that are empirically more
prone to take up mini and midi-jobs (women, young, single mothers, secondary workers and
low educated); (ii) constructing comparable groups by matching in pre-reform characteris-
tics. Both approaches provide diﬀerent possibilities in terms of the outcomes to be analyzed
and the type of treatment eﬀect to be estimated, as will be explained later.
2.5 Fixed eﬀects models and the estimation of the treat-
ment eﬀects
Following the notation in Angrist and Pischke (2009), let Dit be a dummy variable represent-
ing the treatment for individual i in time t. Yit is the observed outcome, and the potential
outcomes are Y 1it in case of treatment and Y
0
it otherwise.
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Suppose:
E(Y 0it |Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1) = E(Y 0it |Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 0) (2.14)
being Xit a vector of observed time-varying characteristics, Ui the unobservable but ﬁxed
confounders, and t the chronological time. Equation (2.14) means that the potential outcome
in case of no treatment is independent on the treatment status, after controlling for Ui, Xit
and t. Since the potential outcome in case of no treatment is not observed for treated units
after the reform, the only possibility is to test for it in the period before, when all units were
not treated (see next subsection).
Assuming further a linear speciﬁcation for the conditional expectation of the outcome:
E(Yit|Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 0) = α + λt + U ′iγ +X ′itβ (2.15a)
E(Yit|Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1) = E(Yit|Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 0) + δ (2.15b)
Combining these expressions, yield:
E(Yit|Ui, Xit, t, Dit) = DitE(Yit|Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1) + (1−Dit)E(Y0it|Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 0)
= α + λt + δDit + U
′
iγ +X
′
itβ (2.16)
The model to be estimated is hence:
Yit = αi + λt + δDit +X
′
itβ + uit (2.17)
where αi ≡ α + U ′iγ is the individual ﬁxed eﬀect which captures the time-invariant unob-
servable confounders, and λt is year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Upon veriﬁcation of the identifying assumption, the resulting estimate for δ from model
(2.17) captures the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) on the relevant outcome:
δ = E(Yit|Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1)− E(Yit|Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 0)
= E(Y 1it |Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1)− E(Y 0it |Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 0)
= E(Y 1it |Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1)− E(Y 0it |Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1)
= E(Y 1it − Y 0it |Ui, Xit, t, Dit = 1) = ATT (2.18)
where the second line just translates the ﬁrst in terms of potential outcomes, and the third
uses assumption (2.14).12
12If E(Y 1it |Ui, Xit, t,Dit) = E(Y 1it |Ui, Xit, t) was also assumed, then the Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE)
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2.5.1 Validity of the identifying assumption
The identiﬁcation of the ATT relies in two assumptions: (i) equation (2.14) and (ii) linearity
and additivity of the model. While (ii) responds to the usual parametric speciﬁcation for the
estimation, which is not excessively restrictive, it is possible to exploit the panel structure
of the data and the availability of information for a period before the reform to verify (i).
Given two periods, t and t′ such that t < t′, rewriting the expression (2.18) for t′, when both
Dit′ = 1 and Dit′ = 0 are observed, yields:
ATT = E(Y 1it′ − Y 0it′ |Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 1)
= E(Y 1it′ − Y 0it′ + Y 0it − Y 0it |Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 1)
= E(Y 1it′ − Y 0it |Ui, Xit′ , t, Dit′ = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Before and After (B/A)
−E(Y 0it′ − Y 0it |Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trend of Y 0 for D = 1
(2.19)
where in the second line Y 0it is added and subtracted, rearranging in the third line. The
ATT is the detrended before-and-after estimator for the treated observations. While Y 0it is
observable for individuals both in the treatment and comparison groups before the reform,
after the reform the only potential outcomes observed are Y 1it for treated individuals and Y
0
it
for the rest.
However, using assumption (2.14) for both t and t′:
E(Y 0it′ − Y 0it |Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 1) = E(Y 0it′ − Y 0it |Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 0) (2.20)
Plugging in the second term of (2.19):
ATT = E(Y 1it′ − Y 0it |Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 1)− E(Y 0it′ − Y 0it |Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 0)
= E(Yit′ − Yit|Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 1)− E(Yit′ − Yit|Ui, Xit′ , t′, Dit′ = 0) (2.21)
In the last line I used that all the potential outcomes in the ﬁrst line coincide with the
observed outcomes after the substitution. The expression in (2.20) is usually referred as
parallel trends assumption, necessary for δ to provide an unbiased estimation of the ATT.
It is possible to verify this assumption only for the pre-reform periods. Assuming it holds
after, the diﬀerences in the trends can be attributed to the presence of the treatment.
Let's deﬁne the variable Di individual speciﬁc and independent of time, which takes the
would be recovered. However, this is more diﬃcult to argue because there is not possibility of testing as it
is the case for assumption (2.14) in the period before the reform.
113
value 1 if the individual is in the treatment group and 0 if she belongs to the comparison
group. Using the period 2000-2002, I run the following regression:
Yit = α
0
i + λ
0
t +
02∑
t=00
φ0tY eart ∗Di +X ′itβ0 + εit (2.22)
which is similar to equation (2.17) in that it also contains the individual and year ﬁxed eﬀects
and time varying characteristics. The key is the set of year dummies Y eart interacted with
the Di. Parallel trends are assumed whenever the hypothesis that φ000 = φ
0
01 = φ
0
02 = 0 is
not rejected.
2.6 Target groups
The selection bias in the estimation of δ by using (2.17) might persist after controlling for
observable and time-invariant unobservable factors, being Dit and uit correlated. One way
to approach this problem is to deﬁne a variable Zit which is exogenous with respect to the
treatment (pre-determined) and captures the assignment to treatment. It takes the value
1 after the reform for a group which has a higher propensity to take up mini or midi-job and
0 otherwise. Treatment and assignment are related as follows:
Dit = pi + ηZit + vit (2.23)
To deﬁne Zit, let's consider those groups typically targeted by in-work beneﬁts: women,
young (35 years old or younger), single parents, secondary workers (not head of household
or spouse) and individuals with low education (high school or less). Even if the legislation
on mini and midi-jobs does not include variations for these groups, they have eﬀectively a
higher representation, as seen in the last column of table (2.61). The biggest diﬀerence in
the proportion of mini and midi-jobs is observed among women compared to men and single
with children compared to the rest (in couples or single without children).
The equation to be estimated is (2.17), where Dit is replaced by Zit. The year 2003 is
excluded because the reform was implemented in April. The sample is restricted to prime
age population (between 25 to 54) to avoid including the extremes labor market behaviors.
As is standard in the literature of treatment eﬀects, δ recovers the Intention to Treat
(ITT) eﬀect, which is typically lower in absolute magnitude than the ATT. The estimates
are interpreted as the eﬀect of the policy on the groups it intends to aﬀect.
The outcome variables are: (1) participation, (2) employment, (3) part-time employment,
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(4) regular employment, (5) regular part-time employment, (6) monthly gross earnings, (7)
monthly net earnings, (8) weekly working hours, (9) hourly net wage, (10) change of job.
Table (2.62) presents the mean and standard deviation of the outcomes before (2002) and
after (2005) the reform, and by groups in 2002. The most salient change after the reform
is the drop in 9 pp. in the share of regular employment, which includes the mechanical
redeﬁnition of jobs between e325 and e800 (regular before the reform and marginal after).
It is interesting that despite the share of part-time workers remains constant, the proportion
of regular part-time increases from 5.5% to 7.5%, which goes against the suspicion that
mini and midi-jobs replace part-time employment. Monthly gross earnings and hourly net
wage increase on average, while the working hours remain relatively constant. Finally, the
proportion of workers who change job decreases slightly between 2002 and 2005.
In the regressions, outcomes (1) to (5) and (10) are binary variables, and (7)-(9) are in natural
logarithm. The ﬁrst ﬁve outcomes are analyzed on the prime age population, and the rest
on the population working in all the periods between 2000 and 2007. Control variables Xit
include time varying relevant characteristics: whether the worker lives in Eastern or Western
Germany, if she is single, the number of children, if she is head of household, if she lives
in a dual-earner household, and the education level. Uit represents unobservables such as
motivation, attitudes towards work, reservation wage, etc..
Table (2.63) shows the estimates for δ. In columns, the outcomes are presented, while the
rows show the diﬀerent choices for Zit. The ﬁrst row presents a before and after replacing
the year ﬁxed eﬀects with a linear trend, and the results are consistent with those discussed
for table (2.62). In the case of binary outcome variables, a linear probability model is used.13
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level to account for autocorrelation.
After the reform, female labor participation increases by 4 pp. and employment, 5 pp.
relative to men, which represents one third of the preexistent gap. However, the proportion
of women in regular jobs decreases by 4 pp. widening the gender gap. There is not signiﬁcant
change in the proportion of part-time employment, which is higher for women (one third of
female workers compared to 5% of male), nor in the regular employment among part-timers,
higher for women as well (36% of female part-timers and 17.5% of male part-timers). Women
do not experience changes in their earnings or working hours, leaving the gap unchanged. A
possible underlying mechanism is an increase in labor supply of women. It is interesting that
the rate of job change, in which there was no gender diﬀerence in 2002, falls 3 pp. relatively
for women, potentially due to higher job stability.
Labor participation increases 3 pp. for young workers relatively to older after the reform,
13The estimation of E(Y |X), the object of interest, is not sensibly aﬀected by the speciﬁcation while the
linear probability model imposes the least distributional assumptions.
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reducing the gap of 5 pp.. There are not signiﬁcant changes in employment and regular
employment, which are lower for youth, and in part-time and regular part-time shares,
higher for youth. Monthly earnings increase for them, both in gross and net terms, by 8
pp. and 4 pp. respectively. The preexistent gap of e140 approximately is reduced in e50
on average. The higher earnings come from both a higher number of hours worked and
a higher hourly wage: δˆ for the respective outcomes is positive but imprecisely estimated.
This results are consistent with a dominant increase in demand for younger workers, which
improves earnings and increases labor participation. The rate of job change decreases by 6
pp. closing the pre-existent gap.
Single individuals with children before the reform display higher participation and lower em-
ployment rate, higher share of part-time employment and lower regular employment. In the
regressions, the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant suggesting no change. However,
this might be partly due the relatively small size of the group (5% compared to approxi-
mately 25% to 80% for the other cases, except for secondary workers). The only statistically
signiﬁcant estimate suggests that this group faces a 10% reduction in the hourly wage and
a 11% increase in the hours compared to people in other types of families, keeping earnings
growing at the same pace as the rest of workers.
There are no diﬀerences in participation and employment between primary and secondary
workers before the reform. Secondary workers hold less part-time employment, and earnings
are lower mainly due to a lower net hourly wage. Even if most estimations are imprecise
partly due to the small size of the group, the point estimates suggest that the reform induced
higher participation and employment in this group and reduced the proportion of part-timers,
against the expectations that mini-jobs are equivalent to part-time employment. In terms
of earnings, the group looses relatively to the primary workers, both in gross and net terms.
Given there is a relative increase in the number of hours, the main channel of the loss in
earnings is a reduction in the hourly net wage compared to primary workers. The results
indicate that the gaps between primary and secondary workers both in labor participation
and earnings are bigger after the reform.
Participation outcomes do not change for low educated individuals after the reform, except
for a mechanical fall in the share of regular employment compared to high educated people.
Net and gross monthly earnings of people with low education decrease 5 pp. compared to
highly educated workers, and this is mainly due to a fall in the hourly wage.
Overall, the expansion of tax exemptions and subsidies with the reform resulted in an increase
in labor participation for female and young people, having the latter improved their earnings
as well. For the rest of more aﬀected groups, there is dominant depression in earnings. In line
with the theoretical framework presented before, this result is consistent with an outwards
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shift of labor supply and demand for women and young workers, groups which consequently
achieve higher participation. In the remaining groups, the change in participation is not
as pronounced, while there is a depression in earnings particularly for workers with low
education level, suggesting appropriation of the tax beneﬁt by ﬁrms.
To qualify the validity of the estimations, I test the parallel trends assumption. Table (2.65)
shows the statistics corresponding to the test. It is not possible to reject that trends are
parallel, except for net monthly earnings for groups by education level, and working hours for
groups formed by gender, age and family type. For visual inspection, the graphs of residuals
of the regression of the outcomes on the controls and years ﬁxed eﬀects are in ﬁgures (2.C1)
to (2.C5) in the Appendix.
2.7 Matching strategy
A second approach to address the selection bias is to construct a comparison group to mini
and midi-jobbers by using a matching strategy on pre-reform characteristics (Ichino et al.,
2014). Matching relies on balance in observables and has the advantage of providing a more
homogeneous group for comparisons. To answer the question addressed by this paper, I
focus on two groups of outcomes: (1) total and hourly net earnings and working hours of
employed population, (2) probability of transiting to regular employment after taking up a
mini or midi-job by the jobless population before the reform.
The matching variables are gender, age, immigration condition, number of children in the
household, per capita after-tax-and-transfer household income, education level (less, equal
or more than high-school), indicator of new entrants in employment who were students in
the period before, work experience and monthly gross earnings. Variables refer to the period
before the reform.14 The treatment is considered as taking up either a mini or midi-job after
the reform.
I apply coarsened exact matching using the method by Blackwell et al. (2009), which consists
on generating cells with combinations of the matching variables, binning the continuous ones.
Then the observations are sorted into the strata and those with missing either treatment or
comparison observations are discarded. Observations kept are those in the common support,
as it is usually referred in the terminology of the matching literature. Matching weights are
computed to balance for the heterogeneous composition of the strata within the common
support.
14Time varying demographics refer to 2002. The indicator for new entrants in employment is measured
as being in this condition in any period between 2000 and 2002. Work experience is the maximum declared
in this period, and monthly earnings is the average during these years.
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In the balanced panel 2000-2007 with working age population (17-65)15, there are 8,917
individuals, of which 4,518 are working during the whole observation window (working pop-
ulation) and 1,422 are inactive or unemployed in 2002 (jobless population). These are the
groups of interest in the present analysis. There are 1,194 and 523 mini and midi-jobs in
each of them respectively, which constitute the treatment group. The potential comparison
groups are formed by the remaining individuals in each sub-sample. After matching, the re-
sulting sub-samples contain 407 treated and 654 matched controls in the working population
(1,061 in total), and 110 treated and 109 controls in the jobless population. For more details
on the sample, see table (2.D1) in the Appendix).
The gain of using the matching strategy is to balance the pre-reform observable character-
istics. Tables (2.D2) and (2.D3) in the Appendix show the mean, standard deviations and
a test for diﬀerence in means for matching variables and other pre-treatment characteristics
of mini and midi-jobbers compared to the rest of the workers, for the original and matched
sub-samples of the working and jobless population respectively.16 While in the original sam-
ple means are statistically diﬀerent, in the sub-sample in the common support diﬀerences
disappear or at least become smaller in all variables, even those not included in the match-
ing procedure. Hence, the matching strategy renders gains in terms of comparability of the
groups of mini and midi-jobs and the rest of the workers. However, this comes at the cost
of a considerable loss of observations, such that the remaining sub-samples represent 23%
of the original sample of working population, and 15% for the jobless. Figures (2.E1) and
(2.E2) in the Appendix show what is called in the literature as the propensity score for the
original sample and the sub-sample in the common support.
The outcomes to be analyzed in the working sub-sample are: (1) net monthly earnings, (2)
weekly hours worked, (3) net hourly wage, all in natural logarithm. In the sub-sample of
jobless individuals, the outcome of interest is the probability of holding a regular employment.
The evolution of the outcomes for the original sample as well as the matched sample with
and without matching weights is shown in ﬁgure (2.F1) in the Appendix. Visual inspection
suggests that the take-home earnings, both monthly and hourly, as well as the hours worked
decrease for the mini and midi-jobbers once the reform is in place. On the other hand, the
probability of holding a regular employment increases for the mini and midi-jobbers right
after the reform, and decrease thereafter.
The evolution of the outcomes after accounting for the observable time-varying variables and
15I use all ages due to sample size restrictions.
16The matching variables are not balanced by construction because the algorithm used allows strata with
diﬀerent number of units in the groups of mini or midi-jobbers and the rest of the workers. The last block of
columns shows the same statistics using the weights computed with the matching algorithm to compensate
for the diﬀerential strata sizes.
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year ﬁxed eﬀects on the matched sample is displayed in ﬁgure (2.71), where the residuals of
the corresponding regressions are plotted. Trends in earnings and hours for mini and midi-
jobbers after the reform do not suggest a relative fall compared to the rest of the workers.
Regarding the probability of holding a regular employment, it increases soon after the reform
and then goes down.
Figure 2.71: Evolution of the outcomes. Residuals from regression on observable time-varying
controls and year ﬁxed eﬀects
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Visually, the parallel trend assumption holds for the hourly net earnings and the probability
of being in regular employment, but it is not clear for the rest of the outcomes. Table (2.71)
shows the formal test using equation (2.22). Let's deﬁne the variable Di individual speciﬁc
and independent of time, which takes the value 1 if the individual takes up a mini or midi-job
after the reform, and 0 otherwise. The relevant test statistics in table (2.71) for the matched
sample (last two columns) do not allow to reject the hypothesis of parallel trends pre-reform
in all the outcomes.
Using the matched observations in the balanced panel in 2000-2007, excluding 2003, I es-
timate the model in equation (2.17), but modiﬁed to diﬀerentiate mini and midi-jobs in
the spirit of heterogeneous eﬀects. The underlying assumption is that after removing dif-
ferences in observable characteristics, the selection into mini or midi-jobs is determined by
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time-invariant unobservables Ui and time-varying observables Xit on which I condition. Dit
equals 1 for all years since the worker's ﬁrst entrance in a mini or midi-job after 2003.17.
Under assumption (2.14), δ identiﬁes the ATT and since it is estimated on the matched
sample the eﬀect estimated is local to this subgroup of comparable individuals.
Tables (2.72) and (2.73) show the estimation of δ for the corresponding outcomes and sub-
samples. The ﬁrst column for each outcome variable shows the estimation by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS), the second, using Fixed Eﬀects (FE), and the third one, using FE in the
matched sample.
Estimations using OLS are all signiﬁcant both statistically and economically. However,
the selection bias is apparent when comparing with the lower estimations using FE. The
negative sign of OLS estimates in the case of earnings and hours suggests that mini and
midi-jobbers work fewer hours and earn less than regular workers. This result is mechanical
and potentially due to the deﬁnition of mini and midi-jobs based on a maximum of earnings.
FE estimates are lower in magnitude, reﬂecting the diﬀerences in trends after controlling
for disparities in levels. When restricting to the matched sample with more comparable
individuals, estimations became slightly smaller in general, and less precise potentially due
to the reduction in the sample size.
Among people working during the whole period 2000-2007, net monthly earnings decrease
7% for mini-jobbers and 2% for midi-jobbers compared to workers in regular employment.
These magnitudes are economically signiﬁcant, equivalent to a lose of e70 and e20 a month
respectively, if evaluated at the mean net earnings of e1,000 in the sample. The coeﬃcients
are not precisely estimated though.
Decomposing the variation in earnings, hours fall by 10% for the mini-jobbers and 4% for
the midi-jobbers compared to the rest of the workers, though the latter is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This magnitude represents 3 and 1 hour a week respectively, given the average
is 32 hours in the sample. The net hourly wage, which is on average e7, decreases by 1%
(e0.07) for mini-jobbers and 6% (e0.42) for midi-jobbers with respect to the rest, but the
coeﬃcients are not statistically diﬀerent from 0. To sum up, hours worked fall potentially to
beneﬁt from the lower tax burden in mini and midi-jobs. However, workers do not receive
the beneﬁt because earnings, both monthly and hourly, do not increase. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that ﬁrms appropriate the beneﬁt of the lower tax burden. It is worth
reminding that the lack of growth in net earnings relatively might come from a dominant
17The treatment is considered since the ﬁrst entrance, because starting a mini or midi-job can be attributed
to the expansion of this type of employment by the reform, while changing the labor situation afterwards
is not exogenous, depends on worker's eﬀort, for example. Since the deﬁnition of mini-job changed deeply
with the reform, the variable Dit does not take the value 1 for mini-jobbers before the reform.
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outwards shift in labor supply or from a higher supply elasticity.18
Further insight on the mechanism underlying the results is derived from table (2.74), where
indicators of job change and reduction in gross monthly earnings are regressed on three
lags of the mini and midi-job indicators (maximum length allowed by the sample). The
coeﬃcients of interest are on the contemporaneous values. They capture whether there is
a higher probability of changing job or suﬀering a cut on earnings when entering a mini
or midi-job. Focusing on the estimation by FE on the matched sample, workers have 25%
higher chances of suﬀering a reduction in the salary when entering a mini-job, and 14% when
starting in a midi-job. The coeﬃcients regarding job change are not statistically signiﬁcant,
providing not conclusive evidence regarding workers leaving their jobs to take up a mini or
midi-job. Jointly with the previous results, this suggests that ﬁrms might directly depress
the gross remuneration of workers, by cutting hours or hourly wage, to take advantage of
the lower tax wedge. Net earnings by hour do not improve for workers. This is consistent
with the ﬁndings by Azmat (2006) for the WFTC, which has a similar design to the mini
and midi-jobs in the sense that the beneﬁt is part of the payroll.
For the inactive and unemployed individuals before the reform, the estimations regarding
mini-jobbers transiting to regular employment one period after on the matched sample even
switch sign compared to the OLS estimates. Selection is very strong in this case. Mini-
jobbers face a lower probability of holding regular employment due to their observable and
unobservable characteristics. Once accounted for this, mini-jobbers have a 12 pp. higher
probability (statistically signiﬁcant) of obtaining a regular employment if they stay one year
in the mini-job. In case they stay two years or more, the coeﬃcients become lower and
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. For the midi-jobs, there is the opposite situation: the
coeﬃcients increase with the length of the period (for 2 lags, it is 12 pp. higher, though
imprecisely estimated). Estimates are high compared to the unconditional probability of
being in regular employment of 14% in the whole sample and 18% since 2004.
A possible interpretation of this result is that mini-jobs act as a probation period: workers
accept a low pay and hours of work to signal their ability and motivation to work, and ﬁrms
screen workers by oﬀering these jobs. But if they stay too long in this type of job, it has a
lock-in eﬀect where the signal is negative and it is more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a regular employment.
In the case of the midi-jobs, since they are better paid and involve more hours, they might
allow to accumulate human capital with time and improve the likelihood of transiting to
regular employment.19
18Bispinck and Schulten (2011) point out that even if unions tried to limit the number of mini and midi-
jobs in certain sectors, such as retail, the rules were not enforceable. This together with the low unionization
rate in Germany (60%) hints on the low bargaining power or high supply elasticity of low-income earners.
19It is diﬃcult to discard that the positive eﬀect does not come from an improvement on the ﬁrm's
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Tables (2.G1) and (2.G2) in the Appendix present an analysis of heterogeneity of eﬀects for
relevant groups. The main ﬁndings suggest that the elimination of the hours limit played
a role. Previous mini-jobbers increase hours, the same as young people, Eastern Germans,
single parents and secondary workers. However, not in all cases earnings improve, because
there are downward pressures on the hourly net wages in mini and midi-jobs. This is the
case for single parents for example. Young people who hold mini or midi-jobs are the most
beneﬁted in terms of earnings.
Estimations regarding stepping-stone eﬀects for inactive and unemployed workers are impre-
cise potentially due to the reduced sample size. However, it seems that mini-jobs constitute
an eﬀective means for unemployed to transit to regular employment. However, there is a
lock-in in this type of jobs for women, Eastern Germans and single parents.
2.8 Discussion: Robustness and general equilibrium ef-
fects
In this section, I qualify the validity of the results by showing they hold under changes in the
speciﬁcation and I discuss how they are aﬀected by general equilibrium eﬀects. Robustness
checks are oﬀered for the results using the combined matching and ﬁxed eﬀects strategy.
First, I redeﬁne Dit so as it only refers to mini and midi-jobs as main job. The ﬁrst four
columns of table (2.81) show that the results are qualitatively robust, even if the sample size
after matching is smaller for the working population. Most of the estimates do not change
sign, though the point estimations are higher in absolute magnitude and more precise. The
coeﬃcient regarding the eﬀect of mini-jobs on net monthly earnings is signiﬁcant and of
higher magnitude. For inactive and unemployed people, there is almost no change in the
sample and the results, since they mostly take up mini and midi-jobs as main.
A second change in the speciﬁcation is to consider mini-jobs before the reform as part of the
treatment, keeping the original matched samples, as shown in columns 5-8 in table (2.81).
While results in terms of earnings are very similar to the previous speciﬁcation, for the
jobless population the estimates decrease in magnitude and become statistically insigniﬁcant.
However, the temporal pattern of the coeﬃcients remain.
The ﬁrst four columns in table (2.82) is a standard DID exercise, in which I disregard that
individuals enter into mini and midi-jobs in diﬀerent moments after the reform. Results
possibilities to screen workers on the base of unobservables for the econometrician but not for the ﬁrm.
It would be an unfair comparison if the workers who enter mini-jobs are the most skillfull of the pool of
unemployed and inactive.
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do not qualitatively change. Finally, in the last columns I restrict attention to those who
are part-timers (or inactive and unemployed in the case of the jobless group) during all the
observation period, and I present the results on the original sample due to its limited size.
The only treatment is to take up a mini-job, and the comparison group is composed by regular
part-timers. This exercise potentially abstract from the decision between being full and part-
time. Results on earnings remain, though the change in hours become insigniﬁcant as it is
to be expected. Coeﬃcients related to the probability of transition to regular employment
maintain the temporal pattern but are lower and statistically insigniﬁcant.
An additional test for the presence of eﬀects on earnings for people working during the whole
period of observation, 2000-2007, is performed using the concept of intensity of treatment.
Following Duﬂo (2001) and Bleakley (2007), workers in sectors with more low-paid jobs
before the reform are more aﬀected by the expansion of these type of employment with the
reform. I deﬁne low-paid jobs as those which comply with the post-reform deﬁnition of mini
and midi-jobs. The sector in which the worker is before the reform is highly correlated with
the sector after: 60% of the workers with valid sector declaration remains in the same sector
in between 2002 and 2007. Since it is a pre-determined variable, I consider it exogenous and
an indicator of the worker's ability.
The evolution of the outcomes is shown in ﬁgure (12) in the Appendix, in which sectors are
classiﬁed in high and low intensity of treatment according to whether they are above and
below the median of low-paid jobs respectively. In a regression framework the speciﬁcation
is:
Yijt = αi + λt + δ(D
pre
j ∗ Postt) +X ′itβ + uit (2.24)
where all the variables are as in equation (2.17), Dprej represents the intensity of low-paid
jobs in the sector where the worker was employed before the reform (in 2002) and Postt is
an indicator which takes the value 1 after 2003. The intensity is computed as an average of
the proportion of low-paid jobs by sector between 2000-2002. I consider separately a more
restrictive concept using only the deﬁnition of mini-jobs, and a wider one including midi-jobs
as well. As shown in table (2.83), there are not signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. However, the point
estimates suggest that neither the net earnings nor the hours are lower for workers in high-
intensity sectors in low-paid jobs compared to the rest. The net hourly wage is between 0.7%
and 0.9% lower when the intensity is 10% higher after the reform though. This is consistent
with the hypothesis of appropriation of the tax by ﬁrms.
A ﬁnal word is worth regarding the existence of general equilibrium eﬀects. The analysis is
based on the comparison of earnings, hours and probabilities of transition to regular employ-
ment between mini and midi-jobbers and the remaining workers. However, the comparison
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group is potentially aﬀected by the reform as well, and the direction of the eﬀect depends
mainly on the degree of substitutability between low and high-earnings' workers.
If they are substitutes, the higher attractiveness of mini and midi-jobs due to their lower
tax cost might have led ﬁrms to reduce the demand for regular workers, yielding downwards
pressures on earnings in this sector. Results hence become a conservative estimation of the
eﬀect of the reform in the earnings of mini and midi-jobbers. They would overestimate
the real eﬀect if wages of regular employment were increasing driven by complementarity
with mini and midi-jobbers. However, the demand for regular employment should increase
considerably compared to mini and midi-jobs, which is quite implausible because of the
relative sizes of the sector.
Finally, regarding the probability of holding regular employment, the reform mechanically
decreased it for both the treatment and comparison group. Even if ﬁrms substitute or
complement marginal and regular employment, the change in this probability should be
homogeneous for both groups not biasing the results.
2.9 Conclusions
The German Mini-job Reform is a controversial policy designed along the lines of the welfare-
to-work policies popular in the developed world. It entails tax exemptions and subsidies for
workers with gross earnings below a limit, the so-called mini and midi jobs. While
the main goal of this type of interventions is to promote labor participation and improve
conditions for workers with low earnings capacity, much of the political debate about the
German reform has suggested that it also brought undesired eﬀects related to in-work poverty
and lock-in eﬀects in low-quality jobs. In this paper, I provide empirical evidence of the
eﬀects of the reform on earnings and employment prospects of targeted workers. I exploit
the panel structure of the G-SOEP by estimating ﬁxed eﬀects models, and I provide several
alternatives for the construction of comparison groups. On the one hand, I use groups
more aﬀected by mini and midi-jobs, i.e. women, young, single parents, secondary and low-
educated workers. On the other hand, I construct a comparison group by matching mini
and midi-jobs to the rest of the workers on the basis of demographic and socio-economic
pre-reform characteristics.
The theoretical framework of tax incidence in the labor market predicts that a reduction
of the tax wedge in the low-earning segment as implied by the Mini-Job Reform is shared
by employers and employees depending on the elasticities of supply and substitution among
mini and midi-jobbers and regular workers, and the inﬂow of new workers. The latter is
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expected to be positive according to the static labor supply model, which on the other
hand predicts a reduction in hours of individuals already working. Hence, the expected
change in net earnings after the tax reduction is theoretically ambiguous. Empirically, I ﬁnd
that workers in the low-earning segment face downwards pressures on earnings. Using the
matched sample, the probability is 25% for mini-jobbers and 14% higher for midi-jobbers to
suﬀer a gross earnings reduction compared to regular workers, while the net monthly and
hourly earnings do not increase even if they pay lower taxes. Besides, mini-jobbers reduce
hours worked by 10% on average. The ﬁndings are consistent with ﬁrms appropriating all
the economic incidence of the tax reduction.
For inactive and unemployed workers before the reform, mini or midi-job might represent
stepping-stones if they yield human capital accumulation or help signalling willingness to
work. By these means, jobless workers would transit smoothly to employment with higher
earnings. However, it is also possible that working for low wage or hours generates a negative
signal regarding the worker type, or detracts time from job search, harming future employ-
ment prospects and leading to a dead-end. I ﬁnd mini-jobbers have 12% higher chances of
transition to regular employment after one year, while midi-jobbers increase their chances
in a similar magnitude after the third year. At longer horizons for mini-jobs and shorter for
midi-jobs, the probabilities are not statistically nor economically signiﬁcant. This evidence
supports mini and midi-jobs potentially serving as stepping-stones.
Encouraging low-earning jobs via tax incentives aﬀects diﬀerently groups of the population.
In the German experience, younger workers are the winners, increasing labor participation
and earnings. The reform seems also eﬀective for activating women. However, some vulner-
able groups which are usually targeted by welfare-to-work policies such as single parents and
low-educated workers face downward pressures on earnings without improving the chances
to be employed.
Even if the Mini-Job Reform took place more than a decade ago, the debate regarding it is
ongoing, and many European countries are looking at the German experience to analyze the
possibility of adoption of similar policies. Having thorough picture of the consequences of
promoting low-earning jobs by tax beneﬁts is hence relevant for policy design. The results in
this paper raise questions about the eﬀectiveness of the German design to improve earnings
and life quality of workers in the lower tail of the income distribution. On the other hand,
they support the hypothesis that jobs with tax subsidies may act as spring board for jobless
people to improve their employment prospects.
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Table 2.41: Characteristics of jobless, mini and midi-jobbers and regular workers in 2002
(17-65 years old)
Non-working Mini/midi-job Regular job
Demographics
Female 0.683 0.745 0.423
(0.466) (0.436) (0.494)
Age 49.66 38.71 39.73
(10.51) (12.09) (10.19)
Immigrant 0.162 0.138 0.109
(0.369) (0.345) (0.312)
East 0.211 0.194 0.203
(0.408) (0.396) (0.402)
Single 0.245 0.352 0.322
(0.430) (0.478) (0.467)
Children 0.486 0.816 0.688
(0.926) (0.974) (0.956)
Head of HH 0.521 0.460 0.659
(0.500) (0.499) (0.474)
Dual earner HH 0.131 0.426 0.527
(0.338) (0.495) (0.499)
UB or Assist. 0.219 0.177 0.0596
(0.414) (0.382) (0.237)
Public transfers to HH 10081.7 6198.0 3836.1
(9283.1) (6762.3) (5291.8)
Per capita annual HH income 12049.1 11120.9 14864.2
(7780.1) (6920.7) (7795.2)
Less than HS 0.260 0.205 0.111
(0.439) (0.404) (0.314)
High School 0.611 0.693 0.718
(0.488) (0.462) (0.450)
More than HS 0.129 0.103 0.171
(0.335) (0.304) (0.376)
Work history (2000-2002)
Working 0.402 0.884 0.988
(0.490) (0.320) (0.108)
Years of FT experience 16.11 10.05 15.51
(13.02) (10.79) (10.80)
Years of PT experience 2.547 3.313 1.681
(5.883) (5.723) (4.243)
Years of unemp. experience 1.893 1.003 0.393
(3.143) (2.040) (1.109)
Weekly working hours 7.589 19.22 37.60
(12.47) (14.62) (12.29)
Hourly net wage 10.82 8.204 9.325
(14.74) (7.699) (5.013)
Gross monthly labor earnings 450.8 783.2 2281.4
(847.7) (816.2) (1280.7)
Change of job 0.119 0.341 0.294
(0.323) (0.474) (0.456)
Labor market outcomes after the reform (2004-2007)
Weekly working hours 15.61 37.76
(12.82) (12.42)
Hourly net wage 8.581 10.35
(7.940) (7.063)
Gross monthly labor earnings 636.6 2554.1
(653.7) (1387.8)
Change of job 0.432 0.232
(0.496) (0.422)
New worker 0.0112 0.00411
(0.105) (0.0640)
Student before 0.000240 0.000439
(0.0155) (0.0210)
Note: Categorization according to labor situation in 2004-2007: Non-working if did not work in any period,
mini or midi-jobbers if such an employment in some period, regular job if employment of other type in
some period and not mini or midi-job. Work history: working, new worker, student before and change of
job is 1 for an individual who is in this status at least one year in 2000-2002; experience refers to the
observation with the maximum, and earnings and weekly hours are the average; same deﬁnitions for
variables included in outcomes.
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Table 2.61: Proportion of people in working age (17-65) not working, in regular jobs and in
mini or midi-jobs. 2005
Groups Not working Regular job Mini/midi-job
Female 29% 49% 22%
Male 16% 74% 10%
35 y.o. or younger 19% 60% 21%
More than 35 25% 60% 15%
Single with children 30% 43% 27%
Rest 23% 61% 16%
Secondary worker 19% 57% 23%
Primary worker 23% 60% 16%
Low education 25% 58% 17%
High education 14% 74% 12%
Note: Balanced panel 2000-2007. Mini or midi-jobs held as main or secondary jobs.
Table 2.62: Summary statistics, before (2002) and after (2005), and by groups (2002)
Before and after Gender Age Family comp. Type of worker Education
2002 2005 Male Female >35 <=35 Rest Sing. w. chil. Primary Secondary High Low
Participation 0.886 0.883 0.966 0.819 0.902 0.854 0.883 0.932 0.886 0.887 0.937 0.877
(0.318) (0.321) (0.181) (0.385) (0.297) (0.353) (0.321) (0.253) (0.318) (0.317) (0.243) (0.329)
Employment 0.847 0.837 0.929 0.777 0.861 0.818 0.849 0.813 0.847 0.832 0.926 0.832
(0.360) (0.370) (0.256) (0.416) (0.346) (0.386) (0.358) (0.391) (0.360) (0.375) (0.262) (0.374)
Part-time 0.157 0.158 0.0437 0.253 0.156 0.161 0.151 0.252 0.160 0.0909 0.0884 0.170
(0.364) (0.365) (0.205) (0.435) (0.362) (0.368) (0.358) (0.435) (0.366) (0.288) (0.284) (0.376)
Regular employment 0.793 0.702 0.922 0.683 0.810 0.758 0.798 0.720 0.792 0.808 0.905 0.772
(0.406) (0.457) (0.267) (0.465) (0.393) (0.428) (0.402) (0.450) (0.406) (0.395) (0.293) (0.420)
Regular part-time employm. 0.0542 0.0749 0.00695 0.0939 0.0515 0.0596 0.0515 0.0930 0.0553 0.0234 0.0210 0.0603
(0.226) (0.263) (0.0831) (0.292) (0.221) (0.237) (0.221) (0.291) (0.229) (0.152) (0.143) (0.238)
Gross monthly labor earnings 1857.1 1904.1 2620.0 1216.8 1951.5 1668.6 1898.4 1271.4 1865.1 1626.6 3009.2 1645.3
(1514.8) (1751.4) (1525.8) (1169.9) (1574.8) (1368.3) (1530.5) (1118.5) (1524.4) (1185.4) (1941.5) (1317.3)
Net monthly labor earnings 1403.5 1463.4 1808.5 980.9 1449.1 1307.7 1420.0 1132.9 1409.1 1241.4 1927.3 1292.1
(813.1) (914.1) (798.0) (580.6) (867.7) (675.2) (824.4) (531.2) (819.3) (585.0) (997.5) (720.9)
Weekly working hours 30.38 29.73 39.29 22.90 30.74 29.67 30.71 25.75 30.37 30.68 38.16 28.95
(18.12) (18.40) (14.57) (17.41) (17.29) (19.66) (18.12) (17.54) (18.13) (17.74) (16.34) (18.07)
Hourly net wage 9.110 9.319 10.03 8.139 9.147 9.032 9.128 8.803 9.141 8.202 10.81 8.749
(5.918) (5.666) (4.871) (6.714) (5.405) (6.878) (5.994) (4.478) (5.964) (4.278) (4.848) (6.062)
Change of job 0.103 0.0783 0.0959 0.110 0.0846 0.141 0.105 0.0775 0.104 0.0827 0.112 0.102
(0.304) (0.269) (0.294) (0.312) (0.278) (0.348) (0.307) (0.268) (0.305) (0.276) (0.316) (0.302)
Note: Balanced panel 2000-2007. Prime age population (25-54).
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Table 2.63: Intention-to-Treat (ITT) estimates. Balanced panel 2000-2007, prime age pop-
ulation (25-54)
VARIABLES Partic. Employm. Part-time Regular emp. Regular PT
After 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.08*** 0.04***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011)
Female 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
35 y.o. or younger 0.03* 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01
(0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.022) (0.011)
Single with children 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01
(0.024) (0.033) (0.039) (0.030) (0.036)
Secondary worker 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028) (0.015)
Low education 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.03* -0.01
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010)
Observations 31,462 31,462 31,462 31,462 31,462
Number of indiv. obs. 4,495 4,495 4,495 4,495 4,495
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.64: Intention-to-Treat (ITT) estimates. Balanced panel 2000-2007, people working
all the periods, prime age (25-54)
VARIABLES Gross m. earn. Net m. earn. Hours Hr. wage Job change
After -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02**
(0.018) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011)
Female 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03**
(0.028) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.013)
35 y.o. or younger 0.08*** 0.04** 0.02 0.01 -0.06***
(0.024) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.014)
Single with children 0.13 -0.01 0.11** -0.10*** 0.01
(0.077) (0.031) (0.044) (0.036) (0.038)
Secondary worker -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.02
(0.040) (0.066) (0.038) (0.069) (0.027)
Low education -0.05** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.04*** 0.02
(0.023) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 22,376 21,751 22,350 21,749 22,376
Number of indiv. obs. 3,197 3,197 3,197 3,197 3,197
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.65: Test of parallel trends assumption. Panel 2000-2002, prime age population
(25-54)
Female Young Single w. childr. Secondary Low educ.
F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
All
Participation 2.54 0.0790 0.35 0.7069 2.26 0.1043 2.97 0.0516 0.33 0.7172
Employment 2.42 0.0891 0.26 0.7680 1.53 0.2165 1.06 0.3460 0.43 0.6531
Part-time 0.87 0.4200 1.48 0.2269 0.12 0.8841 0.75 0.4710 0.18 0.8328
Regular employment 1.61 0.2003 0.39 0.6776 2.18 0.1132 1.78 0.1691 0.32 0.7261
Regular part-time employment 0.09 0.9156 0.91 0.4013 0.30 0.7444 0.96 0.3841 0.02 0.9846
Working in all periods
Gross monthly earnings (ln) 2.02 0.1328 0.93 0.3947 2.55 0.0786 0.53 0.5912 0.45 0.6363
Net monthly earnings (ln) 0.31 0.7344 1.98 0.1384 0.46 0.6288 2.09 0.1232 8.19∗∗∗ 0.0003
Weekly working hours (ln) 4.29∗ 0.0138 3.83∗ 0.0218 3.59∗ 0.0277 0.51 0.5996 2.80 0.0610
Hourly net wage (ln) 2.53 0.0795 0.60 0.5463 2.73 0.0656 1.61 0.2006 0.94 0.3902
Change of job 0.14 0.8714 1.08 0.3410 2.47 0.0849 0.17 0.8437 0.21 0.8131
Table 2.71: Test of parallel trends assumption. Panel: 2000-2002, matched sample
F-stat p-value
Working population
Net monthly earnings (ln) 0.20 0.8193
Log weekly working hours 0.50 0.6089
Hourly net wage (ln) 0.60 0.5489
Jobless population
Prob. of regular employment 1.08 0.3410
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.72: Estimated eﬀects of holding mini and midi-jobs. Panel 2000-2007, working
population
Monthly net earnings (ln) Weekly hours worked (ln) Net hourly wage (ln)
VARIABLES OLS FE Matching and FE OLS FE Matching and FE OLS FE Matching and FE
Mini-job -0.75*** -0.10*** -0.07 -0.52*** -0.10*** -0.10* -0.27*** -0.06** -0.01
(0.027) (0.031) (0.048) (0.027) (0.031) (0.055) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038)
Midi-job -0.70*** -0.05 -0.02 -0.41*** -0.06 0.04 -0.31*** 0.00 -0.06
(0.041) (0.039) (0.053) (0.038) (0.045) (0.068) (0.041) (0.038) (0.071)
Observations 29,678 29,678 7,018 30,665 30,665 7,223 29,614 29,614 7,001
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.04
Number of indiv. 4,416 1,039 4,417 1,039 4,416 1,039
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.73: Estimated eﬀects of holding mini and midi-jobs. Panel 2000-2007, jobless pop-
ulation
Probability of regular employment
VARIABLES OLS FE Matching and FE OLS FE Matching and FE
Mini-job, 1 lag -0.10*** -0.00 0.06 -0.11*** 0.04 0.12*
(0.027) (0.032) (0.056) (0.035) (0.031) (0.062)
Mini-job, 2 lags 0.04 0.07* 0.02
(0.053) (0.038) (0.045)
Mini-job, 3 lags -0.10* -0.04 -0.04
(0.058) (0.043) (0.079)
Midi-job, 1 lag 0.12** 0.02 0.06 -0.00 -0.04 0.06
(0.056) (0.051) (0.075) (0.070) (0.057) (0.074)
Midi-job, 2 lags 0.28** 0.25*** 0.07
(0.115) (0.084) (0.081)
Midi-job, 3 lags -0.14 -0.11 0.12
(0.159) (0.088) (0.085)
Observations 8,916 8,916 1,310 7,767 7,767 1,131
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.21 0.30 0.16 0.21 0.32
Number of indiv. 1,356 205 1,356 205
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.74: Probability of job change and gross monthly earnings reduction in any activity.
Panel 2000-2007, working population
Prob. of job change Prob. of gross monthly earnings reduction
VARIABLES OLS FE Matching and FE OLS FE Matching and FE
Mini-job 0.05** 0.02 0.03 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.25**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.041) (0.030) (0.050) (0.100)
Mini-job, 1 lag 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.20***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.038) (0.050) (0.042) (0.072)
Mini-job, 2 lags 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.08
(0.040) (0.041) (0.088) (0.051) (0.048) (0.081)
Mini-job, 3 lags -0.09** -0.07* -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
(0.038) (0.040) (0.089) (0.054) (0.044) (0.072)
Midi-job 0.09** 0.03 0.13 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.14**
(0.036) (0.050) (0.100) (0.042) (0.046) (0.058)
Midi-job, 1 lag 0.01 0.01 -0.10 -0.13** -0.14** -0.05
(0.053) (0.054) (0.128) (0.064) (0.064) (0.088)
Midi-job, 2 lags -0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.13** -0.12** -0.18**
(0.051) (0.046) (0.060) (0.066) (0.059) (0.092)
Midi-job, 3 lags 0.10 0.11 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.19
(0.086) (0.098) (0.137) (0.061) (0.063) (0.127)
Observations 25,266 25,266 5,905 25,266 25,266 5,905
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Number of indiv. 4,417 1,039 4,417 1,039
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.81: Estimated eﬀects of holding mini and midi-jobs. Robustness check. Panel 2000-
2007
Only main job Mini-job before
VARIABLES Earnings Hours Hr. wage Pr. reg. emp. Earnings Hours Hr. wage Pr. reg. emp.
Mini-job, main -0.18* -0.27** -0.03
(0.093) (0.106) (0.068)
Midi-job, main 0.04 0.09 -0.03
(0.062) (0.077) (0.078)
Mini-job, main, 1 lag 0.12*
(0.061)
Mini-job, main, 2 lags 0.02
(0.043)
Mini-job, main, 3 lags -0.03
(0.079)
Midi-job, main, 1 lag 0.07
(0.076)
Midi-job, main, 2 lags 0.07
(0.081)
Midi-job, main, 3 lags 0.13
(0.087)
Mini-job* -0.15** -0.25*** 0.04
(0.061) (0.072) (0.040)
Midi-job -0.02 0.05 -0.06
(0.053) (0.063) (0.073)
Mini-job*, 1 lag 0.08
(0.079)
Mini-job*, 2 lags 0.02
(0.058)
Mini-job*, 3 lags 0.04
(0.052)
Midi-job, 1 lag 0.04
(0.073)
Midi-job, 2 lag 0.07
(0.078)
Midi-job, 3 lags 0.11
(0.085)
Observations 3,879 4,054 3,864 1,104 7,018 7,223 7,001 1,131
Number of indiv. 587 587 587 202 1,039 1,039 1,039 205
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.31 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.32
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.82: Estimated eﬀects of holding mini and midi-jobs. Robustness check. Panel 2000-
2007
Standard DID Only part-timers
VARIABLES Earnings Hours Hr. wage Pr. reg. emp. Earnings Hours Hr. wage Pr. reg. emp.
Mini-job*Post -0.03 -0.07** 0.03
(0.057) (0.034) (0.058)
Midi-job*Post -0.15*** -0.12** -0.08
(0.050) (0.060) (0.053)
Mini-job*Post, 1 lag 0.06
(0.090)
Mini-job*Post, 2 lags -0.05
(0.060)
Mini-job*Post, 3 lags -0.01
(0.063)
Midi-job*Post, 1 lag 0.00
(0.084)
Midi-job*Post, 2 lags -0.01
(0.054)
Midi-job*Post, 3 lags 0.03
(0.050)
Mini-job -0.11*** -0.08 -0.09*
(0.038) (0.052) (0.053)
Mini-job, 1 lag 0.06
(0.034)
Mini-job, 2 lags 0.05
(0.053)
Mini-job, 3 lags -0.04
(0.050)
Observations 7,018 7,223 7,001 1,131 3,968 4,172 3,961 6,280
Number of indiv. 1,039 1,039 1,039 205 601 602 601 1,094
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.31 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.83: Estimated eﬀects using intensity of treatment. Panel 2000-2007, working pop-
ulation
Monthly net earnings (ln) Weekly hours worked (ln) Net hourly wage (ln)
VARIABLES Only mini-jobs Mini or midi-jobs Only mini-jobs Mini or midi-jobs Only mini-jobs Mini or midi-jobs
Intensity (mini-job)*Post 0.07 0.07 -0.09
(0.097) (0.132) (0.113)
Intensity (mini/midi-job)*Post 0.05 0.04 -0.07
(0.074) (0.099) (0.083)
Observations 28,077 28,077 28,722 28,722 28,016 28,016
Number of indiv. 4,131 4,131 4,131 4,131 4,131 4,131
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Intensity (mini-job): more restrictive deﬁnition of low-paid jobs (only mini-jobs). Intensity
(mini/midi-jobs): wider deﬁnition including mini and midi-jobs. Sample of workers with valid sector
declaration in 2000-2007.
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2.A Labor market numbers according to the G-SOEP
Table 2.A1: Labor market indicators in 2002 and 2005
2002 2005
Labor participation 77.9% 80.0%
Unemployment rate 5.5% 6.0%
Hours a week 34 34
Monthly net earnings 1,332 1,360
Note: Cross-sectional weights.
Figure 2.A1: Evolution of mini and midi-jobs
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Note: Using the deﬁnitions of mini and midi-jobs before and after the reform. Cross-sectional weights.
Figure 2.A2: Evolution of mini and midi-jobs
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Figure 2.A3: Distribution of weekly working hours and hourly net earnings in all occupations,
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Table 2.A2: People working at least one period in 2004-2007 (mini and midi-jobs and other
employment) by their labor situation in 2002
Labor status 2002 Working age population (17-65) Prime age population (25-65)
ANY JOB MAIN JOB ANY JOB MAIN JOB
Mini-job Midi-job Other Mini-job Midi-job Other Mini-job Midi-job Other Mini-job Midi-job Other
Inactive 47% 31% 22% 46% 31% 24% 44% 31% 24% 44% 31% 25%
Student 28% 48% 24% 27% 47% 27% 24% 24% 52% 19% 24% 57%
Unemployed 36% 32% 32% 36% 31% 33% 36% 31% 32% 36% 30% 34%
Irregular employment 41% 39% 20% 40% 36% 24% 40% 26% 34% 40% 22% 38%
Working PT 24% 37% 39% 21% 35% 44% 23% 34% 43% 19% 32% 48%
Working FT 13% 12% 76% 7% 9% 84% 11% 10% 79% 5% 7% 88%
Mini Job 54% 38% 8% 54% 36% 10% 58% 35% 8% 57% 34% 9%
Note: Balanced panel 2002-2007.
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2.B Selection into mini and midi-jobs
Table 2.B1: Probability of taking up a mini or midi-job as main job in 2004-2007 of working
age population (17-65)
VARIABLES All Non-working Working
Female 0.06*** 0.09* 0.04*
(0.021) (0.048) (0.023)
Age -0.00** -0.02*** 0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Immigrant -0.03 0.09 -0.07**
(0.027) (0.058) (0.030)
East -0.06*** -0.04 -0.08***
(0.022) (0.047) (0.025)
Single 0.02 0.03 -0.03
(0.025) (0.050) (0.030)
Children 0.04*** 0.03 0.03**
(0.011) (0.020) (0.013)
Head of HH 0.00 0.03 -0.00
(0.021) (0.047) (0.023)
Dual earner HH -0.01 -0.00 -0.06**
(0.026) (0.101) (0.029)
UB or Assist. 0.08** 0.11** 0.06
(0.031) (0.054) (0.040)
Public transfers to HH -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per capita annual HH income 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High School -0.00 0.05 -0.01
(0.026) (0.048) (0.031)
More than HS 0.07* 0.02 0.07
(0.039) (0.072) (0.046)
Working 0.29*** 0.15**
(0.029) (0.070)
New worker 0.07 0.27 0.07
(0.058) (0.219) (0.059)
Student before -0.07 -0.04
(0.097) (0.100)
Years of FT experience 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of PT experience 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Years of unemp. experience 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Weekly working hours -0.00* 0.01** -0.00***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Gross monthly labor earnings -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 7,084 1,336 5,747
Pseudo-R2 0.151 0.192 0.180
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Non-working and working populations refer to those who were in this situation in 2002, i.e. before
the reform.
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2.C Graphs of parallel trends for analysis by target groups
Figure 2.C1: Trends of outcome variables (residuals). Treatment: Female. Comparison:
Male
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Figure 2.C2: Trends of outcome variables (residuals). Treatment: 35 years old or younger.
Comparison: Older than 35
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Figure 2.C3: Trends of outcome variables (residuals). Treatment: Single with children.
Comparison: Rest
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Figure 2.C4: Trends of outcome variables (residuals). Treatment: Secondary worker. Com-
parison: Primary worker
−
1.
00
e−
09
−
5.
00
e−
100
5.
00
e−
10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Participation
−
5.
00
e−
100
5.
00
e−
10
1.
00
e−
09
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Employment
−
.
02
−
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Part−time
−
.
00
20
.
00
2.0
04.
00
6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Regular employment
−
.
03
−
.
02
−
.
01
0
.
01
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Regular PT
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Gross m. earn.
−
.
04−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Net m. earn.
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hours
−
.
05
0
.
05
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hr. wage
−
.
06−
.
04−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Job change
Comparison Treatment
140
Figure 2.C5: Trends of outcome variables (residuals). Treatment: Low education. Compar-
ison: High education
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2.D Sample size and balance tables. Matching strategy
Table 2.D1: Panel 2000-2007
Working age Working Non-working in 2002
Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc.
Mini-job 2004-2007 1,567 18% 626 14% 314 22%
Midi-job 2004-2007 1,326 15% 568 13% 209 15%
Rest 6,024 68% 3,324 74% 899 63%
Total 8,917 4,518 1,422
Mini-job 2004-2007 224 21% 72 33%
Midi-job 2004-2007 183 17% 38 17%
Rest 654 62% 109 50%
Matched (% of total) 1,061 23% 219 15%
Table 2.D2: Working population (17-65), 2002
Original sample Matched sample Matched weighted sample
Rest Mini/midi-job Diﬀ. Rest Mini/midi-job Diﬀ. Rest Mini/midi-job Diﬀ.
Female 0.398 0.664 -0.265∗∗∗ 0.444 0.576 -0.132∗∗∗ 0.576 0.576 -0.000
(0.490) (0.473) (0.016) (0.497) (0.495) (0.031) (0.494) (0.494) (0.000)
Age 40.619 39.678 0.941∗∗ 39.302 38.128 1.174∗ 38.147 38.128 0.019
(8.962) (10.370) (0.317) (9.144) (9.914) (0.597) (9.986) (9.904) (0.001)
Immigrant 0.116 0.124 -0.008 0.020 0.030 -0.010 0.030 0.030 -0.000
(0.320) (0.330) (0.011) (0.140) (0.170) (0.010) (0.169) (0.169) (0.000)
East 0.273 0.211 0.062∗∗∗ 0.346 0.286 0.060∗ 0.332 0.286 0.047
(0.446) (0.408) (0.015) (0.476) (0.452) (0.030) (0.471) (0.452) (1.974)
Single 0.223 0.250 -0.026 0.231 0.246 -0.015 0.253 0.246 0.007
(0.417) (0.433) (0.014) (0.422) (0.431) (0.027) (0.435) (0.431) (0.048)
Children 0.769 0.789 -0.020 0.606 0.665 -0.059 0.665 0.665 -0.000
(0.977) (0.947) (0.033) (0.771) (0.832) (0.050) (0.832) (0.831) (0.000)
Head of HH 0.616 0.477 0.139∗∗∗ 0.590 0.488 0.102∗∗ 0.511 0.488 0.023
(0.486) (0.500) (0.017) (0.492) (0.500) (0.031) (0.500) (0.500) (0.390)
Dual earner HH 0.627 0.668 -0.041∗ 0.677 0.675 0.002 0.691 0.675 0.016
(0.484) (0.471) (0.016) (0.468) (0.469) (0.030) (0.463) (0.469) (0.221)
UB or Assist. 0.035 0.065 -0.030∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005 -0.000 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(0.183) (0.246) (0.007) (0.068) (0.070) (0.004) (0.070) (0.070) (0.000)
Public transfers to HH 3991.765 4675.363 -683.598∗∗∗ 3590.228 3833.995 -243.767 3873.711 3833.995 39.715
(5036.312) (5900.921) (179.044) (4725.201) (5410.640) (315.942) (4973.423) (5404.976) (0.011)
Per capita annual HH income 14503.234 13163.261 1339.973∗∗∗ 13029.961 12889.230 140.730 12918.608 12889.230 29.377
(7351.921) (7030.933) (246.633) (4685.433) (5052.361) (305.221) (4893.245) (5047.072) (0.007)
Less than HS 0.093 0.154 -0.061∗∗∗ 0.018 0.032 -0.014 0.032 0.032 -0.000
(0.291) (0.362) (0.011) (0.134) (0.176) (0.010) (0.176) (0.176) (0.000)
High School 0.706 0.692 0.014 0.914 0.882 0.032 0.882 0.882 0.000
(0.456) (0.462) (0.016) (0.280) (0.323) (0.019) (0.323) (0.323) (0.000)
More than HS 0.201 0.154 0.047∗∗∗ 0.067 0.086 -0.019 0.086 0.086 -0.000
(0.401) (0.361) (0.013) (0.251) (0.281) (0.017) (0.281) (0.281) (0.000)
New worker 0.016 0.039 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.018 0.030 -0.011 0.036 0.030 0.006
(0.126) (0.194) (0.005) (0.134) (0.170) (0.009) (0.186) (0.169) (0.184)
Student before 0.003 0.008 -0.006∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.052) (0.092) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.)
Years of FT experience 16.508 11.850 4.658∗∗∗ 15.812 13.363 2.449∗∗∗ 13.314 13.363 -0.049
(9.862) (10.304) (0.339) (9.827) (10.332) (0.634) (10.202) (10.322) (0.004)
Years of PT experience 1.747 4.000 -2.253∗∗∗ 1.941 2.749 -0.808∗∗ 2.751 2.749 0.002
(4.196) (5.713) (0.158) (4.456) (4.928) (0.293) (5.253) (4.922) (0.000)
Years of unemp. experience 0.362 0.552 -0.189∗∗∗ 0.265 0.352 -0.087 0.317 0.352 -0.035
(0.921) (1.414) (0.036) (0.687) (0.928) (0.050) (0.693) (0.927) (0.333)
Weekly working hours 40.072 30.583 9.489∗∗∗ 39.323 34.399 4.924∗∗∗ 36.940 34.399 2.541∗∗
(9.355) (14.091) (0.366) (9.703) (13.340) (0.710) (10.813) (13.326) (7.944)
Gross monthly labor earnings 2445.386 1518.220 927.165∗∗∗ 1986.646 1719.183 267.463∗∗∗ 1799.656 1719.183 80.473
(1236.721) (1187.915) (41.533) (788.589) (1001.656) (55.388) (910.626) (1000.607) (1.263)
Note: Balanced panel 2000-2007. In parentheses, standard deviations in each group, standard error for the
diﬀerences between groups and F-statistics for the diﬀerence in the case of the matched weighted sample.
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Table 2.D3: Jobless population (17-65), 2002
Original sample Matched sample Matched weighted sample
Rest Mini/midi-job Diﬀ. Rest Mini/midi-job Diﬀ. Rest Mini/midi-job Diﬀ.
Female 0.718 0.775 -0.057∗ 0.784 0.734 0.050 0.734 0.734 0.000
(0.450) (0.418) (0.025) (0.413) (0.444) (0.061) (0.453) (0.433) (0.000)
Age 46.930 36.702 10.227∗∗∗ 36.059 34.011 2.048 34.086 34.011 0.075
(11.402) (10.260) (0.623) (11.224) (10.417) (1.550) (10.686) (10.150) (0.002)
Immigrant 0.181 0.180 0.001 0.098 0.085 0.013 0.085 0.085 -0.000
(0.385) (0.384) (0.022) (0.299) (0.281) (0.041) (0.286) (0.273) (0.000)
East 0.263 0.283 -0.021 0.265 0.266 -0.001 0.307 0.266 0.041
(0.440) (0.451) (0.025) (0.443) (0.444) (0.063) (0.473) (0.433) (0.329)
Single 0.200 0.295 -0.095∗∗∗ 0.343 0.362 -0.019 0.367 0.362 0.005
(0.400) (0.457) (0.024) (0.477) (0.483) (0.069) (0.494) (0.471) (0.005)
Children 0.669 1.184 -0.515∗∗∗ 1.020 1.138 -0.119 1.138 1.138 -0.000
(1.077) (1.124) (0.062) (1.169) (1.170) (0.167) (1.193) (1.140) (0.000)
Head of HH 0.428 0.434 -0.005 0.235 0.319 -0.084 0.250 0.319 -0.069
(0.495) (0.496) (0.028) (0.426) (0.469) (0.064) (0.444) (0.457) (1.009)
Dual earner HH 0.027 0.056 -0.029∗∗ 0.127 0.117 0.010 0.159 0.117 0.042
(0.163) (0.230) (0.011) (0.335) (0.323) (0.047) (0.375) (0.315) (0.480)
UB or Assist. 0.244 0.322 -0.078∗∗ 0.088 0.106 -0.018 0.106 0.106 -0.000
(0.430) (0.468) (0.025) (0.285) (0.310) (0.043) (0.316) (0.302) (0.000)
Public transfers to HH 11531.869 9043.500 2488.369∗∗∗ 7704.892 7574.298 130.594 7719.830 7574.298 145.532
(9195.811) (6980.383) (479.699) (6555.543) (7143.280) (978.472) (6564.676) (6960.615) (0.021)
Per capita annual HH income 11024.918 8874.297 2150.622∗∗∗ 9397.878 8522.738 875.141 8787.246 8522.738 264.508
(6706.715) (4622.321) (342.388) (3567.812) (3601.007) (512.393) (3541.648) (3508.923) (0.262)
Less than HS 0.237 0.236 0.002 0.176 0.170 0.006 0.170 0.170 -0.000
(0.426) (0.425) (0.024) (0.383) (0.378) (0.054) (0.385) (0.368) (0.000)
High School 0.645 0.645 0.001 0.794 0.798 -0.004 0.798 0.798 0.000
(0.479) (0.479) (0.027) (0.406) (0.404) (0.058) (0.412) (0.393) (0.000)
More than HS 0.117 0.120 -0.003 0.029 0.032 -0.003 0.032 0.032 -0.000
(0.322) (0.325) (0.018) (0.170) (0.177) (0.025) (0.180) (0.172) (0.000)
New worker 0.001 0.025 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.000 0.011 -0.011 0.000 0.011 -0.011
(0.034) (0.156) (0.005) (0.000) (0.103) (0.010) (0.000) (0.101) (1.006)
Student before 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.045) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.)
Years of FT experience 13.333 8.444 4.889∗∗∗ 5.272 4.738 0.533 5.233 4.738 0.495
(11.867) (8.969) (0.618) (6.879) (6.351) (0.948) (7.236) (6.188) (0.236)
Years of PT experience 2.185 1.428 0.757∗∗ 1.336 1.429 -0.092 0.802 1.429 -0.627
(4.848) (3.259) (0.246) (3.322) (4.012) (0.525) (2.404) (3.909) (1.908)
Years of unemp. experience 1.789 1.767 0.022 0.757 1.071 -0.314 0.828 1.071 -0.243
(2.891) (2.741) (0.161) (1.715) (2.239) (0.284) (1.819) (2.182) (0.659)
Weekly working hours 3.692 6.737 -3.045∗∗∗ 1.601 3.811 -2.211∗ 1.980 3.811 -1.831
(7.568) (9.280) (0.465) (5.005) (7.823) (0.931) (5.988) (7.623) (2.817)
Gross monthly labor earnings 171.733 241.933 -70.200∗∗ 54.948 73.851 -18.903 66.029 73.851 -7.822
(376.217) (378.960) (21.345) (154.590) (178.233) (23.783) (183.447) (173.675) (0.073)
Note: Balanced panel 2000-2007. In parentheses, standard deviations in each group, standard error for the
diﬀerences between groups and F-statistics for the diﬀerence in the case of the matched weighted sample.
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2.E Propensity score for matching
Figure 2.E1: Density of the probability of selection in the original sub-samples
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Note: Vertical lines correspond to the limits of predicted probability in the matched
sample.
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Figure 2.E2: Density of the probability of selection in the matched sub-samples
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2.F Evolution of outcomes. Matching strategy
Figure 2.F1: Evolution of the outcomes
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2.G Heterogeneity of eﬀects. Matched sample
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Table 2.G1: Heterogeneity of eﬀects of holding mini and midi-jobs. Panel 2000-2007
VARIABLES Net monthly earnings (ln) Weekly hours worked (ln) Net hourly wage (ln) Prob. of regular job
Mini-job -0.10* -0.13*** 0.02
(0.056) (0.045) (0.040)
Midi-job -0.05 0.02 -0.05
(0.058) (0.073) (0.078)
Mini-job*MJ before 0.22** 0.14 -0.19**
(0.101) (0.269) (0.083)
Midi-job*MJ before 0.22 0.20* 0.01
(0.162) (0.119) (0.132)
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.04
Mini-job -0.15** -0.14* -0.03
(0.073) (0.074) (0.045)
Midi-job 0.02 0.12 -0.11
(0.106) (0.111) (0.091)
Mini-job*Female 0.13 0.06 0.03
(0.095) (0.103) (0.073)
Midi-job*Female -0.07 -0.11 0.06
(0.119) (0.136) (0.122)
Mini-job, lag 0.11
(0.124)
Midi-job, lag 0.19**
(0.083)
Mini-job, lag*Female -0.07
(0.140)
Midi-job, lag*Female -0.28***
(0.106)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.30
Mini-job -0.16** -0.17** -0.05
(0.063) (0.074) (0.045)
Midi-job 0.01 -0.03 0.02
(0.063) (0.072) (0.094)
Mini-job*Under35 0.23** 0.17* 0.12
(0.091) (0.094) (0.079)
Midi-job*Under35 -0.07 0.20 -0.18
(0.107) (0.124) (0.122)
Mini-job, lag 0.08
(0.108)
Midi-job, lag -0.11
(0.148)
Mini-job, lag*Under35 -0.01
(0.125)
Midi-job, lag*Under35 0.19
(0.165)
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.30
Mini-job -0.11** -0.12* -0.04
(0.053) (0.067) (0.043)
Midi-job 0.00 0.06 -0.05
(0.056) (0.077) (0.078)
Mini-job*East 0.18* 0.10 0.14
(0.102) (0.082) (0.091)
Midi-job*East -0.10 -0.09 -0.00
(0.146) (0.128) (0.134)
Mini-job, lag 0.07
(0.068)
Midi-job, lag 0.12
(0.090)
Mini-job, lag*East -0.01
(0.080)
Midi-job, lag*East -0.23**
(0.113)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.30
Observations 7,018 7,223 7,001 1,310
Number of indiv. 1,039 1,039 1,039 205
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.G2: Heterogeneity of eﬀects of holding mini and midi-jobs. Panel 2000-2007
VARIABLES Net monthly earnings (ln) Weekly hours worked (ln) Net hourly wage (ln) Prob. of regular job
Mini-job -0.06 -0.13** 0.02
(0.050) (0.055) (0.036)
Midi-job -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.057) (0.065) (0.071)
Mini-job*Single w. child. -0.07 0.49** -0.45***
(0.216) (0.198) (0.149)
Midi-job*Single w. child. 0.05 0.36* -0.23**
(0.164) (0.187) (0.103)
Mini-job, lag 0.06
(0.057)
Midi-job, lag 0.08
(0.083)
Mini-job, lag*Single w. child. -0.03
(0.079)
Midi-job, lag*Single w. child. -0.14
(0.121)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.30
Mini-job, lag 0.03
(0.051)
Midi-job, lag 0.08
(0.073)
Mini-job, lag*Unemployed 0.30*
(0.182)
Midi-job, lag*Unemployed -0.54***
(0.139)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.30
Mini-job -0.07 -0.09 -0.02
(0.051) (0.058) (0.040)
Midi-job -0.04 -0.02 -0.05
(0.058) (0.063) (0.078)
Mini-job*Secondary -0.02 -0.11 0.11
(0.161) (0.148) (0.171)
Midi-job*Secondary 0.18 0.49*** -0.06
(0.107) (0.187) (0.146)
Mini-job, lag 0.10
(0.068)
Midi-job, lag 0.02
(0.091)
Mini-job, lag*Secondary -0.12
(0.100)
Midi-job, lag*Secondary 0.14
(0.160)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.30
Mini-job -0.19 -0.23 0.23
(0.334) (0.380) (0.199)
Midi-job 0.03 0.06 0.23
(0.635) (0.523) (0.158)
Mini-job*High-school 0.12 0.13 -0.27
(0.337) (0.385) (0.202)
Midi-job*High-school -0.04 -0.01 -0.27
(0.637) (0.528) (0.173)
Mini-job*More than HS 0.19 0.12 -0.12
(0.393) (0.388) (0.242)
Midi-job*More than HS -0.14 -0.02 -0.41**
(0.642) (0.525) (0.193)
Mini-job, lag -0.00
(0.051)
Midi-job, lag 0.11
(0.158)
Mini-job, lag*High-school 0.09
(0.077)
Midi-job, lag*High-school -0.06
(0.176)
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.30
Observations 7,018 7,223 7,001 1,310
Number of indiv. 1,039 1,039 1,039 205
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1149
2.H Evolution of outcomes. Intensity of treatment
Figure 2.H1: Evolution of the outcomes
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Chapter 3
Intergenerational correlation of
employment: Is there a role for work
culture?
joint with David Koll and Lukas Mayr
3.1 Introduction
The intergenerational correlation of labor market outcomes has been subject of interest
among both academics and policy makers for several decades. As a key determinant of
socio-economic mobility, the correlations of earnings between subsequent generations has
received particular attention. Correlations are typically estimated by regressing the earnings
of workers on those of their parents, limiting the sample to individuals and periods for which
earnings are observed, i.e. only observations corresponding to employment periods (see e.g.
the pioneering studies Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). This literature typically focuses
on the earnings of individuals, capturing skills, eﬀort and other dimensions of individual
merit once the person is in employment. The present paper focuses instead on a diﬀerent
type of intergenerational correlation: the correlation of the employment status between two
consecutive generations. We argue that it provides important information for understanding
intergenerational links in employment decisions, i.e. the extensive margin of labor supply.
This paper formalizes the intergenerational link of the decisions to work as a combination of
factors including productivity (human capital and ability), which is a key determinant of the
intergenerational transmission of earnings, and a residual correlation which we interpret as an
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intergenerational transmission of preferences for work. Intuitively, more able and educated
individuals tend to have stronger incentives to work due to better market wages. They also
have more resources to invest in their oﬀspring's education. Their successors will likely be
more able due to genetics, and be endowed with a higher human capital, increasing their
economic motivation to work. In this paper, we show that there is an additional element
generating a positive correlation of employment status across generations. Our evidence
suggests that this element may capture what we refer to as work culture, understood as the
transmission of preferences for work through social interactions across generations (Bisin and
Verdier, Palgrave 2008).
We build a theoretical framework of two generations inspired by Solon (1999) in which
parents are heterogeneous in productivity and disutility for work. Generations are linked
through correlated innate abilities and parental human capital investment for children. We
introduce endogenous labor supply decisions and intergenerational transmission of disutility
from work. The solution of the model yields an intergenerational equation of employment
status that relates labor supply of children and parents. After partialling out ability and
human capital, the remaining intergenerational correlation of employment status represents
transmission of preferences for work. The transmission of preferences plays a role that
goes beyond the human capital and ability mechanisms discussed in the literature on the
persistence of earnings.
We obtain evidence in support of this mechanism using data from the NLSY79 and NLSY79
Children and Young Adults and estimate the intergenerational equation derived from the
model. We focus on relationships between mothers and children. Since there is more variation
in female labor supply than in male labour supply, the focus on mothers is particularly
suitable in the context of this study. We construct a representative sample of mothers born
in the US between 1957 and 1964, and their children. Exploiting the longitudinal structure
of the data, we ﬁrst estimate the permanent component of employment status along the
life-cycle for both, mothers and children. This permanent component measures the fraction
of years the individual is employed during her active life. The information comprised in this
component is diﬀerent from the permanent component of earnings, which is only based on
periods of employment when earnings are eﬀectively observed. In our approach, we focus on
information on the labor supply decisions at the extensive margin.1
We ﬁnd robust support for a statistically signiﬁcant and positive correlation of employment
status. On average, an increase in lifetime employment of mothers by 5 years increases the
1Strictly speaking, labor supply corresponds to labor force participation, including both employment
and unemployment. However, we do not include unemployment mainly due to the lack of information for
the children's cohort. Furthermore, the empirical distinction between unemployment and inactivity is not
clear cut.
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employment of her child by more than 1 year. After netting out the eﬀect via productivity
and other observable factors, the incremental employment for children is two thirds of a
year. The residual correlation after partialling out potential labor and non-labor income is
consistent with a preference transmission mechanism according to the model.
To rule out alternative explanations for this residual correlation, such as the eﬀect of net-
works, speciﬁc human capital or local labor markets, we look at heterogeneity in the inter-
generational correlation of employment across mothers-children pairs that share businesses,
occupations or local labor markets. The lack of diﬀerence across groups indicates these
explanations are unlikely to drive the intergenerational correlation of employment status.
In general, results seem to suggest an intergenerational transmission of work preferences
that operates through the parental employment behavior or role model. There is a stronger
correlation of employment status between mothers and daughters than between mothers and
sons. This diﬀerence advocates in favor of a role model channel since role models tend to be
more pronounced within genders. The channel though appears to exceed a mere transmission
of gender roles as the correlation, though lower, is still signiﬁcant between mothers and sons.
Importantly, the correlation is higher for the lower tail of the income distribution, a relevant
feature for policy design. We also show that the correlation of employment status is more
pronounced during periods in which mothers cohabit with their children. Cohabitation
increases the possibility of emulation.
The intergenerational transmission of preferences for work bears important implications for
the dynamic eﬀects of economic and social policies that aﬀect labor market participation.
The design of programs such as income support and in-work beneﬁts earnings supplements
for low income workers that aﬀect the labor participation decision of the current generation,
should take into account the eﬀects on future generations via changes in preferences for work.
This is particularly relevant in the context of US. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
provides incentives for women to work as opposed to depend on welfare beneﬁts. Our paper
shows that women have the capability to act as role models by shaping the preferences for
work of their children. A fair calculation of the costs-beneﬁts of this particular policy for
instance should factor in the eﬀect on the generations to come.
Related literature
Most of the academic discussion around the intergenerational correlation of labor market
outcomes has revolved around the intergenerational persistence of earnings (for reviews see
Solon, 1999; Black and Devereux, 2011; Björklund and Jäntti, 2011) in an attempt to measure
socio-economic mobility. The most widely explored explanations for these intergenerational
correlations are correlated abilities and investment in human capital (see e.g. Bowles and
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Gintis, 2002).2 Early work has concentrated on measurement issues of earnings' persistence
(see e.g. the seminal studies Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992). By now, the existence of a sub-
stantial correlation of earnings has been documented as a robust fact for several countries.3
Intergenerational correlations of other labor market outcomes typically studied include hours
(see e.g. Toledo, 2010; Mulligan, 1997; Couch and Dunn, 1997) and occupations (Lo Bello
and Morchio, 2016; Knoll et al., 2017). Our paper contributes to the broad literature on
intergenerational correlations by providing evidence on a diﬀerent labor market outcome,
namely the employment status. We argue that this correlation, which remains signiﬁcantly
positive after controlling for the classical transmission channels of productivity, sheds light
on preferences for work via the extensive margin of the labor supply decision.
Several recent papers measure the intergenerational correlation of non-employment or unem-
ployment, an outcome closely related to employment status which is the focus of our paper.
These studies document positive and causal relationships between unemployment experi-
ences of fathers and children. See e.g. Macmillan (2011) with data for UK,4, Oureopoulos
et al. (2008) for Canada, and Mäder et al. (2015) for Germany. Although our ﬁndings are
consistent with this general result, our approach diﬀers in several dimensions. Contrary to
previous studies, we focus on maternal employment status, which helps to shed light on the
transmission of work culture. Since males typically have a lower elasticity of labor supply,
labor demand factors are likely to play a relatively larger role in the unemployment ex-
periences of men. Hence children with unemployed fathers are potentially aﬀected by the
psychological cost of job loss or stigma rather than the role model channel. Female labor
force participation is lower than male participation, suggesting that non-employment spells
of females might be more often the result of labor supply decisions. More generally, the fo-
cus on labor supply allows to interpret the correlation in employment status as informative
about the transmission of preferences for work.
Another related labor market outcome that has been studied in the existing literature of in-
tergenerational transmission is welfare reception. Dahl et al. (2014) show a positive eﬀect of
parents' disability insurance reception on children's claim for the same beneﬁt in Norway by
2There is a vast literature on the intergenerational correlations of ability and education. See e.g. Black
et al. (2009); Anger and Heineck (2010); Björklund et al. (2010); Grönquvist et al. (2017) for ability; Hertz
et al. (2008); Heineck and Ripahn (2009); Pronzato (2012) for education. Other channels of intergenerational
persistence of earnings include wealth transfers and the family background (Black and Devereux, 2011).
3For the US, the intergenerational elasticity of earnings is estimated around 0.5 (Corak, 2016). Using
tax records, Mazumder (2005) computes an intergenerational elasticity of 0.6 or higher, and more recently
Chetty et al. (2014) provide an estimation of 0.45 (0.34 when using rank-rank regressions), with substantial
heterogeneity across geographical areas. Davis and Mazumder (2017) and Blanden et al. (2013) show that
the intergenerational mobility declined during the last half century, both in US and UK.
4Lo Bello and Morchio (2014) provide evidence of positive correlation between employed fathers and
job ﬁnding probabilities for sons for UK. The correlation is stronger for those pairs that share the same
occupation. They interpret this ﬁnding as informational advantages of sons in the labor market.
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exploiting random assignment to judges of appeals after rejection. Exploiting a reduction in
the coverage of the disability insurance in 1993 in the Netherlands with an age discontinuity,
Dahl and Gielen (2018) document similar results. Hartley et al. (2017) report a substantial
eﬀect of maternal welfare receipts in the US on their daughters' welfare receipts, attenuated
by the mid-nineties' reform which was intended to reduce welfare dependence. Corak et al.
(2000) provide evidence of a positive correlation in unemployment insurance claims between
fathers and sons both in Canada and Sweden. Although the transmission of preferences for
work is an alternative explanation for these results, they can also be attributed to other fac-
tors such as the transmission of stigma or information about welfare beneﬁts.5 Furthermore,
welfare dependence is not one-to-one related to non-employment. A jobless individual may
receive other sources of non-labor income for her support, such as family transfers.
Another connected strand of literature studies the transmission of cultural traits or prefer-
ences across generations. Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) document that
the labor force participation of second generation migrant women in the US is related to
the female labor force participation in the country of origin of their mothers. She interprets
these results as evidence of a causal eﬀect of culture, as second generation migrant women are
exposed to the same economic environment but diﬀer in the culture of ancestry. Fernandez
(2013) proposes intergenerational learning about the returns to female work as one of the
factors driving the pronounced growth in female labor force participation during the second
half of the 20th century. She shows that a model in which the current generation learns
about the return to working from the average of the previous generation describes well the
empirical evolution of the female labor force participation. In a related work, Olivetti et al.
(2016) exploit the availability of both intergenerational links and information on peers in
adolescence in a data-set for the US to show that women gender norms or work behavior
is shaped during adolescence by observing both their mother and their friends' mothers.6
While these papers also consider the transmission of preferences for work across generations,
the level at which preferences are formed are diﬀerent. Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez and
Fogli (2009) deal with social preferences, from the country of origin or the average within
one cohort, and Olivetti et al. (2016) do not limit attention to mother-child interactions but
include also the interaction of children with mothers of peers. Our paper instead investigates
speciﬁcally individual preferences that are transmitted from a mother to her oﬀspring. As
yet another diﬀerence, these papers focus on the formation of gender roles by intergenera-
5Dahl et al. (2014) document important peer eﬀects within the work place and the family magnifying
social programs' participation, which favors the interpretation of the transmission of information underlying
the persistence of welfare dependence.
6Olivetti et al. (2016) analyze correlations in hours worked either in the current or the most recent
job, focusing explicitly on the intensive margin of the labor supply decision. In our paper we are instead
interested in the extensive margin.
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tional interactions, whereas our paper instead ﬁnds that the maternal employment status is
important both for sons and daughters, even after controlling for the inﬂuence of paternal
status. We thus study children's imitation of their parents' working behavior.7
The studies most closely related to ours are those which infer the presence of transmission
of preferences for work from observed labor market outcomes. Toledo (2010) proposes the
transmission of preferences for work as an explanation for the intergenerational correlation
of working hours. He documents a non-negligible correlation using PSID data,8 and in-
corporates this and other intergenerational correlations into a model of intergenerational
transmission of leisure preferences, human capital and wealth. Altonji and Dunn (2000) use
a similar structural approach to uncover correlations in preferences for work. They estimate
a model of earnings determination which decomposes the correlation in observed labor mar-
ket outcomes in factors related to wages and factors related to preferences. The estimation of
the model uses data from the NLS for US. Both Toledo (2010) and Altonji and Dunn (2000)
ﬁnd that transmission of preferences for work are the main drivers of intergenerational cor-
relations in hours worked while the intergenerational persistence of workers' productivity or
wages are the main determinants of the earnings correlations. The main diﬀerence to our
paper is that these studies focus on preferences for hours worked, i.e. the intensive margin of
the labor supply. We are interested instead in the participation decision, i.e. the extensive
margin of labor supply, and therefore focus on employment status rather than hours worked.
Moreover, we introduce a direct measurement of ability and human capital to capture po-
tential wages, whereas these studies proxy potential wages with observed wages that are
endogenous to the labor supply decision. Furthermore, we provide a discussion of the role
model channel underlying the preference transmission given its relevance for tax and transfer
policies.
Addressing the role model channel behind the preference transmission, Mulligan (1997) dis-
cusses the presence of work ethic in the US by measuring correlations in unemployment
duration, hours, and welfare participation using the PSID. We follow a similar empirical
approach in this paper. The main diﬀerence is that our study focuses on mother-children
pairs, as maternal employment is more likely to be inﬂuenced by supply-side factors than
paternal employment. Moreover, we do not rely on measures of wage and income to model
the human capital and unobserved ability channels. Instead, we control directly for these
7Other work dealing with preference transmission is Baron et al. (2009), which correlates declared views
and perceptions about welfare beneﬁts and eﬀort in Australia, used as proxies for youth's and mothers' latent
attitudes. Although ﬁndings are in line with the results in this paper (children seem to favor work culture
when mothers work), we consider reported perceptions are not reliable as they often correspond more closely
to perceptions about correct answers rather than actual beliefs or behaviors.
8Point estimations are similar to the values found here with respect to employment status, however in
Toledo (2010) they are imprecise and not statistically signiﬁcant.
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factors taking advantage of our richer data-set.9 Mulligan (1997)'s evidence for an inter-
generational persistence in work attitudes and role model explanation is consistent with our
ﬁndings.
Finally, the preference transmission mechanism that is the focus of our paper is inspired
by the theoretical literature on the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. Bisin
and Verdier (2001) propose a model in which parents transmit preferences to children via
socialization decisions, i.e. contacts inside the family (vertical socialization) or with the
rest of the society (oblique socialization). Parents make a rational decision on the type
of socialization they provide to their children to induce desired preference traits. Doepke
and Zillibotti (2008) and Doepke and Zillibotti (2016) also consider preference transmissions
across generations. These studies focus on parents' deliberate actions to shape children's
preferences, either through speciﬁc socialization or investment decisions, or through other
types of paternalistic actions. Instead of studying how parents deliberately inﬂuence their
children's preferences, we study the (potentially) unintended transmission of preferences that
arises from the labor supply decisions of parents.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a simple model
and derive an equation of intergenerational transmission of employment status. Section 3
discusses the methodology and the data used to estimate the intergenerational correlation of
employment status. The estimates and discussion of alternative explanations are presented
in section 4. Section 5 provides additional evidence for a role model channel. Section 6
presents robustness checks, and section 7 concludes.
3.2 Model
In this section we build a simple two generations model based on the canonical framework
by Solon (1999). We introduce endogenous labor supply and a mechanism of transmission of
preferences for work. We use the model to derive an equation of intergenerational correlation
of labor participation, which we estimate in section 3.3.
9Our implementation diﬀers in some other minor aspects from Mulligan (1997). He uses the PSID,
which comprises a smaller sample with intergenerational linkages than the NLSY79. Furthermore, he uses
four year averages for fathers and children, with potential biases due to transitory ﬂuctuations and life-cycle
discrepancies across generations.
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3.2.1 The Environment
There is a continuum of families, each consisting of one parent and one child.10 Generations
are indexed by k ∈ {0, 1} for parents and children, respectively. Parents are altruistic but
discount their child's expected utility by a factor α ∈ [0, 1). They decide on consumption
c0, labor supply l0 and on human capital investment for their child H. Children also decide
on consumption c1 and labor supply l1, whereas they do not have an oﬀspring and hence do
not invest in human capital. Agents are heterogeneous in ability ek and disutility from labor
θk.11 Abilities are correlated across generations accounting for genetic inheritance.
The parents' optimization problem is given by
V0(θ0, e0, v0) = max
c0,l0,H
c1−σ0
1− σ − θ0
l1+χ0
1 + χ
+ αE0V1(θ1, w1)
s.t. c0 + pH = w0l0
log(w0) = log(e0) + v0
log(θ1) = κ0 − κ1 log(l0) + η1. (3.1)
We assume that utility is additively separable in consumption and labor. The parameter
σ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and χ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. Parents ﬁnance consumption c0 and investment in their child's
human capital H, a unit of which costs p, by labor earnings w0l0.12 The wage of the parent
is determined through ability e0 and a random term v0 which captures labor-market luck.
The last equation (3.1) is the process of intergenerational transmission of preferences for
work. Children's disutility from labor, θ1, (potentially) depends on the parental labor supply
decision l0, through a parameter κ1. A value of κ1 diﬀerent from 0 means that parents' labor
supply has an eﬀect on children's preferences for work. We do not impose any prior on the
direction of the eﬀect. If κ1 > 0, the more parents work, the less children dislike working,
and the opposite for κ1 < 0. If κ1 = 0, parental employment does not have any inﬂuence on
children's preferences for work. The parameter η1 is an idiosyncratic preference shock. It is
worth noting that we do not include a direct eﬀect of θ0 on θ1 in this formulation to be able
to derive a parsimonious inter-generational equation for employment status. We discuss the
10The exposition of the model uses the word parent for the sake of generality, but we use mothers in the
empirical implementation due to the higher variation in maternal labor supply.
11Whereas diﬀerences in productivity among children are captured explicitly by both e1 (ability) and H
(education), e0 represents for parents a combination of abilities and education, the latter not being modelled.
12Savings are not included in the model to ease the derivation of a parsimonious intergenerational equation.
Empirically, we control for wealth to mitigate concerns about this exclusion.
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implication of this assumption later.
Similarly, the child's optimization problem is given by
V1(θ1, w1) = max
c1,l1
c1−σ1
1− σ − θ1
l1+χ1
1 + χ
s.t. c1 = w1l1
log(w1) = log(e1) + ψ log(H) + v1
log(e1) = λ log(e0) + u1.
Children ﬁnance their consumption with labor earnings. Wages w1 of children depend on
their ability e1, on the acquired human capital H (which has a return ψ), and v1 which
captures labor-market luck. The last equation states that ability is partially inherited. To
be speciﬁc, parent's and child's ability are linked via an AR(1) process with persistence
λ ∈ (0, 1).
3.2.2 The Solution
In order to perform our empirical tests below, it suﬃces to solve the children's problem. To
be speciﬁc, we take parental decisions and realizations of shocks as given. The ﬁrst order
condition for labor supply l1 can then be written as
log(l1) = − 1
σ + χ
log(θ1) +
1− σ
σ + χ
log(w1).
We can substitute for log(θ1) and log(w1) and obtain the main equation of this paper,
log(l1) = α + β log(l0) + γ log(e0) + δ log(H) + . (3.2)
This inter-generational equation relates children's and parents' labor supply decision, par-
tialling out parents' ability and human capital investment. The coeﬃcients α, β, γ and δ,
which we will estimate in section 3.3, are functions of structural model parameters. Speciﬁ-
cally, the intercept α is given by
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α =
(1− σ)e¯− κ0
σ + χ
Our main coeﬃcient of interest
β =
κ1
σ + χ
,
captures the transmission of preferences across generations. It has the same sign as κ1, which
determines how parent's labor supply translates into children's attitude towards work.
The coeﬃcient on parental ability and human capital investment are given by, respectively,
γ =
1− σ
χ+ σ
λ
and
δ =
1− σ
χ+ σ
ψ.
Finally, the error term  depends on the structural shocks of the model,
 =
(1− σ)(u1 + v1)− η1
σ + χ
.
Equation (3.2) provides an empirical test for the presence of preference transmission. If β
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0, there is no transmission of preferences for work and all
the correlation in labor supply decisions is explained by productivity. If β is statistically
diﬀerent from 0, the model suggests a role for work culture or transmission of preferences
for work. The sign of β is informative about the type of transmission: β > 0 suggests child's
disutility from work decreases with parental labor supply, and the opposite for β < 0.
Understanding the source of intergenerational transmission of preferences for work is impor-
tant for policy implications. If there is a direct eﬀect of l0 on θ1, a policy that subsidizes work
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(e.g. an in-work beneﬁt) would aﬀect the following generation by reducing the disutility from
work and encouraging labor participation. If, on the other hand, β only captures the eﬀect
of pure intergenerational correlation of preferences, independent of the labor supply decision
of the current generation, such a policy would be ineﬀective in changing the preferences and
work behavior of future generations. While our model does not allow to disentangle the
source of intergenerational preference transmission, in the empirical exercise that follows we
provide suggestive evidence that there is a direct eﬀect of parents' labor supply on children's
preferences for work, i.e. a role model eﬀect.
Note that in the model l0 and l1 are continuous variables although we focus on the extensive
margin of labor supply. The reason is that l0 and l1 describe accumulated employment over
the whole life-cycle.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section we describe the data used and the empirical methodology. Furthermore, we
discuss the measurement challenges identiﬁed by the literature on intergenerational correla-
tions, and how the data helps to overcome these limitations.
3.3.1 Data
We use the NLSY79 and NLSY79 Children and Young Adults. The NLSY79 surveys a repre-
sentative sample of 12,686 individuals born in the US between 1957 and 1964. Respondents
are 14-22 years old in 1979 and are followed until 2012, when they are 47-56 years old. The
frequency is annual between 1979 and 1994, and biannual thereafter. The children of the
women in this cohort are followed on a biannual basis since 1986 by the NLSY79 Children
and Young Adults, and are linked to the original cohort by a unique identiﬁer provided by
the US Bureau of Census. As of 2012, more than 10,000 out of the 11,512 children born from
these mothers have been interviewed in at least one survey round. The fact that children
are linked to their mothers suits our objective of considering the extensive margin of the
labor supply decision since female labor supply is known to be more elastic than male labor
supply.
The NLSY79 consists of three sub-samples: (1) the cross-sectional sample (6,111 individuals)
is a representative sample of the US population in 1979, (2) the supplemental sample (5,295
individuals) over-samples disadvantaged groups (Hispanic or Latino, black and poor people),
and (3) the military sample (1,280 individuals) over-samples the population participating in
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the army. We only use the cross-sectional sample to avoid using stratiﬁcation weights. We
further restrict the observation window for employment status to mothers and children of
age 25-45 in order to maximize the length of the sample while keeping its representativeness
regarding lifetime experience.13 From the 3,040 women in the cross-sectional sample, we
obtain a ﬁnal sub-sample of 1,373 mothers paired to 2,339 children. Figure 3.31 provides an
example for a mother-child pair in the data.
Figure 3.31: Visualization of an exemplary mother-child pair
These data provide a measurement of ability, one important variable in equation (3.2). For
the 1979 cohort, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) is collected
around 1980, when mothers are between 15 and 23 years old. The scores correspond to the
Armed Force Qualiﬁcation Tests (AFQT), which is a composite of test results in arithmetic
reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension and numerical operations.14 Similar
measures of cognitive abilities are collected for the children cohort since 1986. In particular,
we use the latest measurement for each child of the Peabody Individual Achievement Test
(PIAT) for Math, considered the most appropriate measure of ability among the test-scores
available in the data for the younger cohort (Abott et al., 2013)).15
Table (3.31) provides descriptive statistics of the data. The last four columns refer to the
sample of mothers and their children, and the ﬁrst shows characteristics of the total sample
of women in the NLSY79 cohort for reference. All monetary values are deﬂated with the
Consumer Price Index with basis in 1980.
Mothers are observed an average of 14 waves, and children in 2.5 waves (distributions of
number of interviews are in Figure (3.B1) in the Appendix). Average age is 33 years old for
13The oldest child in 2012 is 38 years old.
14We use the version of the AFQT revised in 2006 to control for diﬀerences in cohorts within the NLSY79.
15It has been argued that these measures capture not only genetic ability, which is the variable included
in the model, but also some components of scholastic skills. As we are interested in the correlation of
employment after controlling for productivity derived both from ability and education, this does not aﬀect
our analysis.
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Table 3.31: Summary statistics for women and mother-children pairs in NLSY79
Women NLSY79 Mothers Children
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 32.9 1.67 33.2 1.01 27.3 1.58
Female 50% 0.500
White 80% 0.403 74% 0.440 73% 0.446
Black 13% 0.337 18% 0.382 19% 0.391
Migrant 5% 0.208 5% 0.209
Married/cohabiting 67% 0.469 77% 0.419 33% 0.471
Number of children 1.9 1.36 2.6 1.19 1.2 1.32
Northeast 18% 0.383 14% 0.343 12% 0.323
Northcentral 28% 0.451 30% 0.458 29% 0.456
South 37% 0.482 39% 0.489 42% 0.493
West 17% 0.377 17% 0.376 17% 0.376
Urban 80% 0.402 75% 0.433 70% 0.460
Father at home 56% 0.496
Maternal age at birth 21.7 3.39
Years of education 13.7 2.57 12.8 2.24 13.4 2.38
High school drop-out 7% 0.251 10% 0.303 12% 0.320
High school complete 40% 0.491 51% 0.500 36% 0.480
Incomplete college 25% 0.435 26% 0.438 28% 0.451
Complete college 28% 0.447 13% 0.339 24% 0.429
Employed 79% 0.272 73% 0.287 84% 0.323
Labor force participation 97% 0.077 81% 0.245
Hours/week* 37.8 8.31 36.4 8.81 39.6 11.02
Hourly wage* 8.1 8.23 6.7 9.91 6.3 4.00
Earnings* 12,886 9,076 9,750 6,737 13,316 9,812
Public sector* 10% 0.300 9% 0.289 4% 0.197
Private sector* 87% 0.341 86% 0.345 92% 0.270
Self employed* 3% 0.176 4% 0.199 2% 0.145
Family worker* 0% 0.051 0% 0.066 2% 0.129
Percentile cognitive test* 48.8 28.49 39.6 26.87 49.1 27.77
Age when test 18.0 4.04 18.3 4.20 11.6 4.63
Net worth* 55,894 95,917 43,064 81,629 9,551 31,248
Family income* 33,543 35,636 27,226 24,460 26,029 29,060
Family income (parents)* 31,449 60,082 20,348 30,208 28,918 39,911
Family income (own)* 33,203 35,886 27,190 24,512 19,495 17,348
Earnings spouse* 22,897 17,085 19,387 13,173 13,579 11,953
Number of interviews 13.2 3.05 14.1 1.90 2.5 1.22
Observations 3,040 1,373 2,339
Note: Cognitive tests are AFQT for parents and PIAT Math for children. *: only observations with
positive values
mothers and 27 years old for children.
The sample of mothers is representative of women with children by design. Potentially
due to the negative relationship between fertility and income, the sample of mothers is less
educated and in poorer households than the total sample of women in the NLSY79. Mothers
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are on average 22 years old when children in the sample are born, though the maternal age at
birth is quite disperse (see Figure (3.B2) in the Appendix). There is an over-representation
of younger children by construction, and observations about older children correspond to
younger mothers at the time of birth. These compositional features of the sample may partly
explain the lower proportion of children married or cohabiting, and the smaller family income
or net worth of children.16 Three fourth of the sample is white and the same proportion comes
from urban areas. As expected, children are slightly more educated than mothers.
The data provides answers to diﬀerent questions that allow to infer employment status. The
choice of the particular question for our analysis follows two criteria. First, we maximize
the homogeneity of the measurement for the sample of mothers and children. Second, we
consider consistency of the questions along the diﬀerent waves and minimize the item non-
response. We consider mothers as employed if they declare they worked for 10 or more
weeks in the year before the interview. We categorize children as employed if earnings in
the year before the interview were equivalent to two months or more at a minimum salary.17
These lower bounds for considering employment intend to exclude odd or itinerant jobs. The
employment rate is 73% for mothers and 84% for children (80% for daughters). Although
they seem high as compared to oﬃcial statistics of labor force participation, they are not
at odds with the annual window of observation we use. Oﬃcial statistics refer to one week
before the interview.
Employed mothers and children work on average 36 and 40 hours a week at an hourly wage
of $7 and $6, respectively. Earnings amount to $9,750 and $13,316 annually. Almost all
the sample of workers comes from the private sector. Net worth (assets minus debts) is
$43,064 for mothers and $9,551 for children, a diﬀerence potentially due to the composition
of the children's sample explained before, and because parents are mostly alive when children
are surveyed and hence there might not be bequests. Average family income is $27,226 for
mothers and $26,029 for children. The average percentile of maternal cognitive test scores is
40, and it is 49 for children. Mothers take the test when they are 18 years old and children
when they are 9.18
16The composition of the children's sample is also behind the atypical employment age proﬁle as shown in
the right panel of Figure (3.B3) in the Appendix. Employment rates decline and become more volatile with
age as older children are fewer and belong to younger mothers at birth. The empirical strategy accommodates
for this. Furthermore, the dip in the employment rate at the age of 35-36 for children reﬂects the 2008 crisis,
which aﬀected particularly younger cohorts.
17The lower bound for earnings corresponds to 20 hours a week (part-time), 9 weeks (2 months) and $2.5
the hour, hence $450. Results do not change qualitatively when we use other measures of employment, as
shown in section (3.6).
18More descriptives are in the Appendix, in Table (3.A1) and Figures (3.B4) and (3.B5).
164
3.3.2 Empirical strategy
We estimate the ﬁrst order condition for children's labor supply which we derived from the
model,
log(l1i) = α + β log(l0i) + γ log(e0i) + δ log(Hi) + i. (3.3)
Our coeﬃcient of interest β describes the intergenerational correlation of employment after
controlling for the transmission of earnings potential. Speciﬁcally, we control for the fact
that wages, a key determinant of the employment decision, are correlated across generations.
This correlation of wages is partially a result of (imperfect) intergenerational transmission of
inherent ability (such as IQ), partially due to the fact that higher earning parents can aﬀord
to invest more in the child's human capital. As is standard in the literature we use AFQT
scores to approximate ability e0, and we measure education H by the number of years the
child went to school.
Our measure for accumulated life-time employment is more involved. In particular, we
control for the variation of employment over life- and business-cycles. In our model each
generation lives only one period (corresponding to her whole life). Hence, these variations
are ruled out by construction. In the data, however, we observe that employment rates
vary considerably along the life- and business cycle.19 Formally, we separate the transitory
components due to life- and business-cycle from the permanent component by estimating
the model
lkit = lki +
2∑
n=1
pinkA
n
kit + λkt + υkit (3.4)
for both generations k ∈ {0, 1}. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the probability lkit of individual
i to be employed in year t is a function of a second order polynomial of her age Akit and a year
ﬁxed eﬀect λkt.20 The individual ﬁxed eﬀect from this regression lki represents the permanent
component of employment status.21 This permanent component can be understood as the
19For example, Figure 3.B3 in the Appendix shows that on average employment for mothers increases
until the age of 39, after which it remains approximately constant. By contrast, we do not observe similar
increases in children's employment over their life-cycle, which can be partially attributed to the fact that
most of these agents were in their early thirties at the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2008.
20We use a linear probability model as it is well known that the conditional expected value of the dependent
variable is similar when using this speciﬁcation than when using a more sophisticated non-linear model for
binary dependent variables.
21As ﬁxed eﬀects are both positive and negative, we add a constant a = 0.001+ |min(lki)| to the original
variable, in order to be able to take the natural logarithm.
165
proportion of lifetime each individual is in employment. Under the assumption that the
observations for each individual are representative of their life-cycle, this is a good measure
of the extensive margin of labor supply.22
3.3.3 Methodological challenges in the measurement of intergener-
ational correlations
The data we use feature desirable characteristics for coping with some estimation issues
identiﬁed in the literature on the intergenerational correlation of earnings. First, Zimmerman
(1992) and Solon (1992) show that early estimations based on single-year measures of parents'
and children's outcomes as proxies for lifetime or permanent components are subject to
substantial measurement error due to transitory deviations from the long-run means, and
yield attenuation bias as a consequence. This problem is particularly relevant for parental
outcomes, the explanatory variables in the intergenerational equations. Mazumder (2005)
estimates the proportion in which the bias can be reduced by increasing the number of
observations. This proportion is higher the less persistent is the process, but it is substantial
even when there is high persistency. The longitudinal nature of the NLSY79 allows to
use several observations for both generations, particularly in the case of mothers that are
observed during 14 periods on average in our sample (only 4% of the sample has fewer than
10 interviews).
Second, the lack of heterogeneity in the samples aggravates the measurement error (Solon,
1992, 1999).23 We use a representative sample of the US population in 1979, namely the cross-
sectional sub-sample of the NLSY79, which is several times bigger than cohorts formed from
the Survey Research Center (SRC) component, the analogous of the PSID typically employed
in empirical studies of intergenerational earnings' correlations (see e.g. Solon, 1992).
Finally, the literature warns about the life-cycle bias that arises when parents' and children's
observations are not representative of their lifetime outcomes due to non-stable trajectories
along the life (Haider and Solon, 2006; Grawe, 2006; Nybom and Stuhler, 2016, 2017). Mea-
surement error is not homogenous along the life-cycle, with higher noise for early and late
years (Mazumder, 2005). To mitigate this problem, the literature recommends using obser-
vations for ages between thirty and ﬁfty (Black and Devereux, 2011). Our sample restriction
22If the permanent component was computed by a simple average (controlling for age and year ﬁxed eﬀects)
and, for example, out of ten observed years an individual is employed in 5, the permanent component of
employment would be 0.5. This measure diﬀers substantially from the analogous corresponding to earnings,
which averages earnings for the 5 periods the individual is employed.
23The interaction between transitory ﬂuctuations and measurement error, and the homogeneity in the
sample is shown in Solon (1989).
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to individuals between 25 and 45 years old and the netting out of age eﬀects from the
permanent components are aimed at mitigating this bias.
3.4 Results
In this section we present our main results. We measure a signiﬁcant positive intergenera-
tional correlation of employment status. The correlation remains signiﬁcant after controlling
for all variables that are usually used in the literature to explain the intergenerational cor-
relation in earnings. According to our model, this is a consequence of the transmission of
work culture. We then put the correlation of employment status into perspective by com-
paring it to other intergenerational correlations in the literature. Further, we show that it
is the extensive margin of labor supply, rather than the intensive margin that drives our
result. Finally, we rule out potential other, alternative, explanations that would in principle
be consistent with this positive correlation.
3.4.1 Main Results
Table (3.41) shows the intergenerational correlations of employment status. Standard errors
are clustered at the mother level to account for possible auto-correlation in siblings' error
term. The ﬁrst column shows the unconditional correlation of employment status, which is
the coeﬃcient of the regression of log(l1i) on log(l0i) without controls. This correlation is
0.21 and statistically signiﬁcant: a child whose mother is employed one year longer, is on
average employed by around 11 weeks longer.
Speciﬁcation 1 shows the results of estimating equation (3.3) derived from the model. When
introducing ability of mothers and education of children, the correlation of employment
status decreases to 0.15 but remains statistically signiﬁcant. The mother's ability and the
child's education have predictive power and signs as suggested by the theoretical framework.
Through the lenses of the model, a positive correlation in employment status across gener-
ations conditional on education and ability is evidence of intergenerational transmission of
preferences for work.
In speciﬁcations 2 and 3 we evaluate whether this transmission mechanism remains once
we include other potentially relevant controls. In speciﬁcation 2, we estimate the following
equation resulting from substituting out e0 in equation (3.3):
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Table 3.41: Intergenerational correlations of employment status
VARIABLES Unconditional Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Employment (ln) Mother 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.13***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.034)
Ability (ln) Mother 0.07*** -0.01
(0.022) (0.021)
Ability (ln) Child 0.14*** 0.10***
(0.028) (0.032)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Mother 0.07
(0.069)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Child 0.62*** 0.52*** 0.24***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.090)
Net worth (ln) Mother -0.02
(0.025)
Net worth (ln) Child -0.06*
(0.032)
Number of children Mother 0.00
(0.013)
Number of children Child -0.06***
(0.013)
Control mother's age at birth NO NO NO YES
Observations 2,339 2,237 2,339 1,969
Adjusted R-squared 0.040 0.074 0.086 0.079
R-squared 0.041 0.075 0.087 0.091
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of children.
log(l1i) = α + β log(l0i) +
γ
λ
log(e1i) + δ log(H) + ˜i, (3.5)
where ˜i = i−ui/λ. Since the coeﬃcient on the child's ability of 0.14 is higher than that on
the mother's ability in speciﬁcation 1 (0.07) this is consistent with partial transmission of
ability, i.e. λ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, our model predicts that the coeﬃcient β should be unaﬀected.
Although it slightly increases from 0.15 to 0.16, this diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant,
nor is the diﬀerence between the estimated coeﬃcients of the years of schooling of children.
In Speciﬁcation 3, we further introduce a set of controls not included in the model but
potential confounders in this context: wealth measured by net worth (assets minus debts),
number of children of both generations, and dummies for the age of the mother at birth.
Wealth is intended to control for non-labor income and the number of children, for correlated
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fertility attitudes. We also introduce all the ability and human capital information for both
generations. The correlation of employment remains almost unchanged after these inclusions
(it slightly decreases to 0.13). The interpretation is that employment of a child whose mother
works 10% of her active life longer, increases by about 1.3% of his active life. Alternatively,
the employment of a child whose mother works one additional year, increases by about 7
weeks. Consistent with wealth eﬀects on labour supply, wealthier individuals work slightly
less, although the coeﬃcient of -0.06 is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level. Furthermore, as
expected, the number of (the child's) children aﬀects employment of the child negatively.
The coeﬃcient of -0.06 is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However, we want to emphasize that
also the results of speciﬁcation 3 are consistent with the model. In particular, there are
no signiﬁcant changes in the coeﬃcients on mother's employment β, child's ability γ/λ and
child's education δ. In terms of our the regression model (3.5), the eﬀects of children's net
worth and children on employment are captured by the error term ˜i. The assumption that
log(l0i), log(e1i) and log(H) are all uncorrelated with this error term can not be rejected.
These results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and to the inclusion of several control
variables, as shown in section 3.6. In the remainder of the paper, we use Speciﬁcation 3.
Putting the numbers into perspective. As discussed earlier, an extensive literature
documents a high persistence of earnings across generations. Recent examples are Chetty
et al. (2014) and Corak (2016), who estimate this correlation to be between 0.4 and 0.5 in
the United States.24 Earnings are the product of two components, wages or more broadly
earnings ability, and time devoted to labor, or more generally the willingness to work.
Most of the literature focuses on the ﬁrst component and intends to identify the channels
through which productivity is transmitted.
On the other hand, only a scarce literature focuses on the second component. A notable ex-
ample is Toledo (2010), who estimates the correlation of working hours, the intensive margin
of labor supply.25 Using PSID data, he ﬁnds that working hours feature an intergenerational
correlation of 0.21. This number is similar to what we ﬁnd using the NLSY.
Extensive vs. Intensive Margin of Labor Supply. However, the data suggests that
it is the extensive margin of labor supply rather than the intensive one, which drives the
transmission of preferences for work. This can be seen in Table (3.42), which compares the
correlation of employment status (ﬁrst two columns) and hours worked (last two columns)
with and without controls.26 The unconditional intergenerational correlations are not sig-
24Note that the samples over which the earnings correlation is estimated are diﬀerent, as only employment
spells are considered.
25Another example is Macmillan (2011), who estimates a correlation of worklessness in the UK of 0.1.
26We include the periods of non-employment with 0 hours worked.
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niﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. However, once we introduce the relevant controls, the
correlation in hours vanishes, while the one for employment status remains signiﬁcant at
0.13. Whereas productivity (proxied by AFQT test scores), education, wealth and other
observables explain completely the correlation in hours worked, they do not fully explain the
correlation in employment status.
Table 3.42: Intergenerational correlations in several employment margins
Employment Hours worked
Employment (ln) Mother 0.21*** 0.13***
(0.034) (0.034)
Weekly hours (ln) Mother 0.17*** 0.05
(0.031) (0.030)
Controls NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,339 1,969 2,433 2,034
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.07
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Fathers. It would be interesting to also observe the correlation between the employment
status of fathers with the one of their children. Unfortunately, the NLSY79 data are not
designed to match fathers to children as only 157 fathers of the children in our sample are
respondents.27 However, the data provides employment status of mothers' spouses, whom
in many cases are the children's fathers.
Table 3.43: Eﬀect of Spouses.
Children's Employment
Employment (ln) Spouse -0.01 -0.02 0.02
(0.032) (0.033) (0.050)
Employment (ln) Mother 0.14*** 0.14***
(0.040) (0.040)
Emp. Mother (ln) x ... 0.06*
... Emp. Spouse (0.034)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 2,086 2,086 2,086
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.08
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
27Furthermore, these 157 are not a representative sample. Table 3.A4 shows the results for the few fathers
present in the sample. There is a negative but not signiﬁcant correlation.
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The ﬁrst column of Table (3.43) represents the same regression as above, just that the
mother's employment status is replaced by their spouses' employment status. We observe
that spouses do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the children's labor supply. Furthermore, when we also
include the employment status of the mother (second column) the coeﬃcient on mother's
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the same regression without spouses. Finally, when we
also introduce an interaction term between mothers' and spouses' employment status (third
column), this coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level suggesting a magniﬁcation
eﬀect of the spouse's employment status. This maybe a result of assortative mating.28
Understanding whether the mother or the father drives the intergenerational link in employ-
ment status is important for the design of in-work beneﬁts that encourage labor participation.
For instance, the EITC in the US targets women.
3.4.2 Assessing alternative explanations
The residual intergenerational correlation of employment status, or work culture as we call
it, can be interpreted as transmission of preferences for work according to the theoretical
framework. However, it is also compatible with other explanations. In this section, we show
that these alternative interpretations are not likely to be driving the correlation.
Second, we explore the possibility that the intergenerational correlation of employment status
is driven by transmission of networks or speciﬁc human capital. It is possible that parents
help children to ﬁnd a job through their network. Alternatively, parents might transmit
speciﬁc human capital or preferences for occupations in which the job ﬁnding rate is higher.
The role of nepotism and preferences for occupations in the intergenerational correlation of
earnings has been documented in Corak and Piraino (2011) and Lo Bello and Morchio (2016).
The data do not support these explanations for employment status instead. Figure 3.41
shows that the correlation of employment status is not statistically diﬀerent when considering
same business or occupation, proxied by industry and sector, and industry and occupation
respectively. Moreover, the point estimate of the correlation is higher for the cases when
mother and child work in diﬀerent businesses or occupations. A similar picture emerges
when considering the spousal occupation (Figure 3.B6 in the Appendix).
Finally, possibly local conditions of the labor market induce a correlation. If mothers and
children live in a place where the labor market is more dynamic, it is more probable that
both generations have better chances of being employed, and the job ﬁnding probability
28Not all the mothers report having spouses in all the waves, nor they are the same spouse. The regressions
correspond to the triples spouse-mother-child for which there is a spouse reported. As we are excluding single
mothers, this sample is not representative.
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Figure 3.41: Intergenerational correlations of employment status by same and diﬀerent in-
dustry, sector and location
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. The industry, sector and occupation for each
individual correspond to the value observed in the maximum number of waves. We only use individuals for
which industry, sector and occupation have valid declaration.
could be lower if the labor market is more sclerotic. However, Figure (3.42) shows that
whether mother-child pairs live in the same region (location) or not does not aﬀect the
intergenerational correlation of employment signiﬁcantly. If anything, the point estimates
are higher for mother-child pairs who live in diﬀerent regions.
To sum up, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the persistence of employment
status between mothers and children documented in our paper is not likely to be driven by
assortative mating, networks, occupation-speciﬁc human capital or preferences and local
labor market conditions. Hence, the explanation proposed in the theoretical framework that
preferences for work are transmitted through generations seems the most promising.
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Figure 3.42: Intergenerational correlations of employment status by region and location
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. The region and location (combination of
region, SMSA and urban/rural) for each individual correspond to the value observed in the maximum
number of waves. We only use individuals for which region and location have valid declaration.
3.5 Preference versus role model channel
Although we already established that the intergenerational correlation of employment status
likely captures transmission of preferences for work from mothers to children, this transmis-
sion potentially includes both a direct preference transmission and a role model channel.
Figure (3.51) is a schematic presentation of this idea. The distinction between the channels
has important policy implications, as policies which provide incentives to work would have
intergenerational consequences more likely if there is a role model channel than if there is
only a direct preference transmission. In this Section, we present evidence discussing this
matter.
First, we present an heterogeneity analysis of the correlation of employment status. Esti-
mates are not precise and diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant because the number of
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Figure 3.51: Direct preference channel versus role model channel
observations within groups is reduced and of variable size. Interpretation is based on point
estimates in consequence, and refer to the statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences when it
is pertinent.
The left panel of Figure (3.52) shows that the correlation is stronger for mother-daughter
pairs than for mother-son pairs, but the later is still important (0.15 and 0.1 respectively).
This complements the ﬁndings in the literature of intergenerational correlations of earnings
that report lower associations between fathers and daughters than between fathers and sons
(see e.g. Chadwick and Solon, 2002). The stronger link for mothers and daughters in em-
ployment status seems to favor the explanation of a role model underlying the correlation of
employment status, as role models are intuitively more likely to be gender-speciﬁc. However,
the fact that the correlation with respect to sons is also present points importantly in the
direction of transmission of preferences for work and not only gender roles.
The right panel of Figure (3.52) shows a decreasing correlation of employment status for
higher birth order, although there is not statistical diﬀerence among the coeﬃcients. This
negative relationship with birth order leads to the hypothesis that the longer the time during
the active life spent by mothers with children, the stronger the transmission of preferences.
This is also suggesting that role models play a role for the intergenerational transmission of
preferences for work.
Figure (3.53) shows that the intergenerational correlation of employment status is slightly
lower (though not statistically diﬀerent) when both spouses cohabit with the children. We
interpret this as evidence that when two adults conform the reference group of children, this
mitigates the transmission of preferences for work from only the mother.
Furthermore, the intergenerational correlation of employment status is stronger when the
background of the mother is more disadvantaged. The left panel of Figure (3.54) shows
that the correlation coeﬃcient is higher for the ﬁrst three quintiles of family income, and
drops to close to zero for the top 40% in the income distribution. The right panel of Figure
(3.54) yields similar conclusions when considering the maternal education background. The
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Figure 3.52: Intergenerational correlation of employment status by gender (left) and birth
order (right)
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID.
intergenerational correlation is higher for mothers who did not complete high-school or only
completed this level, and it is close to zero for mothers with some or complete college. Em-
ployment status of parents is hence more important for the more disadvantaged households.
This is the case for both sons and daughters, as shown in Figure (3.B7) in the Appendix. This
result contrasts to the ﬁndings in Olivetti et al. (2016), who document stronger transmission
of (gender) roles for the top of the income distribution. We ﬁnd instead that transmission of
preferences for work is stronger at the bottom of the distribution. This discrepancy reinforces
our claim that the preference transmission we document is diﬀerent from gender roles.
The left panel of Figure (3.55) shows that the correlation coeﬃcient does not appear sub-
stantially diﬀerent by race. Although it is well known that there is a correlation between
race and economic disadvantage, the type of disadvantage involved in our results does not
seem associated to race.
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Figure 3.53: Intergenerational correlation of employment status by conjugal situation of the
mother (left) and by whether there is cohabitation of the father (right)
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. The conjugal situation of the mother and the
presence of the father are considered according to the category which is observed during the maximum
number of waves.
The right panel of Figure 3.55 suggests that children married or cohabiting denote employ-
ment status less correlated with their mother's than single ones. This is suggestive that joint
labor supply decisions may play a role and impose restrictions to individual decisions.
Ideally, the coeﬃcient βˆ would estimate the role model channel if we could control for the
mothers' preferences for work. Our data does not provide a good measure for this. Instead,
we propose a proxy for this variable: mothers' employment status when children do not live
with them. If the role model can only be transmitted when children observe their mothers,
we can arguably use the maternal employment history in periods without cohabitation as a
proxy for preferences for work, where there is no room for a role model. Work behavior in
periods of cohabitation then captures the role model channel. The main assumptions behind
this exercise are that the work behavior of an individual is a good proxy for her preferences
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Figure 3.54: Intergenerational correlation of employment status by mother's income (left)
and education (right)
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. Mother's position in the income distribution is
attributed according to the quintile observed during the maximum number of waves. The education level of
mothers is the maximum attained.
for work, and that the distribution of ages does not diﬀer substantially between periods of
cohabitation and non-cohabitation.
We split the mothers' observations in those in which she is living with the child and those in
which she is not, either before the child's birth or after the child leaves home. We estimate the
permanent component for mothers only using this period, and estimate the model introducing
this variable to control for mothers' preferences for work. Table (3.51) summarizes the results.
The ﬁrst column shows the baseline regression without the new variable in the sub-sample
for which we observe both cohabitation and not-cohabitation periods. The second column
presents the estimates only including the permanent component of mothers' employment
status for periods without cohabitation. The corresponding coeﬃcient (0.04, statistically
signiﬁcant) is signiﬁcantly lower than when considering all the periods (0.12). This suggests
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Figure 3.55: Intergenerational correlation of employment status by race (left) and conjugal
situation of the child (right)
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. The conjugal situation of the child is
considered according to the category which is observed during the maximum number of waves.
that preferences for work of mothers have an eﬀect on children's employment status, either
by themselves or through mothers' work behavior. The third column presents the results of
including both maternal employment status variables. The coeﬃcient corresponding to the
periods without cohabitation drops and becomes statistically insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient
of mothers' employment status is almost the same as without the additional variable, 0.10.
We interpret this result as evidence that the intergenerational correlation of employment
status is mainly driven by a role model.
Table (3.A5) in the Appendix shows a similar exercise, considering that grandmothers' em-
ployment status aﬀect the preferences for work of the mother (by either channel, role model or
direct preference transmission), and mothers are acting as role model on top of transmitting
their preferences directly. Conclusions are the same.
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Table 3.51: Intergenerational correlations of employment status, separating periods not co-
habitation
Baseline Pref. Pref.+Role model
Employment (ln) Mother 0.12*** 0.10**
(0.041) (0.044)
Emp. (ln) Mother child not at home 0.04** 0.01
(0.017) (0.017)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,123 1,123 1,123
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.09
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the permanent component of employment status
of the children. The observations corresponds to children for whom periods of both cohabitation and
non-cohabitation are observed. Cohabitation and non-cohabitation periods are classiﬁed for each child.
3.6 Robustness checks
In this section we show that the results are robust to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the variables
regarding employment status and to several speciﬁcations.
First, we repeat the estimation of the empirical model in the last column of Table (3.41)
changing the method for computing the permanent components. The ﬁrst two columns
of Table (3.61) show these results. In column 1, we estimate the model without taking
logs of the variables. In column 2, the permanent components are the simple average of
the employment status, without controls for life-cycle or business-cycle ﬂuctuations. The
correlation of employment is virtually the same as in our main estimation.
Second, we use two alternative measures of employment status, which are less comparable
across generations or available only for fewer periods. These results are presented in the
last two columns of Table (3.61). The ﬁrst deﬁnition uses mothers' answers to the CPS
(Current Population Survey) employment status question, which is not asked all the years.
For children, we observe if they declare to have any employer at the time of the survey.
For the second alternative, mothers and children are considered employed if they declare a
positive number of hours and earnings, during the past calendar year for mothers and the
currently for children. Results do not change.
Third, we estimate rank-rank regressions for average employment status of mothers and
children, as this is a common practice in the literature of intergenerational correlations.
We rank parents and children according to the proportion of employment periods, and we
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Table 3.61: Intergenerational correlations in employment: alternative deﬁnitions of the per-
manent component employment status
No logs Averages Altern. Emp. 1 Altern. Emp. 2
Employment Mother 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12**
(0.027) (0.053) (0.035) (0.054)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,969 1,969 1,969 1,996
Adjusted R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the employment status of children, and the
independent variable is the permanent component of employment status of the mother. The ﬁrst two
columns contain diﬀerent estimation strategies for the permanent components, referred to in the title of the
column. The last two columns correspond to natural logarithm of the permanent component using
variables in the survey diﬀerent from those used in the main estimation. The diﬀerent number of
observations across columns is a consequence of missing values.
compute percentile ranks. We estimate the intergenerational equation with all the controls
using percentile ranks instead of the logarithm of the permanent components of employment
status. Table (3.62) is the analogous of Table (3.41) for the rank-rank regressions. The
slope of the rank-rank regressions follows the same pattern previously documented: it de-
creases when controlling for observables and statistically signiﬁcant. The intergenerational
correlation of the percentile ranks once accounting for observables is around one half of the
unconditional correlation. Diﬀerences in the magnitudes of rank-rank and log-log slopes are
mainly explained by the linearity of the former and non-linearity of the latter (see Chetty
et al., 2014, for details on how the two measures diﬀer). Table (3.A6) in the Appendix shows
the transition matrix for employment status, which makes apparent the non-linearities in
the relationship.
Finally, we consider that additional controls to age and year ﬁxed eﬀects in the computation
of the permanent components. The reason is that the labor supply decision can be aﬀected by
demographic events, particularly in the case of women. By controlling for them we attempt
that our diﬀerences in employment status across individuals do not capture only disparities
in demographic events.
We slightly change the computation of the permanent components in the following way:
lkit = lki +
2∑
n=1
pinkA
n
kit + λkt +XDemo
′
kitς + υkit (3.6)
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Table 3.62: Rank-rank slopes for employment status
Unconditional Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Rank employment mother 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Ability (ln) Mother 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.00
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Ability (ln) Child 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.009) (0.009)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Mother 0.02 0.02
(0.018) (0.017)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Child 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.08***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Net worth (ln) Mother -0.01
(0.008)
Net worth (ln) Child -0.04***
(0.014)
Number of children Mother 0.00
(0.004)
Number of children Child -0.03***
(0.004)
Control for mother's age at birth NO NO NO YES
Observations 2,339 2,237 2,237 1,969
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.10
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the rank of children's average employment. The diﬀerent number of
observations across columns is a consequence of missing values in the variables introduced sequentially.
where XDemokit are controls for demographic events such as births, couple formation and
dissolution, job loss and ﬁnding by partner, presence of children 0-3 with/without child-
care, older children, moving out from parental home. Although these events are not entirely
exogenous with respect to the labor supply decision, the exercise shows (Table (3.63)) that
results are qualitatively the same, and coeﬃcients are higher in magnitude.
Other robustness checks not included to economize space are: controlling for education
levels instead of years of schooling, including interactions between ability, education and
wealth, using labor force participation instead of employment of mothers.29 Results of these
robustness checks are available upon request.
29Labor force participation is only available for mothers. There is no information about job search
activities of children during their jobless spells.
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Table 3.63: Intergenerational correlations of employment status netting out demographic
events from the permanent components
Unconditional Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Employment (ln) Mother 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.16***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Ability (ln) Mother 0.05*** 0.02 -0.01
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Ability (ln) Child 0.12*** 0.10***
(0.028) (0.029)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Mother 0.05 0.05
(0.050) (0.052)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Child 0.49*** 0.34*** 0.17**
(0.093) (0.097) (0.084)
Net worth (ln) Mother -0.02
(0.022)
Net worth (ln) Child -0.06**
(0.029)
Number of children Mother 0.01
(0.009)
Number of children Child -0.04***
(0.012)
Control mother's age at birth NO NO NO YES
Observations 2,245 2,153 2,153 1,877
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on intergenerational correlation of labor market
outcomes. Diﬀerently from the existing literature, we focus on employment status. We argue
that the correlation of employment status from mothers to children captures the persistence
of the labor supply decision at the extensive margin, and hence is a good candidate to shed
some light on the transmission of preferences for work.
In a simple model of intergenerational transmission, altruistic parents decide on their own
labor supply and human capital investment for their children, whose abilities are linked to
their parents'. We start from formulating the eﬀect of the parental labor supply on chil-
dren's preferences, and derive an intergenerational equation that links parents and children's
employment status. This equation is estimated using the NLSY79 and NLSY79 Children
and Youth Adults and allows to test the mechanism embedded in the model.
We ﬁrst document the existence of a signiﬁcant correlation in employment status, which is
a novel fact to the best of our knowledge. We observe that the correlation is statistically
and economically signiﬁcant after controlling for the channels suggested by the theoretical
framework and also those proposed as drivers of the intergenerational correlation of earnings,
importantly productivity (ability and human capital). This is consistent with our model and,
hence, we interpret it as evidence of intergenerational transmission of preferences for work.
Furthermore, we show that other candidate explanations, such as networks, transmission of
speciﬁc human capital or conditions within local labor markets are not likely driving the
correlation of employment status.
Heterogeneity in this correlation across groups suggests that a role model channel plays an
important part of the story. In particular, the correlation is stronger between mothers and
daughters than mothers and sons, which is reasonable as role models are likely to be gender
speciﬁc. However, employment of mothers and sons is still signiﬁcantly connected, suggesting
the transmission of preferences for work exceeds a gender role transmission. We also show
a stronger correlation when mothers are in direct contact with children by cohabitation, an
intuitive result if role models run through imitation of observed behaviors.
The transmission of preferences for work in general, and the presence of a role model channel
in particular, bear important policy implications. This is especially the case if these mech-
anisms are stronger at the bottom of the income distribution, where redistributive policies
aﬀect incentives to work. Tax and transfer policies should take into account the eﬀects not
only on current generations, but also on generations to come.
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3.A Tables
Table 3.A1: Summary statistics for women and mother-children pairs in NLSY79
Women NLSY79 Mothers Children
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Mother migrant 7% 0.252 5% 0.231
Father migrant 16% 0.370 14% 0.342
Second generation of migrants 18% 0.383 15% 0.354
Both parents migrants 5% 0.221 4% 0.203
Living with mother (when child) 98% 0.147
Living in own dwelling 92% 0.164 94% 0.119 74% 0.370
Partner works 64% 0.353 68% 0.345 51% 0.442
Children 0-3 not in child care 17% 0.192 20% 0.186 23% 0.339
Children 0-3 in child care 9% 0.137 9% 0.133 9% 0.215
Children 4-5 17% 0.147 23% 0.131 19% 0.283
Children 6-12 40% 0.282 61% 0.164 29% 0.392
Children 13-15 15% 0.147 26% 0.126 3% 0.108
Children 16-18 11% 0.121 20% 0.106 1% 0.048
Births 14% 0.139 14% 0.129 18% 0.278
Couple dissolution 4% 0.067 5% 0.062 7% 0.161
Couple formation 6% 0.081 4% 0.059 18% 0.281
Partner job loss 5% 0.064 5% 0.063 6% 0.155
Partner job ﬁnding 6% 0.079 5% 0.060 16% 0.270
Observations 3,040 1,373 2,339
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Table 3.A2: Estimation of intergenerational correlations: Other outcomes
Net worth Child Ability Child Yrs. schooling Child Num. children Child
Net worth Mother 0.19***
(0.033)
Ability Mother 0.40***
(0.023)
Yrs. schooling Mother 0.38***
(0.024)
Number of children Mother 0.20***
(0.029)
Observations 2,133 2,325 2,433 2,433
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.04
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of each outcome for the children cohort. Hours
and earnings are only considered for employed individuals. The diﬀerent number of observations across
columns is a consequence of missing values.
Table 3.A3: Intergenerational correlations of employment status: spouses-children
Spec. 1 Spec. 2
Employment (ln) Spouse -0.01 0.00
(0.032) (0.050)
Emp. Mother (ln) x Emp. Spouse (ln) 0.02
(0.031)
Controls YES YES
Observations 2,086 2,086
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the permanent component of employment status
of children. The diﬀerent number of observations across columns is a consequence of missing values.
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Table 3.A4: Intergenerational correlations of employment status: fathers-children
Unconditional Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Employment (ln) Father 0.00 -0.04** -0.01 -0.19
(0.043) (0.015) (0.023) (0.195)
Ability (ln) Father 0.00 -0.30 -0.25
(0.057) (0.220) (0.229)
Ability (ln) Child 0.14 -0.08
(0.116) (0.094)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Father 1.60 1.11
(1.145) (1.278)
Yrs. schooling (ln) Child 0.85 0.26 0.47
(0.527) (0.400) (0.433)
Net worth (ln) Father 0.18
(0.200)
Net worth (ln) Child -0.04
(0.041)
Control for mother's age at birth NO NO NO YES
Observations 157 141 141 131
Adjusted R-squared -0.01 0.03 0.12 0.00
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the permanent component of employment status
of children. The diﬀerent number of observations across columns is a consequence of missing values. Note:
The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status of the
children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. The industry, sector and occupation for each
individual correspond to the value observed in the maximum number of waves. We only use individuals for
which industry, sector and occupation have valid declaration.
Table 3.A5: Intergenerational correlations of employment status including grandmothers'
employment status
Baseline Pref. Pref.+Role model
Employment (ln) Mother 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.047) (0.047)
Emp. (ln) Grandmother 0.02 0.01
(0.016) (0.016)
Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,109 1,109 1,109
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.06
Standard errors clustered by mother ID in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the permanent component of employment status
of the children. The observations corresponds to children for whom periods of both cohabitation and
non-cohabitation are observed. Cohabitation and non-cohabitation periods are classiﬁed for each child.
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Table 3.A6: Transition matrix for average employment status
Employment Employment children
mother 0-0.25 0.25-0.50 0.5-0.75 0.75-1 Total
0-0.25 49 13 29 150 241
20% 5% 12% 62%
0.25-0.50 53 11 28 208 300
18% 4% 9% 69%
0.5-0.75 45 15 44 383 487
9% 3% 9% 79%
0.75-1 90 26 109 1,086 1,311
7% 2% 8% 83%
Total 237 65 210 1,827 2,339
Note: Number of observations and transition probabilities in percentages.
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3.B Figures
Figure 3.B1: Number of interviews of mothers (left) and children (right)
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Figure 3.B2: Age of mothers at birth
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Figure 3.B3: Employment-age proﬁles of mothers (left) and children (right)
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Figure 3.B4: Distributions
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Figure 3.B5: Distributions (cont.)
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Figure 3.B6: Intergenerational correlations of employment status by same and diﬀerent
occupation of spouse and either parent
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. The industry, sector and occupation for each
individual correspond to the value observed in the maximum number of waves. We only use individuals for
which spousal information (either having or not) and occupation of the spouse have valid declaration.
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Figure 3.B7: Intergenerational correlation of employment status by mother's income (left)
and education (right) for sons and daughters
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Note: The dependent variable is the permanent component of the natural logarithm of employment status
of the children. Standard errors are clustered by mother ID. Mother's position in the income distribution is
attributed according to the quintile observed during the maximum number of waves. The education level of
mothers is the maximum attained.
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